A close examination of women’s political participation in peace processes in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines.
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**Acknowledgements**

The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) is deeply grateful to the Ford Foundation for making this study possible. In addition, the authors of this report would like to thank the following individuals and organizations for their advice and support: Mara D’Amico, Ashley Binetti, Hannah Beswick, Ségolène Dufour-Gennason, Kelsey Larsen, Ryan Nichols, Erica Vásquez, Anna Newby, Annabelle Timsit, Helen Moser, Amanda Jessen, Sarah Radomsky, Anna Applebaum, Maya Harris, LaShawn Jefferson, Lorna McCaugherty, Amanda Majisu, Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Violeta Ramírez, Claudia Paz y Paz, Kristin Haffert, The Institute for Inclusive Security, and The National Democratic Institute. The authors would also like to express their profound gratitude to Robert Egnell, Anne Marie Goetz, and Jamille Bigio for serving as external reviewers of this report.
WOMEN LEADING PEACE

A close examination of women’s political participation in peace processes in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines

Published by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security

Funded by the Ford Foundation
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FOREWORD

As we mark the fifteenth anniversary of the adoption of historic UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which affirmed the representation and participation of women in building peace and enhancing security, as well as the protection of women from the severe impacts of violent conflict, it is important to reflect on the progress made and the challenges that remain. One critical element of the 1325 framework is women’s political participation in peacebuilding. This study was undertaken to investigate the link between women’s political participation in peace processes and the outcomes of negotiations.

Women around the globe continue to face significant cultural, institutional, and structural barriers to meaningful political participation. In countries mired in conflict or undergoing major political transformations, the obstacles are even greater. When women’s perspectives and potential contributions are left untapped, not only are their voices silenced, but so too are their societies shortchanged, especially in pursuing sustained peace and prosperity. Although women’s leadership and contributions tend to be written out of history, especially on peacebuilding, there are countless examples of women in civil society who have organized and mobilized in the pursuit of peace. While they rarely hold a seat at the formal peace table, their engagement is persistent and profound.

This study, made possible through the generosity of the Ford Foundation, was conducted between 2013 and 2015 and provides an historical record of how women influenced peace processes in four distinct cases. In addition to providing a thorough literature review, this report draws upon extensive fieldwork in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines. Rich and insightful interviews with women and men from civil society organizations (CSOs), government institutions, rebel or opposition groups, and subject matter experts provide the basis for many of the findings in this report, which is a unique resource for those interested in learning about how women accessed formal peace processes in these four countries and how they shaped and influenced the progress of negotiations and the content of resulting peace agreements. A rigorous research methodology, combined with extensive mapping of stakeholders in each country, enabled the authors of this report to engage directly with dozens of women peacebuilders and to learn first-hand how they accomplished what they did, where their strategies and efforts fell short, and what they would advise others to do differently.

Policymakers and practitioners need a clearer understanding about the impact of women’s political participation in volatile political settings and conflict areas. At the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, we recognize that, in order to craft well-informed policies, data and analysis are critical to decision makers. One of our primary goals is to equip practitioners and policymakers with evidence-based research. At the same time, women peacebuilders – who are often on the frontlines of change but feel marginalized – need recognition, support, and access to best practices.

The lessons learned in each case study, as well as the overall conclusions, represent a seminal contribution to the knowledge base in the field of women, peace and security. We know from the findings of this report that women can, do, and continue to make important contributions to the attainment of peace. Their goals and motivations may vary, as do their approaches and tactics, but their agency is universal. What women do with their agency and whether they are able to chart a course through myriad obstacles ultimately determines the kind of difference they make in moving societies from conflict to peace.

Ambassador Melanne Verveer
Executive Director
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security
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ACRONYMS

AFP – Armed Forces of the Philippines
AfriCog – Africa Centre for Open Governance
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASC – Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil, Civil Society Assembly
AU – African Union
BBL – Bangsamoro Basic Law
BMLO – Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization
CACIF – Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations
CCP – Concerned Citizens for Peace
CDM – Centre for Multiparty Democracy
CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CNR – National Reconciliation Commission
CODE-NGO – Caucus of Development NGOs
CONAVIGUA – Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala, National Coordinating Committee of Guatemalan Widows
COPMAGUA – La Coordinación de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala, Coordination of Maya Peoples’ Organizations of Guatemala
CREAW – Center for Rights Education and Awareness
CSO – Civil Society Organization
CUC – Comité de Unidad Campesina, Peasant Unity Committee
DUP – Democratic Unionist Party
EU – European Union
FIDA – The Federation of Women Lawyers – Kenya
FUNDADESE – Fundación para el Desarrollo Educativo, Social, y Económico, Foundation for Educational, Social and Economic Development
GAM – Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo, Mutual Support Group
GGM – Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres, Guatemalan Women’s Group
GNWP – Global Network of Women Peacebuilders
GRUFEPROMEFAM – Grupo Feminino Pro-Mejoramiento de la Familia, Women’s Group for Family Improvement
IRA – Irish Republican Army
KAM – Kenya Association of Manufacturers

1 Used here to refer collectively to both the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Official Irish Republican Army.
ACRONYMS continued

KANU – Kenya African National Union
KEPSA – Kenya Private Sector Alliance
KPTJ – Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice
MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIM – Mindanao Independence Movement
MINCODE – Mindanao Coalition of Development NGO Networks
MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
NARC – National Rainbow Coalition
NCSC – National Civil Society Congress
NCWP – National Council of Women in the Philippines
NICRA – Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
NIWC – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
NPI – Nairobi Peace Initiative
ODM – Orange Democratic Movement
OPAPP – Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process
PCID – Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy
PNU – Party of National Unity
PUP – Progressive Unionist Party
RUC – Royal Ulster Constabulary
SDLP – Social Democratic and Labour Party
SPCPD – Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development
UDA – Ulster Defence Association
UDP – Ulster Democratic Party
UFF – Ulster Freedom Fighters
UN – United Nations
UNSCR 1325 – United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325
URNG – *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca*, Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity
UUP – Ulster Unionist Party
UVF – Ulster Volunteer Force
WAGI – Women and Gender Institute
WCG – Women’s Consultation Group
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Women historically have been, and remain, marginalized from the highest echelons of political power. As a result, their experiences, perspectives, leadership, and potential are untapped in governance. In international peacemaking, women are grossly underrepresented, especially in high-level processes. There are growing calls – by both international policymakers and feminists – to do more to include and uplift women in peace and security efforts, as originally directed in UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Today, this is increasingly framed as not only the “right” thing to do, but also the “smart” thing to do. But what does this mean? And what can we learn from women who have mobilized and engaged in peacemaking already?

This study examines women’s political participation in peace negotiations, focusing on four cases where women have gained access to high-level official negotiations. Each case study – Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines – is framed by eight overarching research questions: Why did women mobilize for peace? How did women mobilize and organize to gain access to high-level peace negotiations? How did they form coalitions and alliances? How did they assemble and shape agendas? How did they set priorities for their activities? How did their priorities change when they participated in high-level peace negotiations? How did they negotiate their goals? And, to what extent were their objectives or priorities represented in the resulting peace agreement?

As a departure from publications of a similar nature, this study offers a comprehensive, systematic literature review and a series of new findings on women participating in high-level peace processes in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines based on a political economy approach. It analyzes nearly 100 in-depth, face-to-face interviews collected in-country with diverse women in civil society, and applies a rigorous two-stage coding method to examine emergent themes. All data are triangulated against existing secondary literature and primary source documents to improve the reliability and validity of results.

Although this is not a cross-comparative study, there are interesting commonalities in women’s experiences that are decipherable. For example, in each case, women were primarily motivated by a desire to end violent conflict, and they seized opportunities that emerged within the process to play more prominent political roles in the formal negotiations. Women drew upon their personal connections and leveraged their interpersonal and professional skills, as well as their political capabilities, to advance their goals. In Northern Ireland and Kenya, for example, women drew on pre-existing and new networks, which proved vital to mobilization. In Guatemala and the Philippines, women forged strategic alliances and relentlessly lobbied at multiple levels in order to negotiate their goals. At the same time, in each case, external actors – within and outside of the country in question – influenced women’s mobilization.

Despite the similarities between the four cases, there are also many important distinctions in how women negotiated their goals, shaped agendas, formulated proposals, and influenced the content of peace agreements. In Northern Ireland, the NIWC established a precedent for political participation and engaged in women’s collective political consciousness-raising. In Guatemala, provisions inserted in the final agreement tracked back to the Women’s Sector’s agenda, but overall the language on gender lacked the strength and depth the Women’s Sector desired. In Kenya, women in CSOs held mixed sentiments about their degree of influence on the process, but generally felt the mediation agenda reflected the issues for which they lobbied. In the Philippines, the dual effects of women officially embedded in the peace talks and external pressure from civil society women’s networks influenced the language, agenda, and format of the power-sharing agreement.

The differences of women’s experiences, resulting from unique conditions in each case, reinforce the understanding that women are not a monolithic demographic anywhere. Rather, race, religion, ethnicity, economic status, cultural background, and other characteristics shape their identities, perspectives, agendas, and lived experiences. This report describes and analyzes the specificity of women’s political participation in each country in detail, demonstrating the myriad ways in which women can and do engage in peacemaking, as well as the challenges they face and the limits of their participation.
Overall, this study provides a comprehensive understanding of not only why and how women in CSOs mobilized for peace, but also how they shaped negotiations and outcome documents within a specific context. More importantly, this study finds that how women in civil society gain access to high-level peace negotiations is contingent not only on the careful selection of tactics and strategies, but also on the dynamic relationships and iterative interactions between different parties (i.e., government officials, rebel organizations, key constituents), the opportunity structures that permit participation, and the socio-political context that shape the interactions. This report is a unique and a significant contribution not only because of its methodological rigor, but also because it brings the voices of different women peacemakers to the fore, highlighting their perceptions, reflections, and lessons-learned. In doing so, the findings here describe how women’s participation affects negotiations and their outcomes.

Having a woman at the formal negotiation table does not guarantee that she will raise issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment, as demonstrated by Raquel Zelaya, who was a member of the Guatemalan government’s peace panel. At the same time, depending on which and how many women are at the table, it is possible that issues affecting women and their families may be taken more seriously, as was increasingly evident in the Philippines. Outside of the confines of official negotiations, women in civil society tend to seek transformative change in a way that conceptualizes peace beyond the cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of warring troops. Irrespective of their strategies and approaches to engagement, this was true for civil society women in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines, and it is by no means unique to those four countries. The frequent, if not consistent, abrogation of peace agreements coupled with the continued marginalization of women from the business of peacemaking poses two problematic, and possibly correlated, challenges that stymie the durability and inclusivity of peace agreements.

In recognition of the unfinished business of gender equality, this timely report offers a detailed historical account of women’s participation in four contexts. There are many important lessons-learned about women’s participation and leadership in peace processes, which are shaped by their circumstances, but hold relevance beyond the four respective contexts. As such, the study also acts as a resource for women in civil society currently engaged in peace activism in conflict settings around the world. At the same time, in a world fraught by violent conflict, this report serves as an informative tool for representatives of international institutions that promote governance, security, and development.
INTRODUCTION

The Platform for Action adopted at the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (Beijing Conference) recognized, “Without the active participation of women and the incorporation of women at all levels of decision-making, the goals for equality, development and peace cannot be achieved.” Two years later, the adoption of historic United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) recognized that women not only bear a disproportionate burden during violent conflicts, but that they also have indispensable roles to play as agents of peace. Although UNSCR 1325 catalyzed international efforts to elevate the status of women in conflict-affected settings, progress to date has been uneven and the pace of change, in some contexts, is glacial. According to the World Economic Forum’s annual “Gender Gap Report,” which measures equality between men and women based on four key indicators, the widest gap – the area where the least progress has been made – is in political participation.

Women are not a homogenous group in any society. While some women may work together in pursuit of common goals – crossing ethnic, economic, cultural, political, or other social divisions – others may oppose each other vehemently based on their conflicting aspirations or diverse experiences. Having a woman at the formal negotiation table does not guarantee that she will raise issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment. Yet women’s participation in formal peace processes can play a critical role in getting issues affecting women taken more seriously.

Women constitute a mere four per cent of all signatories to peace agreements in the last two decades, 2.7 per cent of chief mediators, and less than nine per cent of negotiators in official peace processes. These data points demonstrate the gross underrepresentation of women and their perspectives in peacemaking, but they do not give a complete picture of a complex reality. Participation is about more than simply numbers, especially when there have been so few women in formal tracks of conflict resolution. At the same time, peace – while it may be brokered through official channels – is inextricably linked to, and often shaped by, the role of civil society and community conflict resolution initiatives. Civil society, according to Carothers, is: “A broader concept, encompassing all the organizations and associations that exist outside the state (including political parties) and the market.” This is a space in which women tend to have greater voice and participation. Examining how women in civil society access and influence formal peace processes is critical to better understanding the difference their participation can make in ending wars and resolving armed conflicts.

2 UN DOC/A/CONF.177/22, (September 15, 1995).
4 The other three indicators for WEF are: access to health, educational attainment, and economic opportunity and participation.
7 The varied activities that comprise participation include mobilization, activism, building an advocacy-based social movement, forming coalitions, negotiation, mediation, standing for office, drafting legislation and formal agreements, holding implementers accountable, etc. See also: sub-section on participation in Literature Review in this study.
8 Complete definition: “Properly understood, civil society is a broader concept, encompassing all the organizations and associations that exist outside the state (including political parties) and the market. It includes the gamut of organizations that political scientists traditionally label interest groups – not just advocacy NGOs but also labor unions, professional associations (such as those of doctors and lawyers), chambers of commerce, ethnic associations, and others. It also incorporates the many other associations that exist for purposes other than advancing specific social or political agendas, such as religious organizations, student groups, cultural organizations (from choral societies to birdwatching clubs), sports clubs, and informal community groups.” Thomas Crothers, “Think Again: Civil Society,” Foreign Policy 117 (Winter 1999/2000).
The aim of the study is to deepen the understanding of women’s participation in peace negotiations in countries where women gained access to Track 1 negotiations and sustained influence. “Access” in this study is defined as “being in the spaces where decisions are made” – as in the inclusion in a formal peace process. This definition moves past the traditional definition of access, which has been defined as informal consultations, either via Track 1.5 or 2. Here, the space analyzed is a part of the formal negotiations, as in having a seat at the peace talks or engagement through a formal consultation mechanism.

This study intends to serve as a comprehensive and accurate historical record of women’s participation in the four distinct peace processes; a resource for women in civil society today who find themselves in similar situations around the world and who want to learn from the examples of others in a variety of contexts, and a resource for international organizations (e.g., multilateral organizations, development agencies, foreign ministries, etc.) that facilitate, sponsor, encourage, mediate, and build the capacity of women on the ground to participate in high-level peace negotiations. It seeks to build knowledge on the diverse ways women can participate in and influence Track 1 peace negotiations, and supports quantitative attempts to measure the impact of women’s participation in peace processes.

The strategic selection of the four cases below is premised on the presence of a codified peace agreement, a robust civil society network in peacemaking, and women and/or women’s coalitions that accessed Track 1 peace negotiations, as well as based on geographic and historical diversity, the ability to illustrate diverse women’s roles and strategies for organizing and advocating for peace, and accessibility. While all four cases have female negotiators, mediators, and/or signatories who participated directly in peace talks, each case illustrates a different space and contextual environment within which women in civil society access high-level peace negotiations – from direct access by democratic elections or CSO lobbying to formal parallel consultations with main parties to the conflict. Thus, Northern Ireland and the Philippines demonstrate the most direct forms of access, as in having a seat at the peace table, and serve as bookends to two other cases, Guatemala and Kenya, which demonstrate formal parallel consultations with parties to the peace negotiations or mediation process (see Appendix A for case study justifications):

- **Northern Ireland** in the lead up to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (1996-1998)
- **Guatemala** in the lead up to the signing of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (1991-1996)
- **Kenya** in the lead up to the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008)
- **The Philippines** in the lead up to the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2001-2014)

Rather than one specific category of women, this study focuses on the experiences of women as representatives of civil society, government, and opposition groups in four peace processes to understand how, in these particular contexts, women came together across different divides to bring about political change. It is precisely using a diverse sample of elites and non-elites that enables sufficient variation in perspectives. Such an approach permits a robust comparison of different perspectives and dynamic interactions.
of groups and individuals within a case, but does not lend itself to strict cross-case comparison. This is because of the small sample of cases in which women are included in high-level peace negotiations, selection bias, and the likelihood that spurious inferences based on observations in different contexts can be introduced. Instead, this study offers a multi-case analysis that systematically traces the process of women’s engagement in peace negotiations over the course of each case’s pre-defined period of time to analyze the motivations, strategies, tactics, agility, and resilience of women engaged in high-level peacemaking.

This study explores both women in CSOs and women’s CSOs to capture pluralistic interests and perspectives, not just a particular demographic or group of organizations and its constituents. Each case also traces the significance of women whose peace activism originated as part of civil society, but who were later appointed or strove to gain access to formal roles in the negotiation and mediation processes. This is an important contribution to the literature on women’s peace activism, as the study encompasses a broad range of female actors in each of the cases, and provides rich, thick descriptions of their dynamics that is often underspecified in similar accounts. It addresses the following research questions:

- Why did women mobilize for peace?
- How did women mobilize and organize to gain access to high-level peace negotiations?
- How did they form coalitions and alliances?
- How did they assemble and shape agendas?
- How did they set priorities for their activities?
- How did their priorities change when they participated in high-level peace negotiations?
- How did they negotiate their goals?
- To what extent were their objectives or priorities represented in the resulting peace agreement?

While the scope of this study accounts for the contributions and influences of women – in civil society, government, opposition, and international mediation – to the language of peace agreements in each case, the report does not measure or evaluate the impact of their participation on the outcomes of the peace process, or the implementation of agreements once signed. This is because teasing out the process by which different women interact is just as important as their impact. There is still a dearth of research that enables better insight into the competing choices and trade-offs coalitions make when the opportunity arises to access high-level peace negotiations. Moreover, in spite of similar tactics and strategies, not all coalitions gain access to high-level peace negotiations, so understanding the process of how women in civil society participate is vital.

This study is innovative in several ways. First, critical to understanding of how women participate in formal peace negotiations, a systematic literature review is carried out in the following section to ascertain the state of art and gaps in the research. No other publication to date provides such a broad and thorough review of the topic (see Appendix A for an explanation of the methods of the systematic literature review). Through the systematic literature review, it is evident that research on women’s participation in peace processes can be grouped in three distinct categories. The majority of publications focus on discussing the general absence of women in formal peace negotiations and the obstacles to participation. Some studies make the case for why women should be in formal peace negotiations, and there is a large cohort of studies that discuss the efforts of grassroots women peacemakers and peacebuilders. Only more recently has there been a turn to examining how women’s presence affects peace negotiations. Yet, there are few studies that focus explicitly on the dynamics of how women in civil society engage through coalitions with high-level peace negotiations. Therefore, this study fills a lacuna in the current state of art, especially building knowledge on the nature of networks, coalitions, and alliance building in specific contexts.

Second, this study takes an alternative approach by presenting the cases of Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines through a political economy lens, rather than from a historical, political, feminist, or conflict resolution framework, as many preceding studies have done. The political economy approach enables a holistic understanding of the different structural factors and dynamics that brought the onset of violence in each country, as well as the opportunity incentives that enabled women in civil society to participate in each peace process. More importantly, this study applies a rigorous qualitative analysis of a large sample of in-depth interviews (N=93) collected through face-to-face interviews with diverse women directly engaged in Track 1 peacemaking. It draws on scholarly and policy literature, content analysis of conference proceedings, communique issued by women’s coalitions, audio and visual documentation of events, and peace agreements to gain insight on the process. To ensure reliability and validity, findings in each case study are triangulated and reconciled against mainstream literature in each case study. Interview transcripts are analyzed using an inductive, grounded theory approach. Themes are developed through a two stage coding process as a basis for analysis in each case study. The research protocol enables checks and balances amongst the research team and towards research participants. Also, the research design is attentive to ethical considerations, positionality and power, and reciprocity (See Appendix A for a full account of the methods).

Third, while the analysis in this study builds on existing primary and secondary research, it also offers an array of new findings based on the approach outlined above – unique in both breadth and depth – that adds to the body of knowledge for each case study. A presentation of findings for each case is summarized in the Review of Findings chapter, and broad trends based on the research questions are provided in the conclusion chapter of this study. Overall, the four case studies demonstrate that despite the specificities of their respective contexts, women in civil society face similar challenges to exercising their voice, choice, and political agency in countries rocked by violent conflict. Another important observation based on these distinct case studies is that women in civil society seek transformative change in a way that conceptualizes peace as more than the cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of warring troops. Lastly, this study finds that how women in civil society gain access to high-level peace negotiations is contingent not only on the careful selection of tactics and strategies, but also the dynamic relationship and iterative interactions between different parties (i.e., government officials, rebel organizations, key constituents), the opportunity structures that permit participation, and the socio-political context that shape the interactions. This last point is a departure from mainstream arguments on coalition building and social movements that predominantly attribute the influence of CSOs on political processes to only strategies and tactics.14

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Introduction

In the past two decades, the literature on women’s participation in high-level peace negotiations came in two waves. The first group of publications was produced in the early 1990s to 2000. As the Cold War ended, intrastate as opposed to interstate wars became the main focus of international peace and security studies. Within this context, the first wave of literature conceptualizes the implications of armed conflict on women and reflects on women as peacemakers, and the nature of women organizing for peace. It challenges the exclusion and marginalization of women’s experiences, their voices and their perspectives from the scholarship on war, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. In particular, this body of literature focuses on women’s participation in informal peace processes, highlighting the important ‘back-room’ roles they play in bridging divides and supporting those formally engaged in peace negotiations. The second wave of literature, produced after the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000, carries many similar themes of the first wave, but it also examines 1325’s effect on women’s participation in formal and informal peace processes. The second wave of literature also broadens the discourse from describing the ways women participate in peace processes to demonstrating how women’s inclusion can expand both the scope of peace processes and the viability of peace.

Despite a surge in interest, the body of literature on women’s participation in high-level peace negotiations remains nascent. A systematic literature review (see Appendix A for methods) was conducted to provide an intellectual history of the topic. A vast number of academic disciplines and policy initiatives touch on this subject, making it difficult to cover comprehensively. Instead, this study focuses on major trends in the state of art, examining what is known, what is not known, the strengths and weaknesses of the literature, and where the gaps exist. Based on a series of Boolean searches of online databases, 76 sources were incorporated in this review out of a total of 198 retrieved and vetted works, including but not limited to academic journal articles, governmental and non-governmental reports, books, and policy briefs.

On the whole, women authored most of the studies retrieved (93 per cent of the total vetted sample had women as sole or lead authors). Despite a wide search, all of the works cited were originally written in the English language. Most authors originated or were based in institutions located in the global North.

The body of literature on women’s participation in high-level peace negotiations consists predominately of normative studies that mix research and advocacy. Generally, authors use qualitative methods to understand in-depth the characteristics and meanings of different situations and traditionally marginalized

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15 Understood as the meetings, consultations, and mobilization that occur around formal peace negotiations, usually involving actors who have been affected by the violent conflict in diverse ways but are not recognized as the actors directly involved in perpetuating the violence. The contributions of those participating in the informal peace process are often non-binding and these participants’ access to the official peace negotiation meetings is generally limited if allowed at all.

16 Understood as the official meetings that involve the parties directly engaged in violent conflict with one another, which come together to discuss the parameters and timetables through which fighting between the aggrieved parties will cease.

17 For example: Women, peace and security, political science, feminist studies, conflict resolution, peace and security studies, organizational/behavioral sciences, law, anthropology, international development, international relations, and area studies.

Authors often present single or multiple case studies as rich, first-hand descriptive accounts of women’s voices and their experiences using oral histories, narrative inquiry, and in-depth interviews of women leaders or activist groups playing prominent roles in peace processes. While normative arguments have evolved over time, the literature as a whole remains descriptive and prescriptive. Claims based on anecdotal evidence form the bulk of the findings, making it difficult to generalize from a single or a sub-set of cases. Cross-case comparisons are also limited. Studies focus on a specific time period within the life of a protracted conflict. No studies examine how conflict and group dynamics evolve throughout the duration of an armed conflict. Existing research also fails to sufficiently justify case selection or thoroughly discuss sampling techniques, raising questions about the quality of findings. Limited discussion of methods makes it difficult to verify and assess the validity of findings. Furthermore, there are only a handful of quantitative and empirical studies.

Early literature authored by feminist scholars, activists, and practitioners exposes women’s absence and subordination in all spheres of social and political life, as well as at peace negotiation tables. These works posit, “Where are the women?” and document women’s experiences in case histories, focusing on grassroots women’s organizations, networks, or coalitions, and their activities in Northern Ireland, El Salvador, South Africa, Guatemala, Somalia, and Burundi, to name a few. Succeeding works in the second wave echo the importance of including women’s perspectives, yet some studies take a critical turn to investigate how gender identities are constructed, as well as gender dynamics. At the same time, even though the more recent wave of scholarly research examines the number of women involved in peace negotiations, their political, ethnic, and other affiliations, and the nature of their involvement, these studies fail to answer basic questions on how any of these factors impact peace processes from an empirical point of view. A number of studies point out this deficit. Meanwhile, policy studies promote women’s participation in formal peace negotiations, distill lessons learned, provide advice on how women in CSOs can participate, and briefly summarize secondary research.

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19 This is in part due to feminist researchers who have pointed out the distortion of women’s experiences in mainstream social science and argue that qualitative research allows the researcher to make contact with subjects and avoid detachment of the subject and researchers, as well as avoid imposing analytical frameworks on the subjects. See: Ann Oakley, “Gender, Methodology and People’s Way of Knowing: Some Problems with Feminism and the Paradigm Debate in Social Sciences,” Sociology 32, no. 4 (1998).


In order to identify the gaps in research and an appropriate methodological approach for the case studies, the following sections review the state of art on women’s participation in high-level peace negotiations, providing an overview of the field and the strengths and weaknesses of research to date.

Key concepts, terms, and definitions

Term conflation and conceptual discord amongst thought leaders, practitioners, and scholars constrain the field of women, peace and security. Specifically, the literature examined reveals a lack of clarity on what is meant by women, participation, and peace. Not simply an issue of semantics, this incoherence impacts theory and practice.

Who are the women?

Many authors fail to identify to whom they are referring when they study women. Some texts clump women into one homogenous social group, while others infer that women means females who are outside of government, and, therefore, outside traditional power institutions (e.g., in civil society). Texts focused on specific case studies distinguish more explicitly which women are the study subjects (most frequently


women’s civil society peace organizations). A small portion of the literature focuses on women in Track 1 (formal) and Track 2 (informal) peace processes. The literature reviewed, unsurprisingly, has a superficial analysis on women engaged directly in high-level peace negotiations – considering the historic underrepresentation of women in such processes.

While multiple explanations may exist for the lack of clarity regarding “who constitutes women” (i.e., the study subject), conflating concepts contributes to an essentialization of women that carries unsubstantiated judgments (both positive and negative). A particularly problematic and increasingly criticized trend is the “add women and stir” approach, which assumes that solely the presence of women in high-level peace negotiations is not only necessary but also sufficient to elicit favorable peace outcomes.

More recent publications caution against essentializing women or superimposing a single “women’s perspective” or “women’s experience” in conflict. Essentializing women reinforces gender stereotypes (e.g., women are inherently peaceful, women are predisposed to nurture because they are mothers, women are emotional, women are weak, and women are perpetually and primarily victims) that may further marginalize women.

Interestingly, in some cases, women peace activists can take advantage of gender stereotypes. Helms explores the relationship between gender essentialisms and the ability of civil society women’s groups to exercise political power in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. She argues “affirmative gender essentialisms” provide a strategy for women in Track 2 peace efforts to gain credibility and exert influence in their com-


28 Diaz and Tordjman, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations.”; GIZ, “Promoting Women’s Participation.” And, select case studies where women had a seat at the peace negotiation table such as Northern Ireland.


30 Helms, “Women as Agents of Ethnic Reconciliation?”
Women Leading Peace

Another limitation in the current scholarship – especially second wave literature – is the conflation of the terms gender and women. This pattern has consequences for practitioners and academics. Charlesworth notes the increasing tendency of this trend amongst international institutions in the 21st century. Some authors make plain that gender and women are not synonymous. Proponents of gender analysis argue the importance of considering the experiences of men alongside women, and criticize authors who extol the value of gender analysis but then focus exclusively on women.

What is participation?

It is also unclear what is meant by participation and success. The inconsistency in what constitutes participation is due to both the diverse interpretations of indirect and direct participation, as well as the framework on which an author builds his/her argument (e.g., equality and rights, utility, social transformation). The literature examined generally divides participation along Track 1 and Track 2 processes that in some instances overlap, and in others remain separate. The varied activities that comprise participation include mobilization, activism, building an advocacy-based social movement, forming coalitions, negotiation, mediation, standing for office, drafting legislation and formal agreements, holding implementers accountable, etc. Creating a participation framework, Paffenholz categorizes civil society actions into nine inclusion models: direct representation, observer status, official consultative forums, less formal consultations, high-level civil society initiatives, public participation involving the broader population, public decision making, and mass action campaigns. Bell identifies operational opportunities for women's peace activism in three stages:

- Pre-negotiation: “If women can influence pre-negotiation agreements they can begin to shape the agenda for substantive talks and future governance structures.”
- Framework/substantive agreement: “If women can influence these negotiations they can influence the structures that can enable or prevent their participation in public life for the indefinite future.”
- Implementation/re-negotiation: “Even in processes where women have been excluded, there may be post-agreement opportunities for influence and change.”

Success is also not a universal concept. Authors such as Anderlini frame success as entry into high-level peace negotiations vis-a-vis direct participation (i.e., being at the peace table), whereas others expand this term beyond inclusion to include outcomes such as references to women and/or gender in resulting peace agreements, other legal documents, constitutional changes, institutional reform, and other post-conflict

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31 Ibid., 9.
38 Anderlini, Women Building Peace.
developments directly or indirectly benefiting women. Alternatively, El Bushra, Adrian-Paul, and Olson asked their study subjects how they perceived success and received diverse answers. Study subjects conceptualized success broadly: “a world in which rights and democracy are respected and in which people can be content in their own identity,” and “transform[ing] attitudes and practices, structures and competences, to lay the groundwork for the local and global changes that permanent peace requires.” In Hilhorst and van Leeuwen’s Southern Sudan case study, women’s organizations define success as durable, bottom-up peace in the home and community, and as inseparable from economic empowerment. In a similar vein, some feminist authors see success as post-conflict social transformation, whereby actors deconstruct ascribed gender relations, build a more equitable social order, and chip away at other socioeconomic hierarchies that impinge on gender equality. Clearly, the literature articulates many, sometimes overlapping meanings of success. As is equally evident, success varies from one level of participation to another, whether at the grassroots, sub-national, national, regional, or international level.

What is peace?

No single definition for peace exists; it means different things for different people within and between contexts. Generally, authors concede that signing peace agreements does not guarantee an end to direct, structural, or cultural violence. According to Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen, there is no “aftermath” for women, not in the terms typically understood by the state or military. Instead, women continue to experience suffering, violence, and exclusion post-peace agreement signing. Subsequent authors, including Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn, reiterate this idea. Finally, the women, peace and security field – by its nature and historical evolution – intertwines with advocacy. This relationship subtly surfaces in academic feminist literature and more overtly in grey literature.

Methodological shortfalls

Several qualitative studies use primary data as the basis of their analysis and findings, but do not explain sampling procedures and/or how the researcher builds trust with the subjects. Qualitative methods dominate the approaches used among feminists and other researchers who seek to understand marginalized groups’ voices. Yet, for the most part, those working in this tradition do not address the validity and reliability of their findings explicitly. Researchers that use these methods often fail to acknowledge their position of power over the researched and in their studies. This omission leaves important questions unanswered, such as “Do the findings represent a few self-selected women or the views of the majority of women within the case?” and “To what extent has the researcher imposed his/her own views to reconcile conflicting interpretations?”

40 El-Bushra, Adrian-Paul, and Olson, “Women Building Peace.”
41 Ibid., 10.
42 Hilhorst and van Leeuwen, “Grounding Local Peace Organizations.”
45 Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen, The Aftermath.
46 Anderlini, Women Building Peace; Anderson, “Crossing the Lines.”; Charlesworth, “Are Women Peaceful?”
Some researchers take an ethnographic approach by embedding themselves in a CSO to study the activities of the organization over time. This review also includes a few first-hand accounts by activists. These authors write about their own experiences (as well as others) in seeking to access high-level peace negotiations. When not stated explicitly, it is inferred that the sampling focuses on elites and movement leaders, mostly due to ease of identification and access. A correlated assumption is that few authors focus on community members and intra-group dynamics, except Berger and Roulston and Davies (eds). Self-identification plays a key role in the selection of research participants. Few studies explicitly note and sample those who do not self-identify as “peace activists” (e.g., members of religious groups, trade unions, etc.), but who were nonetheless part of the informal peacemaking process.

Some studies use a small sample of negotiation and mediation “experts”/professionals. When explicitly stated, studies usually sample urban elites and movement leaders based on reputational criteria. A few exceptions are noted: Bilić, Aharoni, Rojas, and Falch employ a non-probability sampling technique known as snowball sampling (or using well-informed individuals to identify other individuals or acquaintances that have a great deal of information on a particular subject) to encompass urban elites and some non-elites in their studies. In addition, one author outlines how she sought to counter urban bias by adopting an inclusive approach of recruiting a broad spectrum of different individuals in urban and rural areas, and using testimonials and ethnographic literature of rural areas to reconcile the urban and rural differences.

**Women’s inclusion and representation in peace processes**

Far more active in informal peace processes, women remain largely absent from formal peace processes. This underpins (in part) why there exists a large body of scholarship on women’s peace activism (roles in informal peacemaking processes) as compared to the study of how women affect the success or failure of formal negotiations. In general, studies focus on four areas: They (1) explain why women are largely absent from formal peace negotiations and the obstacles to participation; (2) make the case for why women should be in formal peace negotiations; (3) examine how women’s presence affects peace negotiations; and (4) unveil women’s experience in informal peace processes.

**Exclusion and marginalization of women from formal peace negotiations**

The average number of women participating in formal peace processes (as negotiators, mediators, signatories, or witnesses) is low. In a limited sample of 31 major peace processes from 1992 to 2011, women represented, on average, nine per cent of formal negotiating delegations, four per cent of peace process signatories, 3.7 per cent of witnesses, and 2.4 per cent of chief mediators. Of the authors that identify more

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49 Cockburn, *From Where We Stand*; Fearon, *Women’s Work*; Roulston and Davies, *Gender, Democracy and Inclusion in Northern Ireland*.
50 Anderson, “Crossing the Lines”; El-Bushra, Adrian-Paul, and Olson, “Women Building Peace.”
51 Berger, *Guatemaltecas*; Roulston and Davies, *Gender, Democracy and Inclusion in Northern Ireland*.
52 Rojas and Conaway, “In the Midst of War.”; Roulston and Davies, *Gender, Democracy and Inclusion in Northern Ireland*.
56 Berger, *Guatemaltecas*.
57 Diaz and Tordjman, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations.”
specific impediments to women’s participation in such processes, most argue that a combination of complex dynamics contributes to the problem, including but not limited to social and cultural practices, power dynamics, the patriarchal and elite structure of peace negotiations, secrecy and exclusivity of high-level political peace processes, the targeting and oppression of activists, and the international community’s apathy and/or ignorance. Within this discussion of barriers to access, a number of key themes emerge.

Many authors focus on structural biases inherent at all peace negotiation levels. Representatives and mediators are often chosen from traditional spheres of influence. Women’s underrepresentation in authority positions generally, and in security and politics particularly, makes them unlikely to be considered. The work demands of participating in peace negotiations fail to account for additional gendered responsibilities ascribed to women, as well as the travel, time, or safety considerations that further hinder women’s capacity to participate. Some authors point to the targeting and repression of women activists, including violent threats and intimidation, as a major deterrent to participation. Others ascribe women’s exclusion to apathy or ignorance amongst both the international and local actors charged with designing the peace process.

Civil society’s writ large exclusion from formal negotiations also bars women’s access. Several studies weigh the benefits of including civil society in formal negotiations against the potential of increased complexity, decreased efficiency, or the introduction of spoilers, all of which may derail the process. Only one study uses a quantitative approach to argue that the inclusion of CSOs in peace processes increases the perceived legitimacy of the process among the population, thereby bolstering the likelihood of sustainable peace.

Various authors assert women’s inclusion in peace processes is critical to the viability of peace. This statement draws tenuous links from international peace and security research that claim nearly 50 per cent of

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60 Bilić, “Not in Our Names”; Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn, On the Frontlines; Rojas, Anderlini and Conaway, “In the Midst of War.”
63 Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace.”
64 This is an impressive study with a large dataset that has some methodological and theoretical limitations including the operationalizing of the independent and dependent variables, as well as a lack of a robust theory to give meaning to the correlations. See Direnç Kanol, “Civil Society at the Negotiation Table, Legitimacy Beliefs and Durable Peace,” Peace and Conflict Studies 22, no. 1 (2015).
peace agreements since the 1990s failed within the first five years, and from studies\(^{67}\) that argue an inclusive\(^{68}\) peace process is more credible to the public and thus more durable, since exclusionary, elite peace processes often lead to conflict resurgence.\(^{69}\) Yet, works focused on women’s roles outside Track 1 negotiations and their CSOs rarely incorporate civil society theory.\(^{70}\) In turn, Howell writes that civil society theory also fails to sufficiently analyze civil society’s gendered relations.\(^{71}\) Works\(^{72}\) on civil society’s inclusion in formal peace processes rarely include more than passing mention of women or women’s organizations, whereas feminist authors\(^{73}\) who discuss women’s roles in civil society do so generally, noting women serve more frequently as leaders in civil society than in formal politics. Women civil society actors face additional skepticism from those arbitrating and those already participating in negotiations. The arbitrators and formal participants often dismiss women as unqualified and claim their participation risks diverting the agenda towards “irrelevant” issues.\(^{74}\) Others insist the architects of peace processes do not see women as lacking in experience – the designers deliberately fail to put forth the effort to integrate women into the process.\(^{75}\)

**Rationale for the inclusion of women in peace processes**

The question, “why include women in peace processes?” cuts to the core of the women, peace and security field. The overwhelming majority of literature – both academic and grey – addresses this question to some extent. The literature advances a number of arguments for women’s inclusion, participation and/or representation. They can be categorized as arguments for equality and rights, utility, and post-conflict social transformation. These arguments are not mutually exclusive. One finds the premise of equality – men and women are equal, and thus women deserve a seat at the table – in literature arguing for women’s participation based on utility. At the same time, social transformation, including transforming gender relations,\(^{76}\) is frequently one of the end goals in writings focused on equality and/or utility. A deeper review of these lines of reasoning follows.

1. **Equality and rights**

A rights-based rationale to women’s participation in peacemaking and peacebuilding is one of the literature’s dominant narratives.\(^{77}\) The notion that women deserve a seat at the peace table because they are equal to men is common in both first and second waves of scholarship and policy studies. Some authors, such as Anderlini, argue, “Regardless of whether women have a positive or negative impact, they, like men, have a right to participate; it is a given.”\(^{78}\) Others appeal to fairness, stating women constitute 50 per cent

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68 Understood as the degree of participation by the major stakeholders including the major warring parties and civil society.


70 Denotes classical, mainstream, and contemporary theories on civil society and democratic change.

71 Howell, “Gender and Civil Society.”


76 Denotes changing how men and women conceive of themselves and their capacities, as well as how they interact within the framework of social expectations.


of the world’s population, and thus need a proportionate role in deciding plans that affect them. More often, authors link these tenets to the sustainability of peace and the fostering of post-conflict democracy and development. Importantly, some studies exhibit more caution than others and stress the importance of not overemphasizing the positive effects of women’s participation.

Some studies claim that the equal participation of women and men in peace processes strengthens democratic ideals and institutions. Porter argues women’s inclusion injects democratic legitimacy into the process. Similarly, Manchanda calls out the incompatibility of setting up post-conflict democratic systems and excluding women from negotiations. Authors in this camp implicitly and explicitly assume women’s participation in formal peace processes helps women gain leadership experience and visibility, which may open up future opportunities to participate in political institutions. Nevertheless, there is an absence of comparative data clearly illuminating this trend. Anecdotal evidence across cases indicates varied trajectories, from women who become politically active, are co-opted by political players, or are marginalized by mainstream decision-makers.

2. Utility

While most authors subscribe to the rights-based argument for women’s inclusion in peace negotiations, many authors focus their approach from the utility perspective, emphasizing that including women is not only the “right thing” to do, but also the “smart thing” to do. In other words, women’s inclusion is critical to the success of the peace process, and, therefore, their inclusion and participation is central to enhancing the overall effectiveness of the process. Much of the literature reviewed in the utility camp has a strong advocacy approach. The policy studies, in particular, use the perceived qualities women possess as a gender to argue the efficacy of women’s involvement in peace processes.

Three main explanations underpin the assumed uniqueness of women’s contributions (none are mutually exclusive): women are more suited to collaboration, empathy and conciliation, either inherently or because of their social upbringing; women experience wartime differently and thus bring a needed perspective that ultimately strengthens peace; and women have stronger community ties and their involvement builds more trust and ownership of the process by the people. However, focusing on these attributes, while in some cases may be true, can slide into essentialism and reinforce gender stereotypes, especially when studies claim women are better suited than men for the achievement and maintenance of peace due to biologically and socially-induced tendencies of being “naturally peaceful,” “caring,” and “motherly.” While most

81 Anderlini, “Women at the Peace Table”; Manchanda, Women, War and Peace in South Asia.
83 Manchanda, “Women’s Agency in Peace Building.”
85 Ibid.
86 Anderlini, Women Building Peace.; Caprioli, “Gendered Conflict.”
88 Anderlini, Women Building Peace; Buchanan et al., “From Clause to Effect”; O’Flynn and Russell, “Should Peace Agreements Recognize Women?”
second wave authors remind us that women are not inherently peaceful, many of these authors continue to use these traits, which they attest are derivative of socially constructed gender roles, or are observable from previous case studies. In this subset of literature, these traits produce several positive outcomes. Those most often cited are: broadening the peace agenda, greater focus on marginalized voices, enhanced local trust in the process and community buy-in, more democratic and sustainable peace, and more efficient and comprehensive negotiations through consensus-building.

While most utility-based authors also support a rights-based approach, some feminist authors explicitly reject the utility argument. Helms argues the increasing use of a utility argument by international funders and intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN, leads women’s groups to tailor their messages to fit a particular image of women to receive support, or as Anderson terms this approach, “strategic essentialism.” However, as noted by Charlesworth, even if the use of these frames gets women to the table, they can circumscribe women’s roles in the process, and further limit their flexibility and perceived relevance in post-conflict reconstruction.

3. Social transformation

Some authors argue that peace processes are a key time to address not only immediate needs, but the underlying social and cultural norms that define gender dynamics in order to alter power imbalances and drive out discriminatory attitudes and behaviors as countries move out of conflict. Conflict often opens up new opportunities for women or suspends traditional gender roles, but backlash in the post-conflict period can push women out of newly opened spaces and undermine fragile gains. Authors contend that neglecting a transformative lens when approaching peacebuilding and reconstruction is detrimental to women in the long run. Several authors link positive social transformation outcomes to the participation of women. Women’s involvement in peace negotiations, while not enough to ensure a transformative process, increases the likelihood that deeper social norms will be considered seriously. International Alert’s 2005 report indicates that women viewed their most important role in peacebuilding as “working to transform attitudes and practices, structures and competences, to lay the groundwork for… local and global changes.” Others note that discounting women’s voices at the outset of the peace process sets a precedent for inequality that perpetuates future injustices. Ní Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn caution that public policies alone will not lead to social transformation, and that a ‘gender-central’ approach is needed that prioritizes women’s advancement and dismantles inequality.

The effect of including women in peace processes

There is broad consensus that women’s participation in peace processes is beneficial. Yet, key assumptions underpinning this consensus remain untested. Absent is the rigorous scholarship that shows how women’s inclusion in (or exclusion from) peace talks affects a peace process. The field needs more methodologically

90 Anderlini, Women Building Peace.; Cockburn, From Where We Stand.; Rojas, Anderlini, and Conaway, “In the Midst of War.”
92 Helms, “Women as Agents of Ethnic Reconciliation?”
93 Anderson, “Crossing the Lines.”
94 Charlesworth, “Are Women Peaceful?”
95 Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen, The Aftermath.
98 Ahern, “An Analysis of Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations.”
diverse and mature research not only to ascertain the effects of women's participation, but also to understand the variance in outcomes prior to generalizing.

Research on the effect of including women in peace processes has two major limitations: (1) a lack of data on women's participation in formal peace negotiations at all levels, and (2) the inability to generalize and draw conclusions from the panoply of single or multiple case studies on highly localized achievements and activities of women's civil society peace organizations. The former makes it difficult to measure effects. It is why studies\textsuperscript{100} that attempt to quantify the influence of women at the peace table rarely go beyond counting the number of women. Even when examining the problem from a different perspective, such as through the language in peace agreements, often no specific data exists on women's participation in peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{101} Moreover, the exclusive and closed-door nature of high-level peace processes further contributes to a lack of data.\textsuperscript{102} The absence of information also calls into question some of the key justifications mentioned above on why women should be included in peace processes.

The latter relates to the challenges of assessing the impact of both women-centric CSOs and women in CSOs working on informal peace processes generally. Despite a plethora of descriptive case studies documenting the experiences and activities of these organizations, the findings are not generalizable outside of the specific contexts, and are often vulnerable to observer biases. Most studies do not track cases over time to allow for comparison and contrast between cases. Despite over two decades of work, we still do not have a good understanding of the general trends and patterns.

When policymakers call for “proof” of how women can make a difference in peace processes,\textsuperscript{103} moral outrage at the gender-discriminatory request can ensue.\textsuperscript{104} But, in general, most studies highlight anecdotal evidence of women’s contributions, often conflating it with impact. The paucity of studies that explicitly examine how women affect peace negotiations further hinders a deeper understanding of this area.\textsuperscript{105} Anderlini and Bouta et al. show that the inclusion of women during peace talks increases the likelihood\textsuperscript{106} that gender issues are discussed and incorporated into peace accords – a finding supported by Bell and O’Rourke’s study that reveals UNSCR 1325 moderately succeeded in increasing the references to women and gender in peace accords.\textsuperscript{107} According to the literature, women’s unique contributions to a peace process range from not only the types of issues they add to the agenda – human rights, justice, reconciliation, health, education, etc. – that may otherwise go unaddressed, but also by the way in which they influence the process – building bridges, crossing party lines, developing unified platforms, etc. In other words, a dominant trend in the literature suggests that women bring distinct style and substance to the peace table. Yet, several papers repeat these claims, especially those emphasizing the qualitative difference between men and women in peace processes, without solid evidentiary support.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{100} Banaszak et al., “Securing the Peace.”; Diaz and Tordjman, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations.”
\textsuperscript{101} Researchers have accessed peace agreement datasets from the UN peacemakers, University of Ulster, Uppsala University Conflict Database, and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.
\textsuperscript{103} Hunt, “Moving Beyond Silence.”
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} That is to say, the mere presence of women in peace negotiations does not guarantee gender issues will be raised.
\textsuperscript{107} Anderlini, “Women at the Peace Table.”; Bell and O’Rourke, “Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper?”; Bouta, Frewks, and Bannon, “Gender, Conflict and Development.”
\textsuperscript{108} An exception is the work of Moser and McIlwaine who examine whether male and female dominated organizations played different roles in the Colombia and Guatemala peace processes. See: Caroline Moser and Fiona Clark, “Gender and Social Capital in Contexts of Political Violence: Community Perceptions from Colombia and Guatemala,” In Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence, eds. Caroline Moser and Fiona Clark (London; New York: Zed Books, 2001).
Even though formal peace negotiations marginalize women, case studies and policy initiatives, such as the Institute for Inclusive Security’s “Women Waging Peace,” show that women participate vigorously in informal peace processes through innovative activities and via community-level organizations, networks, and coalitions. Mainstream research on conflict resolution and peace negotiations fail to appreciate and often ignore many of these initiatives. At the same time, studies like Aharoni and Villellas Ariño may point the way forward for the field by focusing on micro-level empirical research, which can contribute to building more systematic studies on impact and effect.109

**Women’s participation in informal peace processes**

Women have a long history of peace work – the earliest documented examples of women’s political activism date back to the turn of the 20th century. While early activists derived their initiatives from the larger women’s suffrage movement, much continuity exists between them and contemporary efforts grounded in the rhetoric of equality and rights.

Especially in the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction fields, existing literature focuses on how women organize (i.e., as grassroots groups, CSOs, NGOs, coalitions, networks, etc.), or why women regard the informal arena as the venue where they can influence peace processes most effectively (see section: exclusion and marginalization of women from formal peace negotiations). For example, Bilić uses collective identity scholarship to trace the strategies of Belgrade’s Women in Black to create and sustain the anti-war movement in the former Yugoslavia.110 Hilhorst and van Leeuwen trace the dynamic evolution of the Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace movement as it interacted with donors and expanded to rural areas.111 Anderson uses a norm diffusion framework to elucidate causal mechanisms by which women participated and secured rights in peace processes in Burundi and Northern Ireland.112 Policy efforts, such as International Alert’s “Women Building Peace” campaign, provide in-depth single case studies to document women’s experiences from their own perspectives and in their own words.113

Some of the grey literature overgeneralizes the ways in which women frame their own work, emphasizing anecdotal evidence grounded in feminine ‘soft’ skills, such as fostering trust, mobilizing extensive networks, solidarity, and cross-border conciliation.114 Women are perceived as ‘credible’ peace actors when they are committed to highly private and personal motives, such as their family members’ disappearances in war.115 Though organizing as women, and particularly as mothers, has been a powerful tool for entering public and political space, researchers increasingly critique the ways in which women employ womanhood and motherhood discourses, recognizing maternal rhetoric as politically expedient and appraising donor guidelines or political frameworks that privilege traditional women’s roles.116 A few case studies show women’s distinctive qualities, whether biologically or socially determined, as those particularly suited for conflict resolution.

110 Bilić, “Not in Our Names.”
111 Hilhorst and van Leeuwen, “Grounding Local Peace Organizations.”
112 Anderson, “Crossing the Lines.”
Many authors posit that this is more likely a question of necessity or opportunity than of natural inclination. For instance, it is not necessarily women’s conciliatory nature that leads to a tendency to work more collaboratively, but rather their lack of material resources makes relationships a valuable commodity for women’s organizations.117

Classifying the work of women-centric peace organizations and women in CSOs makes it difficult to analyze women’s informal peace work. Several authors attempt to develop frameworks for synthesizing what these groups do – International Alert’s categories of action include basic service delivery, mediation, and promoting women’s inclusion in leadership roles – but no accepted classification system exists, and imposing divisions on the overlapping spheres within which women work may erase important intersections.118 Most of the literature on women’s informal peace organizing focuses on self-identifying organizations explicitly working to end violence or militarism. These analyses often neglect other actors who may become part of a temporary front during a particular moment in the peace process, such as labor unions, environmentalist groups, radical political parties, religious institutions, or charitable organizations, as well as organizations engaged in work relevant to peace but not narrowly defined (e.g., humanitarian relief and emergency service delivery).

The following sections now turn to examine the cases of Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines.

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118 El-Bushra, “Women Building Peace.”
This chapter details the ways in which women contributed to the formal peace process in Northern Ireland from 1996-1998 that culminated in the Good Friday Agreement. Though formal peace talks tend to be exercises in “top-down” diplomacy that exclude civil society women, in the case of Northern Ireland, women civil society leaders accessed the negotiations by building a coalition party and successfully leveraging a change in the electoral system to gain legitimate representation at the negotiation table. While recognizing the important role played by women as facilitators, mediators, and members of other political party teams at the Multi-Party Talks, this chapter primarily focuses on the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) as a vehicle for women in civil society to access the formal political negotiation process. To date, much of the existing literature on the NIWC is written by former members of the party, and these authors, and others who base analyses off their work, tend to ascribe to a similar narrative of the NIWC’s formation and impact.119 This study, however, draws on extensive interviews with a diverse range of actors, including NIWC members and party elites from varied geographic areas, women from other political parties present in the negotiations, and women in diplomatic roles. In doing so, this study adds additional nuance to the existing narrative on the NIWC, specifically relating to how women in civil society mobilized and built transversal coalitions; the cleavages that emerged within the NIWC; the roles of women in other political parties; and varied assessments of how the NIWC impacted the peace process.

This chapter first traces the roots of the conflict in Northern Ireland using a political economy approach. It then follows civil society women’s participation in the high-level peace negotiations, beginning with their mobilization efforts to win electoral seats at the Forum for Political Dialogue, and continuing through to their strategies of influence at the Multi-Party Talks and in the Good Friday Agreement itself. It finds

119 Authors cited in this chapter who were members or close associates of the NIWC include Kate Fearon, Carmel Roulston, Monica McWilliams, Avila Kilmurray, Bronagh Hinds, Robin Whitaker, and Rick Wilford.
that women civil society leaders created the NIWC as a cross-party women’s political party in response to the opening of political space created by a temporary change in the electoral system. With very limited time to mobilize, NIWC leaders leveraged their pre-existing networks and skillsets to cultivate a politically diverse membership, winning enough votes through the regional top-up list system to become official participants in the Multi-Party Talks. This chapter traces the emergent process through which the NIWC shaped its agenda, and follows how the NIWC dealt with the competing needs of remaining connected to its grassroots base and meeting the challenges of actively participating in the peace process. Though a multiplicity of formal and informal relationships between the NIWC and its constituents, broader civil society networks, other political parties, external allies, and key facilitators, the party was able to influence the process and outcomes of the negotiations. Ultimately, this study distills the NIWC’s impact in three core areas: their role as an “honest broker,” facilitating dialogue between opposing parties; their success in integrating issues and language into the Good Friday Agreement that otherwise may have been omitted; and their effect on women’s political participation in Northern Ireland more broadly. It also addresses the varied roles played by other women present at the negotiations, and recognizes the efforts and influence of women diplomats, mediators, and elected party delegates from across the political spectrum.

The political economy of conflict in Northern Ireland

The signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 brought an end to what seemed to most an intractable conflict in Northern Ireland. Though roots of the fighting arguably go back centuries, the Agreement addressed decades of armed clashes, riots, police brutality, and terrorist attacks known as the Troubles, which erupted in the 1960s and continued through the 1990s, touching the lives of citizens in every community (for a concise timeline of events see Appendix D). The Troubles thrived on a rift that existed...
since Northern Ireland was formed. Following a revolutionary uprising in the south that ultimately led to Irish independence from Britain, the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 partitioned the island into two distinct states: Northern Ireland, which comprised the six majority Protestant counties, and the Irish Free State, which eventually became the Republic of Ireland, made up of the 26 majority Catholic counties to the south. Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom, and two main political identities emerged – Protestant unionist and Catholic nationalist – that have dominated the political landscape ever since. Traditionally, nationalists call for the reunification of Ireland and independence from Great Britain, while unionists strive to maintain Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom.

The causes of conflict between Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland are deeply rooted socially, politically, and economically. Ireland had been under British rule since the 12th century, and British policies toward the island were based in economic interest, resulting in economic and legal discrimination against native Irish Catholics, which privileged English Protestants who settled in the northern provinces. In the 17th century, the Irish Parliament, made up entirely of Protestants, banned Catholics from land ownership and public office. By the end of the 19th century, widespread displacement of Catholics from the northern counties meant Protestants controlled most of the economic resources in the region. These early policies had long-lasting consequences for Catholic communities in terms of their educational, economic, and political opportunities. Though armed hostilities between the two camps had largely subsided after the 1920 partition, underlying tensions over discrimination, poverty, political oppression, and aggressive policing came to a boiling point in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A study by Aunger based on data from 1971 found that Catholics were disproportionately represented in lower socioeconomic classes and most likely to be unskilled manual workers, while the average Protestant was more likely to be a skilled worker in a higher-status industry. The 1971 census revealed that unemployment levels for Catholic men in Northern Ireland reached almost 18 per cent, nearly three times that of Protestants. Northern Ireland’s police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was more than 85 per cent Protestant, though Catholics comprised nearly 40 per cent of the population, and both housing and education were overwhelmingly segregated.

The civil rights movement

Inspired in part by the civil rights movement in the American South, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) – the most prominent of a number of civil rights groups, including People’s Democracy and Campaign for Social Justice – was formed in 1967 to address the systematic inequalities and discrimination against Catholics in housing, employment, policing, and electoral representation. The NICRA’s October 1968 march in Derry was a crystallizing moment for the civil rights movement. After the RUC stopped marchers, angry clashes between the police and protesters broke out, highlighting intercommunal grievances and the uneasy relationship between Catholic communities and the primarily Protestant police force. The civil rights movement, and particularly the violence faced by protesters, politicized scores of Irish youth, including many of those who would become influential figures in later peace processes. The movement also offered many opportunities for women’s participation and leadership. NICRA elected Betty Sinclair as its chairperson at their first meeting, and one of the most public figures of the civil rights movement was Bernadette Devlin from People’s Democracy, who became the youngest person elected to the British Parliament after defeating an Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) candidate in 1969 by-elections at age 21.
The Troubles

Throughout the late 1960s, the RUC repeatedly attacked civil rights marches, which eventually escalated in the Battle of the Bogside, a three-day violent riot in 1969 that sparked protests across Northern Ireland and is often seen as the beginning of the Troubles. Three years after the 1969 riots, the Derry Bogside was also the setting of “Bloody Sunday,” when British troops fired on marchers protesting internment policies, killing 14 people. The event precipitated increased recruitment of nationalist paramilitary groups and shocked Catholics, many of whom had previously seen British troops as protecting them from the RUC and unionist paramilitaries. In 1972, after a deterioration of the security environment and the deaths of over 500 people, the British Government suspended the local government at Stormont, the seat of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and declared direct rule. The two and a half decades from 1969 to 1994 were plagued by attacks and counterattacks from nationalist forces, primarily the Provisional and Official Irish Republican Army (noted hereafter collectively as the IRA), and various unionist paramilitaries, primarily the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). These armed unionist groups came to prominence in parallel with the civil rights movement in response to a perceived, and in many cases very real, threat of IRA violence against Protestant communities. Much of the violence targeted political or military entities and individuals, including RUC officers, British soldiers, members of opposing paramilitaries, and politicians, but in many cases civilians were caught in the crossfire. Already-segregated neighborhoods became militarized; curfews, night raids, and assassinations destabilized communities; and bombings frequently took innocent casualties. In 1971, the Special Powers Act introduced a policy of internment without trial for anyone suspected of political violence. The overwhelming majority of the interned were from the Catholic community, a tactic that further disrupted everyday life and drove IRA recruitment, as nationalist prisoners languished in jail and rumors of ill-treatment spread. In total, between 1969 and 1995 more than 3,500 people were killed as a direct result of the Troubles.

Women in Northern Ireland

During the height of the Troubles, women played a key role in both Protestant and Catholic communities, doing what Margaret Logue called the “day-to-day things that people needed to survive... when there’s a conflict on.” Keeping families together, children fed, streets safe, and communities running during conflict took on additional challenges. The violence caused massive displacement of families. In 1969, housing was already segregated with 69 per cent of Protestants and 56 per cent of Catholics reportedly living on streets where they were the majority group, but by 1972 these figures had risen to 99 per cent and 75 per cent respectively. Internment policies led to the mass arrest of men believed to be associated with paramilitary groups, leaving many women suddenly caring for families alone, and thus shifting traditional gender roles. The unemployment rate for Catholic women was much lower than for men, arguably because occupations with the highest concentration of Catholic workers tended to be “feminine” jobs, like nurses and primary school teachers. Women’s greater employment opportunities and increased freedom of movement opened new avenues for participation in the public sphere. Stop-and-search policies and home raids, combined with the arbitrary arrest of male family members, blurred the lines between private

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127 According to Sutton’s Index of Deaths from 1969-1993, loyalist groups killed an estimated 1,027 people, including over 700 sectarian killings of Catholic civilians. Of the estimated 1,823 deaths attributed to the IRA during this time period, over 1,050 of the victims were RUC officers, British soldiers or British or unionist politicians. Malcolm Sutton, Bear in Mind These Dead ... An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969-1993 (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994), Accessed August 8, 2015, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/book/
128 Interview with Margaret Logue, Founding Member, NIWC, January 16, 2015.
131 Aunger, Religion and Occupational Class in Northern Ireland, 8.
and communal space and politicized women’s day-to-day lives. In the face of these policies, women practiced forms of “everyday resistance.” In Catholic neighborhoods, women warned others of police raids, banging pots and pans when outsiders appeared on their streets and maintaining regular patrols to protect nationalist men. Women in inter-religious relationships were often targets of harassment, as were those who spoke out against the violence in their own communities. Women on both sides of the conflict faced the burdens of poverty, domestic violence, single parenthood, and additional struggles caused by living in a conflict setting.

The women’s movement was slow to arrive in Northern Ireland as politically active women were generally expending energy in the civil rights movement or through labor activism. However, by the mid 1970s, groups specifically devoted to women’s empowerment were cropping up around the country among and between Protestant and Catholic communities. Networks begun during this time were later leveraged by NIWC members to grow the party and shape its agenda. Despite many shared goals, differences among these early groups surfaced in times of political strife over issues such as the treatment of female IRA prisoners. The movement saw many gains: Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts were introduced; an Equal Opportunities Commission for Northern Ireland was established; and legal instruments surrounding divorce and domestic violence were reformed. Increased attention on issues of domestic violence and single-parent households also led to the creation of women’s centers in communities across Northern Ireland, which primarily existed to provide services like childcare, violence shelter, legal aid, and employment assistance. These centers also served to bring Protestant and Catholic women together, and provided training and capacity building for women from both communities. Women were also at the forefront of peace activism. In 1977, Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan won the Nobel Peace Prize for their work with Peace People, one of a number of women-led peace organizations, including Derry Peace Women and Women Together for Peace, which together mobilized thousands of people from both communities in public marches petitioning nationalist and loyalist factions to cease attacks.

Towards an agreement

After decades of intercommunal violence, Northern Ireland had become one of the world’s seemingly intractable conflicts, but ongoing efforts for peace began to gain traction in the 1990s. Trade unions played a major role in addressing root causes of economic and social inequality, as well as eventually supporting a formal peace process. The passage of a Fair Employment Act in 1976, the first effort to legislate against employment discrimination, did little to ameliorate the economic divide between Catholics and Protestants, but in the mid-1980s, renewed support for eradicating inequality led to significant victories. The


133 Helen Harris, “Everyday Resistance,” in *Strong About It All*: Rural and Urban Women’s Experiences of the Security Forces in Northern Ireland, eds. Helen Harris and Eileen Healy (Belfast: North West Women’s/Human Rights Project, 2001), 66.

134 Interview with Anne Carr, Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, January 14, 2015; May Blood, *Watch My Lips, I’m Speaking!* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2007), 71; Interview with Ann Hope, Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, January 16, 2015.


137 Roulston, “Women on the Margin.”

138 Cockburn, *The Space Between Us.*

139 Hammond-Callaghan, “Peace Women.”

The road to the Good Friday Agreement was bolstered by increased international support and pressure for a lasting peace agreement. Earlier attempts at ending the violence had been largely unsuccessful; the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 collapsed after a loyalist general strike, and the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, while a stepping-stone in British and Irish relations, was endorsed by only two of Northern Ireland’s major political parties. In the 1990s, diplomatic advances from the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and the United States all pushed towards a negotiation. U.K. Prime Minister John Major and Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds issued a joint statement in 1993 that upheld Northern Irish self-determination and called for peace. In 1994, unprecedented talks began at 10 Downing Street between Sinn Féin leadership and the U.K. Prime Minister, the first time in decades the Nationalist party had met publically with British leadership. The Sinn Féin delegation was comprised of almost half female negotiators: Siobhan O’Hanolan, Michelle Gildernew, and Lucilita Bhreatnach. The resulting ceasefire paved the way for Multi-Party Talks that included the most extreme wings. The inclusion of brokers like Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin and David Trimble of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), who had been excluded from previous attempts at reconciliation, brought community buy-in and legitimacy to the Good Friday Agreement.

The United States took a leading role practicing what NIWC member Jane Morrice termed “megaphone diplomacy” – using the media, high-level visits, and public statements to try to push parties to the table. America’s large Irish population had long been entwined with the Northern Irish conflict, for better or for worse, but in the 1990s ending the Troubles became a political priority, due in part to commitment from the Clinton Administration. “Leading up to that period, the U.S. was starting to play a much, much different role in Northern Ireland than we previously had,” recalled U.S. Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, U.S. Consul General in Belfast (1995-1998). American congressional leadership called for the appointment of a Special Envoy, and Senator George Mitchell was chosen for the position, chairing first an international

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commission on disarmament and then the Multi-Party Talks. In 1995, President and Mrs. Clinton travelled to Belfast, the first time an American president had ever visited Northern Ireland. The First Lady met with women from both sides of the conflict to discuss their shared concerns, and became invested in their work, bringing women leaders to the White House and later organizing the Vital Voices conference in Belfast in 1998 to support women’s political leadership.  

The Republic of Ireland also shifted its traditional position on Northern Ireland. In 1996 Irish President Mary Robinson headed the first official state visit to Britain by an Irish head of state. The Irish parliamentary leadership in the south was a coalition government between the Fianna Fáil party, traditionally more nationalist, and the Progressive Democrats, who held a somewhat more moderate view on Northern Irish issues. Liz O’Donnell, representative of the Irish government to the Multi-Party Talks, credits this coalition with creating a “tendency towards compromise,” and allowing for more flexibility towards the talks process.  

In March 1996, elections were announced for the Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue, the negotiation body that ultimately laid the groundwork for the Multi-Party Talks. The four traditionally largest parties dominated the field. Two parties led the unionist side: the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), founded by the Reverend Ian Paisley in 1970 and historically opposed to any agreement, and the UUP, a slightly more moderate party with wide appeal to middle-class unionists led by David Trimble. The nationalists were primarily represented by Sinn Féin, the republican party affiliated with the IRA and led by Gerry Adams, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), a somewhat more moderate nationalist party led by John Hume. Other smaller parties also ran, including the Alliance Party — the most successful of the few cross-community parties — the Labour Party, the Green Party, the Workers Party, a handful of small unionist parties including the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) led by David Ervine and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), and the NIWC, which was founded by a broad coalition of women civil society leaders from both sides of the conflict.  

Women at the peace table  

The NIWC was not necessarily a unified voice of Northern Irish women, and there were many women from other political parties who decried their methods. Some were critical on political grounds, like Iris Robinson, who accused the NIWC of being a nationalist front. Others, like Marian Donnelly, President of the Workers Party, and Brid Rodgers, the chair of the SDLP negotiating team at the Forum for Political Dialogue, criticized the separation of women’s issues as a platform, arguing that women would be more effective in creating change by rising through the ranks of existing parties. It is not always clear to what extent women were involved behind the scenes in a given party’s work during the Talks, but there were women elected from most parties and present at the Forum for Political Dialogue (see Table 1). Of the 110 members elected to the Northern Ireland Forum in 1996, 15 were women, representing six of the 10 parties who won seats. The UUP sent one woman, May Steele, of their 30-person delegation. The SDLP sent Dorita Field, Margaret Ritchie, and Brid Rodgers. The DUP sent May Beattie, Joan Parkes, and Iris Robinson. Sinn Féin sent Annie Armstrong, Lucilita Bhreatnach, Maria Caraher, Michelle O’Conner, and Dodie McGuiness, with women making up almost a third of their delegation, though the party was expelled from the Forum after a ceasefire breach by the IRA. The Alliance Party sent Eileen Bell, their General Secretary.  

147 Interview with Liz O’Donnell, Minister of State, Government of Ireland, January 21, 2015.  
148 Fearon, Women’s Work, 16.  
Table 1: Gender Breakdown of the Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WOMEN</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MEN</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UUP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinn Féin</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKUP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIWC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, when it came time to choose delegates to the Multi-Party Talks, few parties sent women to represent them. Aside from the NIWC, whose two delegates were Monica McWilliams and Pearl Sagar, and whose back-bench team was comprised entirely of women, most of the negotiating teams were men. Eileen Bell was a key member of the Alliance negotiating team, though she was not an official delegate at the table, and Dawn Purvis served in an integral back-benching role for the PUP. Brid Rodgers was the chairwoman of SDLP’s Forum negotiating team, and she made frequent media appearances with the SDLP delegates and was subsequently appointed SDLP’s Deputy Leader. Sinn Féin named Luciilita Bhreatnach as one of its three delegates, the only party besides the NIWC with a woman at the table, and their negotiating team also included Bairbre de Brun and Dodie McGuinness, among others.

Women diplomats from the U.S., U.K., and Republic of Ireland also played a leading role during this period. The U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Ireland was Jean Kennedy Smith, and the Consul General in Belfast was Kathleen Stephens. When Mitchell was appointed to lead the Multi-Party Talks, his deputy was Martha Pope. The U.K. Ambassador to Ireland was Veronica Sutherland, Baroness Jean Denton served as a Northern Ireland minister, and the Secretary of State to Northern Ireland was Mo Mowlam. The Irish Minister of State for Human Rights, who served as a representative of the Irish Government at the Mitchell Talks, was Liz O’Donnell. Many of these women continued as key players throughout the peace process, and other women who participated in the Talks noted their impact. “One of the key women within the whole of the negotiations was Martha Pope,” said Dawn Purvis of the PUP, “She was such an inspiration, such a phenomenal woman in that role that she played... Going out and talking to all of the parties individually and understanding bottom lines and need and wants.” Many credited these women with encouraging and taking other women’s input seriously, and in giving them direct access to mediators through formal and informal meetings. “Martha would’ve always been looking out to give us a chance when we weren’t taken seriously,” noted NIWC member Jane Wilde. Morrice recalls, “Mo Mowlam was a huge key to our access. The fact that she was a woman Secretary of State... she understood where we were coming from and helped open doors for us.”

Women in these diplomatic posts were also public advocates for women’s

150 Ibid.
153 Interview with Jane Wilde, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, January 16, 2015.
154 Interview with Jane Morrice, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, January 12, 2015.
participation more broadly. According to Michelle Gildernew of Sinn Féin: “It was both Hillary [Clinton] and then later on Mo Mowlam who would have done their best to encourage women’s participation... and I think without [them] there’d be parties who wouldn’t have had women at all, at any level, engaged in the political process and in the peace negotiations.”

**The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition**

One of the important narratives surrounding women’s involvement in the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement is that of the creation, campaign, and presence of the NIWC, a political party that sent two delegates to the negotiations with the express purpose of serving as a voice for women on both sides of the conflict. The NIWC was a non-traditional party, constituted primarily of women civil society leaders who felt disenfranchised by the existing political status quo. Taking advantage of a change in the electoral system, the NIWC mobilized as a party, shaped an agenda prioritizing the “bread and butter” issues they felt were lacking in formal politics – issues like education, economic opportunity, and security that affected their everyday lives – and conducted a successful campaign to win a place at the table.

**Why did women in civil society mobilize for peace?**

The NIWC was a political home for those disillusioned with partisan politics. Four parties dominated Northern Ireland’s electoral politics – the UUP, DUP, SDLP, and Sinn Féin – each of which fell squarely on one side or the other of the unionist/nationalist divide. “I, along with a lot of women, had been so incredibly frustrated with what was happening here politically,” recalled Annie Campbell, one of the NIWC’s founding members, “and, as a feminist, feeling that my voice was not being heard anywhere.” Driven by general disenfranchisement in existing parties, the NIWC captured the imagination of women across the political spectrum. A study conducted by Wilford, Miller, Donaghue, and Bell in 1993 found that when women were asked which party in Northern Ireland best represented the interests of women, two thirds responded “none.”

The NIWC’s founders recognized the necessity of women’s participation in peace processes, and saw the corresponding lack of women present in the political leadership of the assumed main players for the Multi-Party Talks announced in 1996. The precipitating factor that led to the creation of the NIWC was a paper that the Northern Ireland Women’s European Platform circulated to major political parties advocating for the substantive inclusion of women in the upcoming negotiations. When they received little acknowledgment, a group of seven women civil society leaders issued an invitation to women across the

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155 Interview with Michelle Gildernew, Sinn Féin, February 25, 2015.
156 Interview with Annie Campbell, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, January 12, 2015.
region to a meeting in Belfast. There, they presented the idea of campaigning in the upcoming elections as a unified women’s party to overwhelming support.  

The NIWC sought to elevate the “bread and butter” issues faced by women every day into the formal political structures and peace process that tended to prioritize the constitutional question of Northern Ireland’s position within the United Kingdom. Most of its members had personally felt the impacts of the Troubles in their own lives, families, and communities. Motivated by experiences of adversity, persecution, intimidation, loss, frustration, and fatigue, as well as a sense of duty and desire to foster a better future, they were determined to alter the status quo of Northern Irish politics. “There was such enthusiasm,” remembered Brenda Callaghan, a member of the NIWC Forum team, “the energy, the commitment, and the absolute desire to do something to try to feed something different into the process was immense.”

Not all women in civil society supported the party and its aims. At the initial meeting, there was dissent over the decision to join formal politics. Marie Mulholland, coordinator of the Women’s Support Network, told journalist Nell McCafferty that the NIWC was, “colluding with a system that was from the beginning weighted against radical organizations.” Believing the process itself to be flawed, she thought the NIWC’s participation gave validity to an illegitimate structure with nothing to offer women. Nonetheless, the party’s deep roots in the women’s movement and broader civil society in Northern Ireland, from where most of its membership came, made it a legitimate voice for women from civil society at the formal peace table.

How did the women in civil society mobilize and organize?

Northern Ireland’s unusual electoral system for the 1996 elections to the Forum for Political Dialogue opened a unique opportunity that the founding members of the NIWC seized. In addition to a closed-list proportional representational system in each constituency, the law created a “top-up” list that guaranteed two seats to the ten parties that received the most votes across all of Northern Ireland. This system was designed to allow smaller parties, otherwise unable to compete against the four largest parties in a given constituency, the opportunity to have a voice in the negotiations. Though primarily targeted to fringe loyalist parties, including those that acted as the political arm of unionist paramilitaries, the “top-up” system opened the door for the NIWC as well. With help from a political scientist at Queens University, founding members calculated that if the NIWC could get 10,000 votes, they would have a chance at making the “top-
up list.”\(^{168}\) They set a goal of running 100 candidates across Northern Ireland’s 18 constituencies; if each one received 100 votes they would reach the threshold necessary to win a seat.

With six weeks to the March 30 elections, the NIWC core members began in earnest to develop a platform and strategy that would allow them to coalesce as a unified party. Leveraging their expansive network and diverse capacities, they sought to form an inclusive party with open structures and processes – a party that would be accessible to as broad a spectrum of women as possible. Founding member Avila Kilmurray remembers, “From the word go we had women active in both rural and urban areas and women that had experience from civil rights movements, from civil society organizations, as well as some that had come through other political parties, too.”\(^{169}\) The party pursued diverse membership across the board and ensured political balance in its leadership and structures, being particularly sensitive to balance between Catholic and Protestant communities.\(^{170}\)

From the outset, the party had no membership restrictions; NIWC members could maintain membership in existing political parties, easing the tension some members felt between their political allegiances and their cross-community work.\(^{171}\) The party drew members by mobilizing a pre-existing network of colleagues and friends, many of whom were connected through previous work in the women’s movement, civil rights movement, and other peace activism. The NIWC purposefully recruited women from both sides of the political divide, and expressly sought out those with experience in community development, cross-community activities, and the Northern Ireland women’s movement to shape mobilization and organizational strategies. Core members cultivated a diverse constituency that drew on individuals with experience in electoral systems, policy drafting, media, trade unions, volunteer organizations, mediation, and other vital political skills, as well as represented a wide spectrum of women in Northern Ireland.

In order to recruit enough candidates to reach their electoral goal of running 100 women across Northern Ireland’s 18 constituencies, core party members leveraged their networks and friends to stand for elections, and engaged in women’s political consciousness-raising. Many of the women they targeted were former colleagues from the civil rights movement and the women’s movement. “I suppose we were a small group of leaders, women leaders, in Northern Ireland at the time, and we all knew each other,” recalls Eithne McNulty, an NIWC member from Fermanagh.\(^{172}\) The NIWC sought to take the mystery out of politics and get women to reconsider politics as an avenue to change the status quo. With women largely reticent to stand for elections, the NIWC members lead by example. Jane Wilde remembers calling one hundred

\(^{168}\) Kenney “Waving Goodbye to the Dinosaurs?”, 14; Avila Kilmurray and Monica McWilliams, “Struggling for Peace: How Women in Northern Ireland Challenged the Status Quo,” The Solutions Journal, (2011); Rynder, “The Origins and Early Years of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition,” 47; Interview with Margaret Logue, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Brenda Callaghan, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Fearon and McWilliams, “Swimming Against the Mainstream,” 122; Fearon, “Women’s Work,” 10.

\(^{169}\) Interview with Avila Kilmurray, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.

\(^{170}\) Porter, “Risks & Responsibility,” 166-167; Nolan-Haley and Hinds, “Problem-Solving Negotiation,” 394; Interview with Annie Campbell, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Avila Kilmurray, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Jane Morrice, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Kate Fearon, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Bronagh Hinds, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Jane Wilde, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Ann Hope, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Margaret Logue, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Catherine Cooke, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Diane Greer, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Monica McWilliams, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Eithne McNulty, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, February 11, 2015.

\(^{171}\) McWilliams and Kilmurray, “Struggling for Peace.”

\(^{172}\) Interview with Eithne McNulty, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
women asking if they would consider running in their constituencies. When they responded by asking if she was planning to do so herself, she decided to throw her hat in the ring. “There was an issue of setting an example, and participation, and ‘I will if you will.’”\(^{173}\)

With limited time to prepare for elections, the early days of the NIWC were chaotic and informal in character. General meetings were held on procedures, organization, logistics, and funding. Specific issue meetings were held at the university and at certain individuals’ homes. In addition to diverse perspectives, members brought varied expertise that proved essential to their success. “These were not new skills that we had to learn, but they were skills that we transferred from other areas,” said founding member Kate Fearon of the grassroots campaign tactics used by the NIWC.\(^ {174}\)

The NIWC presented itself as a party with a new brand of politics – something essential to turn the page in Northern Ireland’s history. Its campaign posters read, “Wave Goodbye to Dinosaurs,” and it promised a change from decades of partisanship. The party used innovative tactics that grabbed the public’s and the media’s attention and played on its newcomer status, turning the seeming impediment of naïveté into an advantage.\(^ {175}\) Securing billboards “made a huge impact,” recalls Campbell, “precisely because there had just about never been a picture of a woman on the wall, standing for election. So it didn’t really matter who you were. It was just like, ‘Whoa! A woman!’”\(^{176}\) Operating on a shoestring budget with only one paid employee, the NIWC ran a truly grassroots campaign. They used whatever resources their personal networks could spare, from space to telephones, and ultimately succeeded in getting 1.03 per cent of the vote, the ninth of ten parties to be granted “top-up” seats. “We had no expectation whatsoever,” notes Fearon of the party’s victory, “it was a surprise for us as well as for everybody else.”\(^ {177}\) As Diane Greer concludes, “it was complete and utter mayhem, but we did it.”\(^ {178}\)

**How did they assemble and shape agendas?**

After the Forum election, the NIWC centralized its structure as a political party. An executive committee formed, comprised of core drafters, policy thinkers, and communication strategists, while the elected mem-

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173 Interview with Jane Wilde, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
174 Interview with Kate Fearon, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
175 Blood, _Watch My Lips, I’m Speaking!_, 152; Sharoni, “Gendering Conflict and Peace in Israel/Palestine and the North of Ireland,” 16; McWilliams and Kilmurray “Struggling for Peace.”; Interview with Ann Hope, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Annie Campbell, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
176 Interview with Annie Campbell, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
177 Interview with Kate Fearon, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
178 Interview with Diane Greer, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
members ran local operations in their respective constituencies. Core members describe the structure as "relatively horizontal," although many in the periphery express the presence of a disconnect between the Belfast headquarters and the grassroots members dispersed throughout Northern Ireland. By joining the formal political structures, thereby integrating the NIWC into an elite process, core members did not want to alienate constituents and thus delegitimize their status. The bifurcated party structure established the means for local voices to feed into the party’s policy formulation process. Toeing the line between traditional party hierarchy and the “tyranny of structurelessness” that sometimes overwhelms grassroots movements, the executive committee tried to keep membership connected, holding monthly general meetings to remain accessible to its members and to update constituents on the negotiations.

The NIWC subsequently shaped its agenda through an emergent process, where policies and activities were not specified in advance, but unfolded over time as knowledge gained from earlier interactions shaped policies and activities. Instead of setting out a party platform, the NIWC embraced three core principles that guided their strategies and activities from the outset: inclusion, equality, and human rights. These principles drove their internal party processes and their external relationships with other parties, and served as a ruler against which to measure their stance on issues raised during the negotiations. “We used those principles as a lens in terms of the political positions we took,” said Kilmurray. With no pre-existing political platform, the NIWC could maintain flexibility on the political fissures that constrained mainstream parties. “We were a new party and therefore we didn’t have a whole range of policies,” recounts Hinds. By adhering to its principles, the party adopted a cross-sectarian approach, refusing to take a position on the primary political divide of constitutionalism. The NIWC used its “new party” status as further reasoning for why it need not formulate a pre-articulated position on every issue – a rationale that gave them additional space to avoid taking a stance on the constitutional question.

The NIWC agenda was shaped and strengthened by global and regional contexts. Many of its founding members were influenced by the Beijing Conference and the resulting Platform of Action, which outlined

179 Interview with Brenda Callaghan, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Catherine Cooke, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Eithne McNulty, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
180 Interview with Kate Fearon, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Catherine Cooke, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Eithne McNulty, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
181 Interview with Annie Campbell, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Avila Kilmurray, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Jane Morrice, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Carmel Roulston, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Kate Fearon, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Kate Fearon, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Anne Carr, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Bronagh Hinds, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Brenda Callaghan, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Jane Wilde, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Ann Hope, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Margaret Logue, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Catherine Cooke, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Diane Greer, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Monica McWilliams, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Rynder, “The Origins and Early Years of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition,” 46; Nolan-Haley and Hinds, “Problem-Solving Negotiation,” 394.
182 Interview with Avila Kilmurray, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
183 Interview with Bronagh Hinds, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
an agenda for women’s empowerment.185 “We certainly didn’t want to reinvent the wheel,” notes Fearon, “[We] saw ourselves in an international context... very much looking to see what lessons there were, and what language, from other women’s experiences in other places.”186 The party adopted the Beijing Platform wholesale, and looked to the experiences of women in peace processes in Guatemala and South Africa for guidance.187 The agenda also reflected expertise from the NIWC’s wider networks. Wilde explains, “We all had contacts in our fields, and one of the real strengths I think is that we were able to contact those people, ask them for help, when we were writing policy papers.”188

Although the NIWC did formulate a shared agenda, cleavages emerged within the party particularly in relation to class structures, urban and rural divides, and ideology. The tensions between identity and politics between members of the NIWC resemble transversal politics, and the concept of “rooting and shifting” developed by Yuval-Davis.189 The concept of transversal dialogue recognizes there are different perspectives to each situation, and knowledge built on one point of view is incomplete. In line with the NIWC’s three principles, transversal politics embraces difference through equality. It differentiates between positioning, identity, and values, so that collective positions are not automatically conflated with political values. From this standpoint, groups can share common values across different positioning and identities. One instance where community divides arose was over the issue of releasing political prisoners, which Hinds identifies as a class divide between middle-class women who did not understand the impacts of internment, and working-class women whose family members were in jail.190 Ultimately, party members supported prisoner release, drawing on their own experiences in the Troubles and their commitment to human rights, recognizing that prisoners left behind struggling families.

As the Talks progressed and core members needed to focus more attention on the negotiations taking place at Stormont, opportunities for peripheral members to stay in contact with the core dwindled. Catherine Cooke, an NIWC member based in Derry, notes, “They were a very Belfast-based party so it was very difficult to make it wider and bring it to Derry.”191 Despite good faith efforts of core members to maintain connections with other regions, the focus on Stormont meant women outside the core often felt left behind. “To be a member, on the periphery... it was really hard to stay connected,” recalled Eithne McNulty, “Everything happened at Stormont... everything happened at the [NIWC] offices in University Street, and we felt quite disconnected. [...] As the Women’s Coalition grew in maturity, that rural/urban divide widened if anything.”192 More divisions arose in 1998 when the NIWC decided to maintain its status as a formal political party following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and stand candidates in the 1998 Assembly elections. Some members who had joined the party at its inception felt it had served its purpose and were uncomfortable with its increasing institutionalization in order to become part of the Assembly.193

185 Interview with Bronagh Hinds, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Monica McWilliams, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Brenda Callaghan, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Margaret Logue, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Catherine Cooke, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Fearon, and McWilliams, “Swimming Against the Mainstream,” 130; Rynder, “The Origins and Early Years of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition,” 47; Meyer, “Gender Politics in the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” 182.
186 Interview with Kate Fearon, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
187 Ibid.; Interview with Monica McWilliams, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
188 Interview with Jane Wilde, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
190 Interview with Bronagh Hinds, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
191 Interview with Catherine Cooke, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
192 Interview with Eithne McNulty, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
193 Interview with Catherine Cooke, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Margaret Logue, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Jane Wilde, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Monica McWilliams, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
How did they negotiate their goals? To what extent were their priorities represented in the resulting peace agreement?

The NIWC succeeded in their objectives of forming Northern Ireland’s first women’s political party, gaining two seats at the peace table through the 1996 elections and exerting some influence on the formal peace talks. They overcame national divisions by establishing a party focused on an inclusive process of cross-community dialogue and fostering cross-party relationships, which were distinct from conventional party politics in Northern Ireland. Their efforts enabled the concerns of women in civil society to be heard, taken seriously, and brought into the formal peace process, in many cases for the first time.

Interviews with NIWC members and members of other parties, as well as a review of secondary literature, identify the impact of the NIWC in three primary areas: their role as an “honest broker,” facilitating dialogue between opposing parties, their inserting issues and language into the final agreement that otherwise may have been omitted, and their effect on women’s political participation in Northern Ireland more broadly.

The NIWC’s commitment to inclusivity, one of the party’s three core principles, led them to play the role of an “honest broker” between parties. O’Donnell recalls the NIWC “were trusted intermediaries in many ways... they were very much part of the consultative process,” particularly when officials needed a back channel to gauge positions of opposing parties. When Sinn Féin was barred from the negotiations following a ceasefire breach by the IRA, the NIWC maintained relations with the party, reporting back on what was happening in Stormont. “We worked very hard at trying to keep people in, you know the people who might have had a hard time staying in,” says Greer, in reference both to Sinn Féin and the UDP, who were also at times excluded from the Talks due to the UFF’s implication in three murders. The NIWC’s commitment to inclusivity, refusal to take a side on the constitutional question, direct links to civil society, and status as a small party all helped them gain legitimacy as intermediaries, as did the fact that they posed a minimal threat to the bigger political players. “We were an honest broker,” said Wilde, “because we were seen as people... who were hardly going to challenge the main blocs of politics in terms of voting, and who behaved well.” The relationship-building work that earned the NIWC a reputation as intermediaries was a key strategy to negotiating their goals in the Talks. They developed personal contacts in other parties and established ties to the negotiation team led by Senator Mitchell, particularly through Martha Pope, and took advantage of informal settings such as smoking breaks or the coffee bar to network and collect information.

194 Jacobson, “Women and Peace in Northern Ireland,” 191; Sharoni, “Gendering Conflict and Peace in Israel/Palestine and the North of Ireland,” 17; Kilmurray and McWilliams, “Struggling for Peace”; Nolan-Haley and Hinds, “Problem-Solving Negotiation,” 395; Meyer, “Gender Politics in the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” 190; Interview with Annie Campbell, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Avila Kilmurray, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Jane Morrice, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Carmel Roulston, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Kate Fearon, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Anne Carr, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Bronagh Hinds, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Brenda Callaghan, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Anne Carr, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Bronagh Hinds, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Catherine Cooke, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Diane Greer, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Monica McWilliams, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.

195 Interview with Liz O’Donnell, Minister of State, Government of Ireland.


197 Interview with Diane Greer, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.

198 Interview with Jane Wilde, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.

199 Interview with Monica McWilliams, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
Determined not only to serve as mediators, NIWC members took their role as negotiators seriously and worked to ensure their agenda was included in the language of the final agreement. “On the substance there was lots of things that if, had we not been there wouldn’t have been in,” said Monica McWilliams, listing a number of achievements including, “The Civic Forum, the victims’ recognition, that whole chapter on reconciliation, mixed housing, integrated education, the rights of young people… the human rights and equality section we were very strong advocates for, and the Human Rights Commission and proposals on the Bill of Rights.”

Though one of the NIWC’s central tenants was women’s participation, their priorities spanned a range of issues primarily relating to greater inclusion for all marginalized groups, and focusing on social development and reconciliation rather than the constitutional issue.

The NIWC initiated the idea of a Civic Forum as part of the Northern Ireland Assembly to institutionalize opportunities for broader public participation in politics. The creation of a Civic Forum was eventually incorporated into the agreement as part of Strand I, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland. Concentrated lobbying by the NIWC was responsible for the inclusion of a clause ensuring the “right of women to full and equal political participation” in the final Agreement, mentioned in Chapter 6, “Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity,” under both Human Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Issues. Several NIWC party members highlighted the inclusion of integrated education as one of the NIWC’s greatest achievements. In the first draft of the agreement there was no mention of integrated education… [Jane Morrice and I] drafted that short piece that’s in the agreement,” said Anne Carr, a longtime advocate for integrated schools prior to joining the NIWC. Integrated education is incorporated in Chapter 5, Strand 3 of the Agreement, which states, “An essential aspect of the reconciliation process is the promotion of a culture of tolerance at every level of society, including initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated edu-

200 Ibid.
202 Chapter 3, Strand 1: 34. A consultative Civic Forum will be established. It will comprise representatives of the business, trade union and voluntary sectors, and such other sectors as agreed by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. It will act as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues.
204 Kilmurray and McWilliams, “Struggling for Peace”; Interview with Annie Campbell, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Avila Kilmurray, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Jane Morrice, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Anne Carr, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition; Interview with Monica McWilliams, Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
205 Interview with Anne Carr, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
Language regarding victims was a significant priority for the NIWC, and one that every member interviewed mentioned as an achievement of the party. Noting the imbalance between language on prisoners and language on victims in the first draft of the Agreement, the NIWC reached out to NGOs in their networks representing victims to advise them on how best to acknowledge the needs of that population. In the final agreement, Chapter 5, Strand 3 includes three paragraphs to “acknowledge and address the suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation” and ensuring the “provision of services that are supportive and sensitive to the needs of victims” is a key element requiring resources. The NIWC also advocated for an inclusive electoral system, but as Carmel Roulston recalled, “in the end we couldn’t get a consensus across other parties to consider changing the electoral system so we decided not to make that a deal breaker.” Several NIWC members later referenced electoral reform as a significant regret, noting that the electoral climate in Northern Ireland remains unfriendly to small parties, which serves to push out more moderate voices.

The NIWC and women’s political participation

One of the NIWC’s stated goals was increasing women’s participation in politics, in which they succeeded on a number of counts. Internally, the party worked to build the capacities of its members. “Wherever party politics operated was a realm the women didn’t enter and we wanted to demystify all of that,” states Greer, recalling that the NIWC kept a seat at the negotiations open for a “learner,” a member from outside the core team, to see the operations up close. Externally, members of the NIWC claimed that their visibility promoted an increase in women’s political participation more broadly in Northern Irish politics, especially evident when parties tried to capitalize on the media attention received by the NIWC for its novelty by raising the profile of the women in their own parties. As Cooke said, “[the NIWC] worked because it made parties think about women and for a while they made it act on it.” News stories from the time seem to bolster these claims. A 1997 article in the *Irish Times* contends the NIWC “sent the other parties scrambling for women within their ranks to push in front of the cameras.” Cowell-Meyers notes both the numerical increase of female candidates across the board following the 1996 elections, and traces the changes in other parties’ commitment to women’s issues following the creation of the NIWC. Only Sinn Féin, the SDLP, and Alliance consistently mentioned human rights prior to 1996, but in the 1997 Westminster elections, Sinn Féin, the SDLP, Alliance, UUP, and PUP all explicitly mentioned the importance of gender equality and women’s participation in politics in party documents.

Interviews with women in other parties reveal a range of additional factors contributing to women’s political participation. Though women were, and remain, considerably underrepresented in Northern Irish politics...
politics, several parties had made serious efforts to include women prior to the 1996 elections. By the time the NIWC was formed, Sinn Féin had already made public strides towards increasing women’s roles in the party. A 1995 article in British publication The Independent noted that “the women of Sinn Féin are not only visible, they have emerged as major players in the developing peace process,” and traced this trend to party policy changes beginning as early as 1980.215 O’Hare and Gildernew of Sinn Féin both highlighted the important role played by women in the party throughout its history and during the talks. “We always had a very great complement of women members,” said O’Hare, “we brought in a quota system in the 80s... to ensure women were there in the decision-making process.”216 A women’s wing, the Sinn Féin Women’s Department, emerged in 1981 and continued to cultivate women’s participation and influence policy; in 1992 the Women’s Department submitted a women’s policy document, “Women in Ireland,” that was incorporated into the party platform.217 At the time of the peace talks, women held a number of important party positions, including Lucilita Bhreatnach, the General Secretary, Bairbre de Brun, chair of the international department, and Siobhan O’Hanlon, one of Gerry Adams’ close associates. As Gildernew said, “the high level of women in the negotiating teams was a result of the numbers of women within the party at every level. [...] Not because they were there to make up the numbers from a gender point of view, but because they... were setting the policy, dictating the pace of change, and were at the table as a right.”218

In 1995, 40 per cent of Sinn Féin’s National Executive members were women, as were the SDLP’s, and women in the Alliance Party comprised 30 per cent of its Executive.219 Brid Rodgers of the SDLP – her party’s former Chairperson, General Secretary and part of the party’s talks team at Stormont recalled her entry into politics long before 1996. She was first elected chair of the party in 1980 with the support of its male leaders, though she acknowledged, “it was not easy in those days to be a woman in our party. [...] There’s no use to pretend otherwise, all the parties including my own party, they were all dominated by men.”220 Eileen Bell of the Alliance Party, later the first female speaker of the Northern Irish Assembly, remembered trying to address women’s participation, noting, “We had tried... before the Women’s Coalition was thought of or formed, we had tried to get women from other political parties [together],” but had found unionist and nationalist politicians were hesitant to meet with each other.221

“I think the Women’s Coalition did us all a world of good in highlighting the fact that women’s voices not only should be there by right, but they actually should be valued for the contribution that they make.”

Dawn Purvis, Progressive Unionist Party

“About half the members would have been women,” said May Steele, the single female delegate of the UUP to the Forum for Political Dialogue, of her party, “I don’t ever remember any problem with the mix except

216 Interview with Rita O’Hare, Sinn Féin, March 10, 2015.
218 Interview with Michelle Gildernew, Sinn Féin.
220 Interview with Brid Rodgers, Social Democratic and Labour Party, January 14, 2015.
221 Interview with Eileen Bell, Alliance Party, January 13, 2015.
getting women to stand for election. [...] A lot of women they would have said the politics are the men’s prerogative.” Studies by Wilford and Ward corroborate that women comprised upwards of 40 per cent of UUP and DUP membership, but both parties had a deficit of female candidates. From the PUP, Dawn Purvis credited the 1994 ceasefires and support from her own party with her political rise. The ceasefires, she said, made politics safer and “gave women that space within the community to find their voices and become more involved in community politics.” Most of the women from other parties noted in particular the short tenure of the NIWC, and their lack of political voice during the implementation of the Agreement. “I can appreciate their value,” said Bell, “it’s just a pity that they didn’t get a chance to go further.” Though the party folded in 2006, Dawn Purvis concluded, “I think the Women’s Coalition did us all a world of good in highlighting the fact that women’s voices not only should be there by right, but they actually should be valued for the contribution that they make.”

Though they were not the only women’s voices present in the discussions, the NIWC did bring a perspective from women in civil society that women working within a party mandate did not necessarily have the inclination or opportunity to champion. Their own members’ deep connections in community organizations, women’s groups, and human rights advocacy work, as well as their networks in broader civil society, meant that the NIWC brought specific issues and language to the agreement that would likely otherwise have been overlooked.

**After the agreement**

The Good Friday Agreement was an unprecedented and necessary step forward that ceased decades of violence, but the underlying social and political causes of conflict remain largely unexamined. The Civic Forum, a body many NIWC members pointed to as one of their greatest achievements, was dissolved in 2002 and has yet to be reconstituted. Despite the NIWC’s efforts to include language on integrated education, in 2013, 93 per cent of Northern Ireland’s children still attended segregated schools. The new Stormont House Agreement, signed in January 2015, boils down the vast majority of language concerning human rights, civil society, and the “bread and butter” issues championed by the NIWC to one paragraph.

Following the signing of the Agreement and a fervent referendum campaign by the NIWC to ensure that it passed, the party stood candidates for the 1998 election and both Monica McWilliams and Jane Morrice were elected to the Stormont Assembly. In the 2003 elections, perhaps due to return to partisanship and a closing of space for cross-community politics, the NIWC lost both national seats. In 2006, the NIWC officially closed its doors as a formal party. Many of the former NIWC members returned to civil society and continue their cross-community work, advocating for the same agenda items they did during the negotiations. When asked what they would have done differently, women across the board regretted gaps in the implementation phase.

**Conclusion**

The Multi-Party Talks leading up to the Good Friday Agreement opened Northern Ireland’s peace process wider than it had ever been, bringing in a number of previously excluded actors, including women. The Talks coincided with efforts in civil society, the international community, and within some political parties to increase women’s participation, and through a temporary change in electoral law, the NIWC was able to

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222 Interview with May Steele, Ulster Unionist Party, January 19, 2015.
225 Interview with Eileen Bell, Alliance Party.
226 Interview with Dawn Purvis, Progressive Unionist Party.
227 Murtagh, “A Transient Transition,” 23; Interview with Ann Hope, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.
mobilize a coalition of women civil society leaders to win legitimate representation and impact the process from the table. Defining itself as a non-traditional party driven by core principles, the NIWC built a cross-community coalition, and shaped its agenda through an emergent process. As the Talks progressed, the NIWC faced the competing challenges, and resultant internal cleavages, of remaining connected to its grassroots base and actively participating in the peace process. New to the procedures and machinations of peace processes, the NIWC fostered relationships at every opportunity in an effort to influence the negotiations, but also had to climb a steep learning curve to be taken seriously by fellow negotiators. Ultimately, the party served as an “honest broker” between opposing parties, successfully integrated issues and language into the Good Friday Agreement; and impacted women’s political participation in Northern Ireland more broadly. Though a number of women achieved influential positions within their own party teams during the talks, the NIWC served most directly as a conduit for the voices of women in civil society.

Harnessing the expertise of its diverse membership and larger civil society networks, and grounding its policies in a foundation of human rights, equality, and inclusion, the NIWC was able to sustain a transversal coalition in the midst of a polarizing conflict, bringing a unique perspective to the Talks. By drawing on in-depth interviews from a range of actors involved in the Good Friday negotiations, this study adds to the existing literature on the NIWC by introducing additional nuance into how women mobilized and built transversal coalitions, the internal cleavages within the party, the roles played by women outside the NIWC, and the variance in assessments of the NIWC's role in the Northern Irish peace process. Northern Ireland is an important case in terms of women’s participation in formal peace processes as it offers a clear example of how women in a divided society were able to organize on the basis of their shared experiences as women, and leverage their existing networks and resources to gain access to a formal process.
Introduction

This chapter explores how women in civil society gained access to the peace process between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit or URNG) from 1991-1996. While this chapter details the interaction between civil society women and women working on behalf of the Guatemalan government and the URNG in the context of the peace process, it first provides a political economy analysis of the civil war in Guatemala. The focus then shifts to how women in civil society accessed the high-level peace negotiations through a formal mechanism called the Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (Civil Society Assembly, ASC), which was designed to encourage civic discourse. Women from a diverse cross-section of society came together and, under very tight time constraints, collectively mobilized to form the Women’s Sector as part of the ASC. They espoused a consensus-based approach to shaping an agenda, navigated internal challenges through exhaustive dialogue, formed strategic alliances with women and men from other sectors in the ASC, lobbied relentlessly to advance their goals, and prepared detailed proposals for consideration by other civil society sectors as well as the official negotiating delegations. The analysis is informed and enriched by in-depth interviews with an eclectic array of actors, including women within the Women’s Sector, members of other sectors within the ASC, women in civil society working outside the ASC process, and official participants of the government and URNG negotiation teams as well as their advisors.

Driven by a desire to end the war, women, as members and leaders of CSOs, played critical roles in shaping the progress of negotiations, as well as some of the content in each of the accords, including language related specifically to women’s rights and gender equality, as well as non-gender specific substance. As the chapter details, they prioritized issues of reconciliation, justice, economic opportunity, land reform, return of refugees, and violence against women, in addition to gender equality and women’s rights more broadly. Women leveraged alliances across ethnic, geographic, economic, and political divides, formed coalitions, prepared rigorously, relied on male allies, and pursued their goals doggedly. The comprehensive peace agreement, which finally brought an end to a three decade-long civil war, included 11 accords on the issues of addressing human rights violations, the resettlement of groups displaced by the conflict, the rights
of indigenous peoples, socio-economic issues, land rights, civilian power, the role of the armed forces in post-conflict Guatemala, constitutional reforms, and the integration of the URNG into civilian life. Each of the thematic accords included language on women’s rights and gender equality as it related to participation in all sectors of society, ending all forms of discrimination against women, and recognizing the vulnerability of indigenous women. The success of civil society women’s engagement was mixed, varying by issue area, with substantive points in the accords diluted over the course of a cumbersome process.

Political economy of the conflict in Guatemala

Guatemala endured a 36-year civil war that left 200,000 civilians either dead or forcibly disappeared, and hundreds of thousands of people displaced, with much of the violence perpetrated by the government and national military. The overwhelming majority (figures range from 60 to 80 per cent) of the victims was indigenous Mayans, an historically marginalized and ostracized demographic who were overwhelmingly illiterate and poor.

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228 The cumulative government responsibility was for 89.65 per cent of the total violations, with the army being responsible for 62.9 per cent of all violations; 4.81 per cent of the violations are attributed to the guerilla organizations. Marcie Mersky, “Human Rights in Negotiating Peace Agreements: Guatemala,” (working paper, International Council on Human Rights Policy, Belfast, 2005): 3; Charles Reilly, Peacebuilding and Development in Guatemala and Northern Ireland, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 23; Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again! (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1999): 290.

The underlying causes of the civil war are complex and multifold. The Spanish colonialists seized land from the indigenous peoples and exploited their labor to harvest cash crops such as sugar and cacao. Shortly after independence in 1821, the persistence of inequitable land distribution led to violent clashes between poor campesinos (or farmers) and wealthy (non-indigenous) ladinos that had taken increasing control of land and labor. It is one of the key factors that contributed over time to the coup, regime change, and civil war discussed below. The ladino elites also continued the colonialist legacy of pervasive racism towards indigenous peoples that dominated the country’s post-independence history. The racist views were used to justify violence towards indigenous peoples in order for ladino elites to hold onto economic and political power in the 1970s and 1980s. Both education and religion contributed to shaping indigenous identity, consciousness-raising, and collective action. In particular, liberation theology contributed to the realization amongst indigenous groups of the importance of social and economic rights, as well as the need to mobilize the poor to fight for liberation and political change.

Extreme income inequality, especially amongst the indigenous population and campesinos vis-à-vis ladinos and a very small group of wealthy elites in government, military, and business sector, reinforced the vast distance between the rich and the poor. The lack of access to basic services, such as education and health care, and the prevalent poverty amongst the masses in non-urban areas resulted in high rates of malnutrition, illiteracy, unemployment, and marginalization, and bred resentment, mistrust, and social tension. The state institutions and policies were not only exclusionary in nature, but the authoritarian regimes of post-independence Guatemala preferred and profited from these discriminatory structures. Structural violence against the poor, the indigenous, and women were the historical norm, mixed in with a culture of sexism deeply entrenched in patriarchy. Although the Guatemalan economy has always relied heavily on the agricultural sector, despite some diversification in the last two decades, poor and indigenous people have always lacked access to land. This was a key issue in the lead up to and throughout the civil war, as well as a focal point in the peace process. Caumartin explains:

> In Guatemala, the state has not assumed a mediating role between various social and economic interests; it has produced a vacuum that led to a direct confrontation between the beneficiaries of this socio-economic order (the elite), those that defended it (the security forces) and those that aspired to increase their share and participation.\(^{230}\)

Moreover, the geopolitical backdrop of the Cold War and the meddling of foreign governments, particularly the United States, contributed to the promulgation of the protracted violence. The violence began in 1944, when Jorge Ubico, the military dictator in control of the country, was ousted by José Arévalo during the democratic nationalist revolution.\(^{231}\) The subsequent revolutionary government promised democratic liberties, free elections, increased social welfare, and equality.\(^{232}\) While the country, under control of the counterrevolutionary government, indicated signs of economic growth, landowners and the military maintained control over the majority of the wealth, while the rural populations, particularly indigenous Mayan communities, saw little to no improvement in their living conditions under the new government.\(^{233}\) The economic inequality and ethnic discrimination towards indigenous people resulted in rural and indigenous communities supporting leftist organizations who promised to improve their standards of living.\(^{234}\) When Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio ascended to power in 1970, he institutionalized a counterinsurgency strategy, inherited from his previous career in the army, to root out remaining leftist, Communist-leaning rebel guerrilla groups.\(^{235}\)

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234 *Ibid*.

Continued violence, insecurity, and human suffering

The 1970s marked a period of sporadic armed conflict between government forces and guerrilla groups, mainly within the northern and western sections of the country in both rural and urban settings. Mayan communities bore the brunt of this violence, suffering heavy losses of land and lives. The conflict reached its height in the early 1980s, with over 6,000 fighters actively engaged in guerrilla warfare, and between 250,000 and 500,000 active supporters of the four main guerrilla groups (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres, Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, Organización del Pueblo en Armas, and Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo). The groups united in 1982 to create the leftist URNG, which sought to overthrow the state and establish a new system based on Marxist principles. Their base of supporters consisted primarily of indigenous people within the western part of the country. In an effort to stifle the growing support for the guerrilla groups, the government instituted a ‘scorched earth’ campaign, which had devastating consequences for rural, agrarian communities who relied on the land for their livelihoods. Between 1981 and 1983, up to 150,000 people, including guerrilla fighters and civilians who supported or were perceived to support the rebels, were killed or disappeared.

Women, in many ways, bore the brunt of the direct, structural, and cultural violence. They were subjected to targeted attacks, including mass rape, forced impregnation, imprisonment, torture, and sexual abuse by military personnel and members of the authoritarian regime. At the same time, they were secondary victims as wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters of disappeared male family members, in many cases leaving them as heads of households in dire economic conditions. Thousands of indigenous women were forced to flee their ancestral homelands due to the violence and discrimination, becoming internally displaced or migrating to Mexico and other neighboring countries. The severe and, in certain respects, unique ways in which women experienced the consequences of the war helped to energize and inspire women’s activism in civil society, leading to a proliferation of non-governmental organizations within Guatemala, as well as amongst diaspora communities abroad, that focused on a variety of different missions, such as providing services and support to victims, raising awareness, and political advocacy.

By the mid-1980s, violence became unsustainable for the government and guerrillas alike. Both sides had suffered heavy military losses, and the humanitarian toll of the conflict, combined with frustration about the war amongst indigenous and non-indigenous segments of society, hurt national morale significantly. Guatemala’s economy was strained, with stunted growth and burgeoning debt, which also meant that the war was becoming a costly headache, reaping little benefit. Drawing international attention, the government faced mounting pressure to return the country to stability; the U.S., for example, suspended military and economic aid. After decades of insurgency, it was clear that the government would be unable to root out all guerrilla activity. At the same time, targeted military attacks made it impossible for the guerrillas to

236 Ibid., 22.
gain enough momentum to successfully overthrow the government. It soon became clear that the only way to end the conflict would be a negotiated settlement between the rebel forces and the government.

An opening for peace negotiations

With the 1985 election of Vinicio Cerezo, a civilian president, the URNG began to press for peace negotiations. The Cerezo government initially refused, believing instead that a military offensive could successfully eradicate the rebel forces, but this strategy proved ineffective. The Central American Peace Accords, designed to provide a roadmap for ending internal conflicts in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, led to the establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) in 1987. The CNR actively engaged with the URNG to advance the possibility for peace talks. The election of President Jorge Serrano in 1991 led to the beginning of extensive meetings with the URNG mediated by UN authorities, and culminated in the commencement of a formal peace process in April 1991.

Ricardo Rosales Román, also known as Carlos González, Secretary General of the URNG and a member of the negotiating panel, noted, “Since the year 1991, I was convinced that peace was possible in Guatemala. This consists of various proclamations that I subscribed to and in the fact that I had to commit to that effort and, above all, understand the importance of dialogue and of the conversations at the end of achieving a strong and lasting peace in our country.” Nevertheless, the talks began and during this initial phase, Msgr. Quezada Toruño, a “conciliator” for the process and representative of the National Reconciliation Commission, served as a mediator, while the UN was present as an observer.

The negotiations stalled in 1993 when President Serrano attempted to consolidate control over certain government institutions and extend his executive reach. His power grab failed and he was promptly ousted from office, replaced by Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de León Carpio. The negotiations resumed in 1994 under the auspices of the UN and the leadership of UN Special Representative Jean Arnault, who served as the official mediator for the negotiations from then onwards. The framework for these negotiations had a clear agenda and timetable, as well as mechanisms for civil society participation in the accords. The peace process now included representatives from the URNG, Guatemalan government, military, and civil society groups through a formal mechanism in the form of the ASC. The ASC was a non-homogenous bloc of civil society sectors with political, ethnic, and socio-economic diversity.

244 Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves, 31, 37.
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid.
248 Interview with Ricardo Rosales Román, Secretary General, URNG Negotiation Panel, January 27, 2015.
249 Mersky, "Human Rights in Negotiating Peace Agreements: Guatemala," 4; Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves, 42.
250 Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves, 41.
251 Ibid., 41.
253 Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves, 43.
Getting to the negotiation table

The URNG leadership sought a political settlement through which to secure favorable conditions for de-militarization and reintegration through the peace talks, as well as an opportunity to put in motion transformative socio-economic reforms to benefit their support base.\(^{256}\) Civil society groups, particularly those focused on crimes against indigenous groups and seeking socio-economic reforms, initially supported the goals of the URNG at the peace table. Following the 1994 opening of the peace table, civil society engagement became better organized as a result of the creation of the ASC, and their perspectives, to a certain extent, were factored into the dialogue. However, civil society was never an official party to the negotiations and the ASC was not completely representative of the diverse Guatemalan population. Gustavo Porras explained, “A table as complicated as a peace process cannot be a representation of society. It is a representation of those who are in the war, not everybody.”\(^{257}\) And yet, civilians – especially indigenous persons, women and children – bore the brunt of the consequences of the violent conflict.\(^{258}\)

The Guatemalan government sought peace to regain economic stability and political control throughout the country, and to repair its damaged international reputation. The accords would also open a new stream of international investment and aid, including a pledge of $1.9 billion by the UN post-agreement.\(^{259}\) The government representatives, however, needed to also balance different pressures and appease powerful members of society, such as the business community alliance, Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales, y Financieras (Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations, CACIF) and the conservative right factions, who profited from the war and strongly opposed the ideologies of the leftist URNG.

Signing of successive thematic accords

In March 1994, the URNG and the Carpio government signed the Acuerdo Global Sobre Derechos Humanos (Human Rights Accord), which established international verification mechanisms to monitor human rights abuses.\(^{260}\) In June 1994, an additional two new accords were signed, one addressing the resettlement of displaced populations, and the other, the Human Rights Accord, creating a truth commission (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico) to shed light on crimes that occurred during the war, particularly regarding the disappeared persons.\(^{261}\) In March 1995, both the URNG and the Carpio government signed the Acuerdo sobre Identidad y Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas (Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples’), calling for extensive reforms to government institutions, structures, and policies to eradicate discrimination and promote empowerment of native populations.

Amidst ongoing peace negotiations in January 1996, Álvaro Arzú won the general election by a very slim margin, and subsequently appointed a cabinet full of members committed to continuing the peace negotiations. He also asked his former colleague and longtime friend, Gustavo Porras, to head the Government’s peace panel.\(^{262}\) Porras, who would go on to play an instrumental role in forging the peace agreement, recalled, “I was a close friend of the President of the Republic [Arzú] and a friend and disciple of the guerrilla


\(^{257}\) Interview with Gustavo Porras, Member, Government Negotiation Panel, January 21, 2015.


commander Rolando Morán, and what this meant was that from the start I had trust from both sides, and that trust was what [had been] missing from the peace process.”

In May 1996, the Acuerdo sobre Aspectos Socioeconomicos (the Agreement on Socioeconomic Issues) was signed by the URNG and by Arzú’s government. In September 1996, the Acuerdo sobre Fortalecimiento del Poder Civil y Función del Ejército en una Sociedad Democrática (Accord on Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society) was reached. In December 1996, the Acuerdo Sobre el Definitivo Cese al Fuego (the Agreement for a Definitive Ceasefire), the reintegration of the URNG, partial amnesty for URNG and Guatemalan army members, and constitutional and electoral reforms accord was signed. The final peace accord, the Acuerdo de Paz Firme y Duradera (Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace) was signed on December 29, 1996. It granted partial amnesty for war-related crimes, but did not provide amnesty for genocide, torture, forced disappearances or extrajudicial killings.

Women at the peace table

The formal peace negotiation delegations included only two women, Luz Méndez, who was a URNG delegate on the political and diplomatic commission, and Raquel Zelaya, who was a negotiator on behalf of the Guatemalan government (see Table 2).

Table 2: Gender Breakdown in Guatemala Formal Peace Negotiations, 1991-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORMAL PEACE PANELS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WOMEN</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MEN</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t of Guatemala</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URNG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Presence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer (1991 – 1994)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator (1994 – 1996)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Méndez was a member of the URNG’s Secretariat for International Relations and coordinator of the National Union of Guatemalan Women. She was not, however, a negotiator; the URNG’s negotiating team was comprised only of the four commanders of the four disparate rebel groups that united for the peace process. Although Méndez was not a negotiator for the URNG, her advisory role bore significantly on the commanders who led the negotiations. Her physical presence in the negotiations also held symbolic value, and she recognized the opportunity she had to influence the progress and outcome of the negotiations. Méndez said, “I put a task on myself and that was to work in order to have the gender issues included into

263 Interview with Gustavo Porras, Member, Government Negotiation Panel.
the peace accords.” However, this was not always easy to do. She admitted, “I had to speak very loud to be heard.”268 While sometimes her points fell on deaf ears, other times her tactics as well as her reasoning earned support from the URNG leadership. Méndez stressed that her focus on gender went beyond her own view by drawing on the perspectives of women and society writ-large: “When I defended each of those paragraphs [about women], I said, ‘OK, this is coming from the women of the assembly of civil society. This is not coming just from me.”269

Zelaya had previously served as the Finance Minister in 1991, but when she was tapped to join the government delegation, she was working in the private sector. Zelaya was selected by the president to help lead negotiations and draft the accord on economic reforms, as this was her area of expertise, but she was also involved in discussions about all of the thematic issue areas. She explained, “It was agreed that all of the agreements would have a section directly oriented toward women.”270 This, however, was only due to the relentless pressure and advocacy of women in civil society who demanded that specific language be included about gender equality and women’s rights.271 Zelaya claims that women from civil society never sought meetings or consultations with her, but members of the Women’s Sector dispute this, arguing instead that their requests for meetings and their proposals never garnered any response. Zelaya did not come out of the women’s movement and she had limited, if any, connections to women in civil society peace organizations that predated her appointment to the government panel. She did, however, meet with refugee women in camps in Mexico, who raised the issues of right of return, land reform, and social services with her. Zelaya remembers the negotiations as being so cordial that, “It didn’t seem like [there were] two sides, one from the government and one guerilla… we were able to become like a team that was imagining a society.”272 However, she noted that the civil society was not a party to the negotiations, and, therefore, while the URNG and government delegations took their proposals into consideration, the process itself was between “two, not three” parties. This reinforces, as the chapter later explains, the dilution of many proposals made by women in civil society, as well as the superficial integration of their demands and desires into the accords that would, ultimately, signal symbolic progress and some legal protections, but with limited depth and reach.

UN Special Representative Jean Arnault, who presided over the formal negotiations, supported the discussion of women’s issues during the peace negotiations.273 As Méndez recounts, Arnault was eager to know what Méndez had learned upon her return from the Beijing Conference, and how she would bring some of that exposure and experience to the Guatemalan negotiations. The resulting peace agreement, including the thematic accords, included language on women’s rights to participation in all sectors of society. The agreement called for the end of discrimination against women and recognized the vulnerability of indigenous women. The accords sought to grant women more access to political and economic activities, education, and land rights.

Why did women in civil society mobilize for peace?

Women from civil society mobilized to further peace in Guatemala for a variety of reasons. Their mobilization was informed in large part by their experiences during the war and a desire to see its end, as well as their aspirations to create a more equitable, peaceful, and just country. The roles of women throughout the...
peace process are notable not only because of why they organized, but how they engaged and to what effect they had leading up to the signing of the 1996 agreement. Although women in CSOs mobilized in response to the formation of the ASC, which was designed to be politically inclusive, the history of civic organization and participation has its antecedents prior to the formal establishment of the ASC in 1994.

Until the 1990s, women had never featured prominently in the country’s political life. A patriarchal society, in urban and rural areas alike, meant that women had historically been marginalized. Although violence against women was rampant, it was treated as a private matter with very little opportunities for victims’ redress. As Sandra Morán explained, “At that time, violence against women wasn’t a social problem, it was ‘your’ problem.”274 The civil war, however, prompted women to come together, share their grievances, and strive for a better reality.

Women began organizing in the 1980s primarily through “mothers movements,” reacting against the military’s killings or forced disappearance of thousands of civilians, who were targeted primarily because of their allegiance, or perceived allegiance, with leftist groups. In 1984, indigenous mothers and wives created an organization called Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (Mutual Support Group, GAM), whose goal it was, originally, to help low-income women fight to be heard by the authorities about the fate of their loved ones and gain critical information on disappearances.275 GAM, an umbrella organization for smaller groups seeking justice for the disappeared, was mainly made up of indigenous women from the Kaqchikel, K’iché, and Mam groups, but also includes indigenous men who have lost family members.276 In 1988, smaller women’s groups comprised of indigenous rural women who had lost their husbands either because of violence or diseases came together and formed the Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala (National Coordinating Committee of Guatemalan Widows, CONAVIGUA).277 CONAVIGUA’s mission focused on highlighting the struggles of indigenous widows. In other words, women in Guatemala joined or formed mixed-gender or women-only CSOs in response to state violence,278 out of frustrations with the civil war, and later to end war. They called for justice and knowledge on the whereabouts of their family and friends, rights for refugees and the displaced, indigenous rights, land reforms, access to services, and socio-economic equality, as well as subsequently to advance gender equality. These groups held public marches that gathered thousands of people, and protested against the military’s brutal insurgency campaign.279 Their approach to peace advocacy is not unique to Guatemala, but the example they would set for other women’s activism and their

274 Interview with Sandra Morán, Member, Women’s Sector, ASC.
275 Berger, Guatemaltecas, 24.
276 Giron, “Taking Matters into One’s Hands,” 360.
278 Berger, Guatemaltecas, 360.
influence on the peace negotiations in the 1990s is notable. Against the backdrop of the peace process, women’s social and political activism increased significantly. Rosa María Wantland observed, “The fundamental [peace] process helped facilitate the development of the women’s movement.”

Women also organized and mobilized in groups as refugees in Mexico, including most notably Mama Maquín, Ixmucane, and Madre Tierra, whose membership exceeded 9,000 women. Refugee women, many of whom were indigenous peoples, sought safe return to their ancestral homeland, land tenure, and freedom of movement within Guatemala upon their return. They also sought economic reforms to improve their livelihoods and access to greater social services, including health and education. Their plight as refugees, however, had a deep impact on their political activism and defined their experience during the war. María Guadalupe García described the agony of being a refugee, recounting, “For us as women, it was painful because in addition to having to leave our country, leave our house, leave our place of origin, leave our land and take off our traditional clothes and language, it [was] like stripping us of our identity.” Many women in Guatemala, throughout the duration of the conflict and particularly amongst Mayan communities, were also raped and subjected to torture, as well as forced imprisonment. The existing literature repeatedly states that rape was rampant and used as a tactic of war, especially during Montt’s regime as part of the scorched earth policy, it is difficult to document the exact number of victims of rape and sexual violence. Women and men were both subject to forced disappearances, and approximately 80 per cent of the 40,000 who suffered this fate were indigenous persons.

The creation of the ASC in 1994 marked an important turning point in women’s involvement; it created an unprecedented channel for accessing the formal process, and in doing so, helped to significantly increase women’s indirect participation in the peace negotiations. The ASC resulted from international and external pressures on the government to create a space for public discourse and civic engagement. The international community, particularly the UN, Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United States, and Venezuela, encouraged the inclusion of civil society perspectives in the negotiations. The ASC was tasked with making non-binding proposals and recommendations to the government and URNG. It was comprised of 11 sectors that elected 10 representatives each to consolidate and relay proposals, and was composed of constituencies that had been excluded from the formal peace talks. A broad range of social sectors were represented in the ASC, crossing generational, ethnic, class, gender, religious, geographic, and ideological

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280 Interview with Rosa María Wantland, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC, January 26, 2015.
282 Interview with María Guadalupe García, Leader, Mama Maquín, January 22, 2015.
283 The Commission for Historical Clarification documented 1,465 cases of sexual violence; however, the number of victims is believed to be far larger. Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (Guatemala), Guatemala, Memory of Silence: Tz’inil Na’tabal’ : Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, Conclusions and Recommendations (Guatemala: CEH, 1998); Armon, Sider, and Wilson, “Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process.”
285 ASC sectors: religious groups, journalists, labor and popular groups, human rights organizations, political parties, Mayan groups, women’s organizations, study and research and academic centers, non-governmental development organizations, and the Atlixco sector comprised of cooperatives, academics, and independent businesses.
286 CACIF, which had been engaged in the 1990 peace talks at Oslo, did not join the ASC due to the belief that the ASC was a platform for leftist organizations that were sympathetic to the guerrilla fighters. Another key point of contention for members of CACIF was the belief that the ASC’s membership consisted of small organizations, which allowed for individuals to promote their political agenda under the guise of representing larger sections of Guatemalan society: See Interview with Héctor Rosada, Member, Government Negotiation Panel, January 27, 2015; Interview with Raquel Zelaya, Member, Government Negotiation Panel, January 26, 2015. See also Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce, Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration (Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers, 2001), 28. See also Krznaric, “Civil and Uncivil Actors in the Guatemalan Peace Process,” 5-6. See also Ulrike Joras, Companies in Peace Processes: A Guatemalan Case Study (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2007), 180.
ties. The government and the URNG intended to give civil society a voice in the peace talks through the ASC, but with minimal influence on the peace talks (e.g., non-binding proposals, no veto power, and no seat at the negotiation table).287

Although there were individual women in some of the other sectors – such as Nineth Garcia Montenegro, who was a leader in the Human Rights Sector – there was initially no specific sector designated for women. Some members of the ASC questioned the importance and relevance of women’s issues, and others assumed that women’s needs would be met as part of other social groups.288 According to María Marroquín, “There were many men who believed that the Women’s Sector did not need to exist.” However, a coalition of women’s organizations, including Convergencia Cívico Política de Mujeres (Women’s Civic Political Convergence, CCPM), Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres (Guatemalan Women’s Group, GGM), Coordinadora por el Desarrollo Integral de la Mujer, Familiares de Detenidos y Desaparecidos de Guatemala, Tierra Viva, and Coincidencia de Mujeres fought for the inclusion of a Women’s Sector.289 They argued that, considering the highly machista society in Guatemala, the many challenges to women’s political, economic, and social participation, as well as the unique and disproportional burdens they suffered during the war, a Women’s Sector was not only essential, but had the potential to make important contributions to the peace process.

The mid-1990s marked a period of proliferation of Guatemalan women’s organizations. There was growing international pressure from the UN conferences and public and private donors to include women’s issues in governmental activities and NGOs – both of which were dependent on external funding.290 The influence of global feminism on development and democratization also shaped the organization and mobilization of autonomously formed women’s groups (supported by international non-governmental organizations and funds, including CONAVIGUA, GGM, Tierra Viva, Grupo Femenino Pro-Mejoramiento Familiar (Women’s Group for Family Improvement, GRUFEPROMEFAM), and Proyecto Mujer y Reformas Jurídicas.291 At the same time, the Beijing Conference set an important backdrop for women’s political activism.292

How did women in civil society mobilize and organize?

The creation of the Women’s Sector was neither easy nor fully supported by the leadership of the ASC. As a challenge to the coalition of women that fought for participation in the peace negotiation, Monsignor Quezada Toruño stated that if they could organize a Women’s Sector in one week and reach consensus, then he would accept its creation and inclusion in the assembly.293 Destrooper explains that the initial resistance toward the creation of a Women’s Sector in the ASC was due to suspicion that foreign actors were trying...
to divide and weaken CSOs that were allowed to participate at the high-level political peace process for the first time. It was believed that civil society was stronger when united.\textsuperscript{294}

The Women’s Sector in the ASC was composed of 32 organizations, representing a diverse cross-section of society including urban and rural women, academics, students, human rights activists, feminists, trade unions, indigenous and mestiza, etc. From the outset, there was a genuine effort to be as inclusive as possible, and to also avoid creating any formal hierarchies within the sector. However, due to constraints on physical access and economic means, there were more women from Guatemala City who were able to participate regularly in the sector’s activities. There were also networks of women outside of the city who had communication channels with those with the ASC, and this allowed for a flow of information. According to Walda Barrios Klee, the women’s sector, “worked in harmony and then [the rural women] returned to their communities and shared... they took ideas back to communicate, and then they returned to the next meeting, it was supposed [to be] that they brought community consensus.”\textsuperscript{295}

Some organizations that constituted the Women’s Sector worked exclusively with women, whereas others worked on advocating women’s issues in mixed-gender organizations. Some individuals in the Women’s Sector were active in CSOs, as well as in political parties or state institutions, and others found their way into this sector because they felt they could be more useful compared to in other sectors of the ASC. Some civil society individuals and organizations received resources and support from foreign governments and international organizations\textsuperscript{296} to travel to different locations, such as GAM, CONAVIDUA, COPMAGUA, and union groups. Indigenous organizations were also funded through Fundación para el Desarrollo Educativo, Social, y Económico (Foundation for Educational, Social and Economic Development, FUNDASEDE), which also sought to increase women’s participation in the peace process.\textsuperscript{297} Additionally, there was a perception by some members of the government panel that organizations within the ASC had ties to the URNG, making the ASC seem to be a non-neutral body.\textsuperscript{298}

Organizations in the Women’s Sector came together explicitly for the purposes of the ASC, yet the sector was characterized initially by a high degree of fragmentation, which limited the sharing of common interests, common identity, collective action, agendas, and goal setting.\textsuperscript{299} A number of interviews highlighted the differences amongst women, noting a lack of shared experiences.\textsuperscript{300} On one end of the spectrum were women’s groups, such as CONAVIDUA, who embraced traditional gender roles, such as mothers, wives, and sisters, and whose interest was in justice for the families of those who had disappeared. These groups received support from the religious sector (or institutions). The other end of the spectrum consisted of feminists, Marxists, and indigenous activists, such as Comité de Unidad Campesina (Peasant Unity Committee, CUC), GGM, GRUFEPROMAFAM, Agrupación de Mujeres, Tierra Viva, and CCPM, who sought deep-rooted, transformational change in society to upend conventional notions of gender, class and identity in Guatemala. These more radical views were generally less popular amongst the broader ASC and received less collaboration from members of other sectors. With the exception of a handful of organizations, such as GGM, GRUFEPROMAFAM and CCPM, which had an explicit feminist orientation, most other member organizations – which had been created prior to or during the war – did not pursue gender equality as their

\textsuperscript{294} Tine Destrooper, \textit{Come Hell or High Water: Feminism and the Legacy of Armed Conflict in Central America} (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 88.

\textsuperscript{295} Interview with Walda Barrios Klee, Member, National Union of Guatemalan Women (UNAMG), January 21, 2015.

\textsuperscript{296} Howell and Pearce, \textit{Civil Society and Development}, 152.

\textsuperscript{297} Biekart, \textit{The Politics of Civil Society Building}, 266.

\textsuperscript{298} Interview with Héctor Rosada, Member, Government Negotiation Panel; Interview with Raquel Zelaya, Member, Government Negotiation Panel; See Howell and Pearce, \textit{Civil Society and Development}, 152; Biekart, \textit{The Politics of Civil Society Building}, 266, 269-274.

\textsuperscript{299} Carrillo and Chinchilla, “From Urban Elite to Peasant Organizing,” 146.

\textsuperscript{300} Interview with María Guadalupe García, Leader Mama Maquín; Interview with María Marroquín, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC; Interview with Martha Godinez, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC, January 28, 2015.
primary objective. Rather, their organizations focused on issues of social justice (i.e., access to land, reparation for war victims, and safe return of refugees) and human rights, or helped to search for those who disappeared.

In compliance with the structures and rules of procedure within the ASC, the Women’s Sector had to speak with ‘one voice’ on behalf of the Women’s Sector, so they organized teams to discuss their positions on different themes, capitalizing on each other’s different expertise, and held meetings every Thursday afternoon to discuss ideas and try to reach consensus. They recognized it was imperative for the sector to present itself as a cohesive unit to the broader ASC. The process of consultation and consensus in the ASC contributed to a period of learning, especially in parliamentary techniques, consensus-making, respect for dissent, and the development of positions independent of the main negotiating parties. It also contributed to increased cooperation in the Women’s Sector over time as dialogue was encouraged to find common ground on issues. This process encouraged communication among women, which had not previously existed, and provided a legitimate forum to discuss a variety of perspectives and opinions from a gender framework. There was an aversion to the formation of a hierarchical coalition; rather, groups were organized by themes. At the same time, those with specific competencies – such as drafting of formal language or negotiation – took on roles to support the overarching goals of the Women’s Sector in line with the activities of the ASC. According to Walda Barrios Klee, “There were no class divisions within [the Women’s Sector], but those who became the spokespersons for the group were from the more urban class... They were the women who wrote the [proposals] document.”

The Women’s Sector faced a multitude of barriers in advancing their agenda and being accepted as a group within the ASC, including most notably the misogynistic attitudes of the Assembly’s leadership, as well as certain members of other sectors. María Marroquín recounted, “[The Monsignor] was a conservative man, he would call us names... he quieted us, he did not take us seriously... he got angry with us when we said anything scandalous... everything seemed scandalous, everything that we as women said! He treated us like little girls.” This culture of discrimination, which was especially prevalent at the beginning of the ASC’s lifespan, undermined the effectiveness of the Women’s Sector and necessitated their creativity and flexibility in how they would promote their agendas. Maya Alvarado echoed this sentiment by noting: “There was a prevalence of prejudice, discrimination, the sense of limiting, of not recognizing women as social and political subjects,” and at the same time, “There were many women who took personal risks for their social and political participation.” Women who were members of other sectors in the ASC noted that they did not receive the same poor treatment as many of their counterparts in the Women’s Sector.

Additionally, the geographic distance of where the peace talks were held versus where some, predominantly rural, women were based was a contributing factor to limiting their participation. All of this fostered tensions between different levels of educated women in the sector.

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301 This behavior is in line with Molyneux’s typology of women’s collective action movements, whereby she argues that the formation of autonomous women’s organizations do not guarantee the collective pursuit of gender interests. See: Maxine Molyneux, “Analyzing Women’s Movements,” Development and Change 29 (1998).
302 Ibid., 13.
304 Interview with Walda Barrios Klee, Member, National Union of Guatemalan Women (UNAMG).
305 Interview with María Marroquín, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC.
306 Interview with Maya Alvarado, Member, National Union of Guatemalan Women (UNAMG), January 28, 2015.
307 Interview with Nineth Montenegro, Member, Human Rights Sector, ASC, Founder, Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM) January 27, 2015; Interview with Carmen Rosa de Leon-Escribano, Member, Academic Sector, ASC, Representative, Instituto de Enseñanza Para el Desarrollo Sostenible (IEPADES), January 26, 2015.
How did they form coalitions and alliances?

The Women’s Sector forged strategic alliances through cross-sector outreach or by offering their assistance to other sectors in exchange for support. Given the diversity of agendas and interests in the Women’s Sector, the formation of alliances was on an ad hoc basis initially, and became opportunistic over time. The Women’s Sector’s primary objective in building alliances and working with other sectors was to promote their agenda and to influence the content of the proposals that would be approved within the ASC and relayed to the formal negotiators. Women leveraged personal relationships with representatives of other sectors whom they knew prior to the establishment of the ASC and they also conducted strategic outreach to make new connections. María Marroquín explained, “What was indispensable was building alliances with other women… talking with other women about our thoughts, our dreams, our ideas… on how to live life.”308 At the same time, Nineth Montenegro, who was not in the Women’s Sector, noted: “I had very good relations with the women [from the Women’s Sector]… I learned so much from the women.”309

The Women’s Sector relied on convergence in similar social identities and interests, creating common ground based on shared values, beliefs and positions. For instance, parts of the Women’s Sector collaborated with the religious sector to ensure the issue of refugees was reflected in a proposal, and other parts maintained relationships with the human rights sector. The Women’s Sector formed alliances with other sectors to understand unfamiliar themes, relied on men who were supportive to present their causes, and made their proposals broad-based enough to ensure they would capture the interest of other sectors. Over time, a collaborative spirit grew between the Women’s Sector and representatives of many other sectors, especially their women members, and respect for members of the Women’s Sector grew because of their resilience, competence, and inclusiveness.

How did they assemble and shape agendas?

A combination of being present as often as possible wherever possible, unwavering determination, collective action, and compromise formed the basis of how women in civil society created and promoted their agendas as part of their engagement in the peace process. Even though women had to fight to be included in their own separate sector, they were consistent in how they pursued their various goals in the ASC, and, at the same time, strived to increase the visibility of the larger women’s movement. According to Rosa María Wantland, “The fundamental [peace] process helped facilitate the development of the women’s movement,”310 but at the same time, “Women fought for human rights when the whole social movement was repressed.” The Women’s Sector pushed for gender equality throughout the language of the accords. Their

308 Interview with María Marroquín, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC.
309 Interview with Nineth Garcia Montenegro, Member, Human Rights Sector, ASC, Founder, Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM).
310 Interview with Rosa María Wantland, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC.
greatest advocacy and emphasis focused on addressing rights to land ownership, access to credit, labor rights, increased access to education, and access to positions within the armed forces.311

Their objectives and aspirations for the peace accords were derived from a desire to overcome the difficult realities faced by Guatemalan women, including the urban, rural, displaced, and indigenous. Bringing an end to the war and moving past violence was the glue that bound the women together and served as the centerpiece of their platform for change. The Women’s Sector had permanent presence in the ASC, meaning they always showed up to every meeting and even to meetings for which they had no invitation, and they refused to leave until they were heard. As Rosalina Tuyuc remembered, “When we were knocking on doors for the peace negotiations... we were never, never welcome... we always had to pressure them to enter, to talk.”312 Similarly, she described surprise visits to important meetings: “When we knew that there was a meeting at such-and-such time at such-and-such place, we showed up. And we stayed there in front of the offices until they let us enter. We did the same throughout the whole peace negotiation.”313 Women also understood they had strength in numbers, so in addition to arriving on time and being prepared to discuss and submit proposals, they also made an effort to show up in groups and include members of other sectors in their lobbying.314 This persistence became characteristic of women’s engagement and a key facet of their strategy for being taken seriously and raising awareness about their agenda.

To arrive at an agreement on the issues for their agenda meant that women’s organizations would have to negotiate amongst a diverse group of individuals with sometimes conflicting priorities. Exhaustive dialogue was a cornerstone of their approach to formulate a unified agenda, and they often relied on finding common ground based on shared experiences or by airing grievances to do this. At the same time, the diversity of the Women’s Sector composition meant that their agenda was very broad, touching upon a multitude of issues. In some ways, this made their ability to advocate for language in all of the thematic accords easier because they had members who could speak to a variety of issues and propose reforms in different, although sometimes overlapping, sectors. They would engage in a process of consensus-building to find issues that united them. They would then draft non-binding proposals to the negotiating parties on each issue. This process allowed the Women’s Sector to engage in what Keck and Sikkink call “information politics,” where they gained influence with the negotiating parties (predominately the URNG) by producing politically usable information and disseminating their arguments and proposals through their networks and alliances.315 Despite this, and the role of Luz Méndez on the URNG delegation, some civil society women felt it was difficult to get their proposals on the URNG’s agenda. Since women’s rights and gender equality issues did not rank high for the URNG leadership, the burden of advocacy rested on the Women’s Sector to make the convincing case from outside the negotiations room, whereas Méndez also developed a strategy to introduce and keep gender equality on the agenda.

A few participants cite their participation in the Latin American Feminist Conference and the Beijing Conference as inspirations to help shape their agendas, and to also remain motivated in pursuit of the goals within the Guatemalan peace process. Additionally, these regional and international conferences helped Mayan women to form solidarity and experience sharing networks with other indigenous women, which in turn helped to solidify their role as peacemakers and promoters of rights.316

311 Berger, Guatemaltecas, 35.
312 Interview with Rosalina Tuyuc, Member, Women’s Sector; Founder, CONAVIGUA.
313 Ibid.
314 Interview with María Marroquín, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC.
315 Keck and Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders.
How did they set priorities for their activism? How, if at all, did their priorities change when they participated in high-level peace negotiations?

Despite the internal pressures within the Women’s Sector, as well as the pressurized climate of the ASC, the Women’s Sector made it a deliberate point to work to resolve their internal disputes – through extensive dialogue and compromise – and to reach out to other sectors in search of alliances. The Women’s Sector used a multi-step strategy to reach consensus amongst themselves on not only which issues they would advocate for as part of their proposals to the ASC, but also what demands they would lodge in different thematic areas. For each topic of discussion – whether indigenous rights, land tenure, right of return, socioeconomic reform, rule of law, or others – participants in the Women’s Sector would air out their needs, aspirations, frustrations, concerns, and experiences through open dialogue. They were cognizant of the fact that the ASC, let alone the official negotiators, would not prioritize everything they cared about, but by creating a safe space amongst themselves to debate and discuss, women could finally exercise their voice and be heard. In drafting their proposals, women prioritized those points on which they could reach agreement, and put aside others which were likely to result in fragmentation. Voting was only used as a last measure to resolve disputes and no members, not even the 10 elected representatives, held veto power. The issues that they knew would receive less traction amongst the broader ASC, such as reproductive justice or sexual violence, were set aside as strategy of compromise and prioritization. In other words, consensus was often reached through agreement based on the lowest common denominator.

The structure and procedures of the ASC also presented certain limitations on how issues were prioritized and proposed by different sectors. As stipulated in the 1994 Framework Accord, the ASC had to prepare position papers on each substantive theme in a process of consultation and consensus. Each sector was asked to produce a draft proposal on each substantive theme, and then two representatives from each sector formed an ad hoc commission for each topic to draft a consensus-based document from each sector’s draft. Some members had prior experience in negotiations, lobbying, consensus-building, and policy-making, whereas others who had less experience learned by trial and error. On issues where members of the Women’s Sector lacked deep knowledge, they would work with groups that had specific expertise to help shape their understanding of the priorities needed. They would also advocate for other sectors to present their proposals where the priorities proposed failed to stick in their own sector. For example, they lobbied the Human Rights Sector to adopt certain issues on behalf of women, but framed the issues as human rights as opposed to women’s rights, and this helped garner greater support amongst other sectors. The ASC submitted all its consensus documents on substantive themes to the main parties to the peace negotiation in six months, which was well in advance of the December 1994 deadline for the peace negotiation.

How did they negotiate their goals?

Since the inclusion of women’s organizations in the ASC raised their public visibility, there was a desire to appear competent and professional. Rosa Maria Wantland described how, for many women who may have had no formal training or experience in negotiations, their engagement in the peace process was like a “political education” – they learned by doing and they wanted to do well. A few participants discussed the need to be well-prepared, well-informed, and to do research on each issue before plenary meetings and proposals were submitted. As Sandra Morán described, “We really did our homework... We quickly learned the mechanisms [to be effective in the ASC] through practice and necessity. That’s not something you study, or something you read... we have learned how to do by doing it.” And yet, women who had previously been members of student movements, academics, and the business sector were able to adapt to the fast pace and

317 Interview with Martha Godinez, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC.
318 Interview with Rosa Maria Wantland, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC.
319 Interview with Sandra Morán, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC.
They allowed us to confirm that the Women's Sector has merit and knew how to win the right to participate in political and social life in Guatemala, which was confirmed by their active participation in the peace process and then in the signing of peace.

Ricardo Rosales Román, Secretary General, URNG Negotiation Panel

rigor of the negotiations within the ASC, as well as the hasty timeline to move from one thematic accord to another adopted by the formal negotiators.

The Women’s Sector drew on new alliances in order to help negotiate their goals, and they also relied on hard work to earn a reputation for diligence and competence. They relied on certain professional attributes, such as being well-organized and responsible; completing tasks in an orderly manner; always coming prepared, bringing copies of documents to distribute, for example; being well-informed; and preparing and doing the preparatory research to gain influence among the different sectors and the political parties. The Women’s Sector relied on support from other sectors with shared goals and overlapping identities to achieve their goals. They also leveraged the moderator’s respected position and international backing to advance public pressure to be heard. Another important element in their strategy for negotiating their goals was to seek private and public audiences with member of the government and URNG negotiating panels. Their direct interaction with the formal negotiators was limited, however. None of the members of the Women’s Sector ever presented their proposals to the official negotiating panel. While the Women’s Sector sought out consultative meetings with both delegations, they never received a response or an audience with the government panel, whereas they did meet occasionally and briefly with URNG leaders. And yet, despite this limited direct interaction and exchange, the Women’s Sector was remembered with high regard by URNG Secretary-General Ricardo Rosales Román, who explained,

With the Women’s Sector, [the URNG delegation] had the opportunity to get to know each other, and during our meetings with civil society we established particularly important relationships with the women that participated in the process for the search for peace by political means, negotiations, and, in effect, it was achieved. They allowed us to confirm that the women’s sector has merit and knew how to win the right to participate in political and social life in Guatemala, which was confirmed by their active participation in the peace process and then in the signing of peace.

The process of negotiating their goals did not always come easily to the members of the Women’s Sector, and sometimes their tactics were counterproductive or backfired. For example, as Nineth Montenegro – who was a representative of the Human Rights Sector and co-founder of GAM – recalled, “[The Women’s Sector] did not always know how to be convincing... they had difficulties in presenting themselves. It’s like when someone’s rights have been repressed and they give you the opportunity to speak, and you shout.”

The Women’s Sector enjoyed mixed success in terms of having their proposals heard and incorporated by the ASC, which had to present a consolidated and singular document to the negotiators, and the language

320 Interview with María Marroquín, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC; Interview with Sandra Morán, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC; Interview with Rosa María Wantland, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC.
321 Interview with María Marroquín, Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC.
322 Interview with Ricardo Rosales Román, Secretary General, URNG Negotiation Panel.
323 Interview with Nineth Garcia Montenegro, Member, Human Rights Sector, ASC, Founder, Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM).
To what extent were their objectives or priorities represented in the resulting peace agreement?

The text of the accords that form the peace agreement in Guatemala reflects that certain issues that women in civil society prioritized were included, whereas others were not. With respect to gender equality, provisions were inserted on land access, credit and development assistance, an end to discrimination against indigenous women, support for women's rights and equality within the home, equal rights for working women, greater access to education for women, and increased opportunities for women to serve in the armed forces. The strength of the language in the different accords varied, however. Irrespective of topic, the arduous negotiation and drafting process for the accords meant that the ideas and proposals put forth by the ASC were diluted when they reached the formal peace table, just as proposals by the Women's Sector had been diluted when presented to the ASC for debate and adoption.

A comparison of the language in the Women's Sector proposals with the language of the peace accords reveals a number of noteworthy findings. For example, on indigenous rights, women sought the government's compliance with international treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). There are several clauses in the Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples that address this demand, including a commitment to not only implement CEDAW, which Guatemala ratified in 1982, but to also to classify ethnic discrimination as a criminal offence, and to eradicate existing laws that enabled discrimination against indigenous men and women.324 Mayan women also sought justice and redress for sexual abuse and assault against women of their community and all Guatemalan women, regardless of whether the perpetrators are civilians or military personnel. The accord specifies that the government should, “(a) Promote legislation to classify sexual harassment as a criminal offence, considering as an aggravating factor in determining the penalty for sexual offences the fact that the offence was committed against an indigenous women…”325 This language is relatively weak when compared to the gravity of the harms suffered by Mayan women, and contrasted with the language of the proposals they drafted. Another issue that was of particular importance to Mayan women, and to which several clauses were dedicated in the accord, are rights to speak native languages, dress in traditional clothing, practice cultural traditions without fear or repercussion, and be recognized as Guatemalan. Like

324 Article 14 of Identity and Indigenous Rights Accord.
325 Reference appropriate Appendix, (Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Accord p. 42, § II (B)(1)(a, b)).
other demands made by women, the issues had a broader societal reach beyond a narrow focus on gender equality, and this value of coexistence was reiterated in the Agreement on Firm and Lasting Peace, which stated, “Respect for and the exercise of the political, cultural, economic and spiritual rights of all Guatemalans is the foundation for a new coexistence reflecting the diversity of their nation.”

As part of the accord on socio-economic reforms, the Women’s Sector sought bilingual education opportunities to benefit themselves and their children, demanded the elimination of all sexist and violent texts from educational materials, called for the participation of rural women in planning and designing agrarian policies, and advocated for better pay, benefits, and time off. As part of land tenure reform, women from a diversity of backgrounds – including but not limited to indigenous groups – wanted the ability to inherit and own land independent of their husbands, fathers or brothers, as with other assets and property. They sought transformative change for themselves, their communities, and their country while being inclusive. Ricardo Rosales Román observed,

> In the women’s sector, the majority of sectors were represented. In the country, the women’s sector has earned the opportunity to be widely represented and with very significant participation. Just as there are indigenous women, there are women professionals, students, human rights defenders, and it is them, in their group, that have always been involved in the possibilities and conditions of understanding the substantive and integral components of the peace accords, its implementation, granting, and verification.

They recognized the intersections in their own identities as women with other characteristics that defined them such as urban, poor, *mestizo*, Mayan, religious, atheist, professional, etc., and used this perspective to promote multiple, sometimes overlapping agendas. Their influence in the language of the accords, therefore, was not restricted to questions of gender equality and women’s rights.

Despite their relative success and the high praise they garnered from those outside of the women’s movement – including from the URNG, government, and other sectors – women in civil society realize that much of what they sought to achieve has yet to materialize. A number of interviewees were self-critical of the results, stating that the language of the peace accords that they fought for lacked the strength and depth they would have preferred. They also cited insufficient experience in drafting and pushing proposals forward as a contributing factor that limited their effectiveness. As Porras admitted, “Women’s issues are not very strong in the accords.” Nevertheless, it is important to remember that no peace agreement is perfect and, as many of the women repeated in interviews, they rallied and negotiated the best they could in a very difficult, and sometimes hostile, political climate. The Women’s Sector publically showcased the abilities of a diverse group of women who could come together and advocate not only on behalf of each other’s causes, but also demonstrated that women are not a monolithic demographic, nor one that is always in union.

After the signing of the final accord in December 1996, women’s CSOs grew and were emboldened by the vocal and substantive contributions made by the Women’s Sector during the peace process. It was because women had advocated so relentlessly, albeit with mixed success, in the ASC, as well as beyond Guatemala and abroad, that a space for women’s political participation opened. The accord on constitutional reform had an article on, “(f) Guaranteeing women’s right to organize and their participation, on the same terms as men, at the senior decision-making levels of local, regional and national institutions; (g) promoting

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327 Interview with Ricardo Rosales Román, Secretary General, URNG Negotiation Panel
328 Interview with Gustavo Porras, Member, Government Negotiation Panel.
women’s participation in public administration, especially in the formulation, execution and supervision of government plans and policies.” And yet, Maya Alvarado explained, “What we really aspired to do and demanded were dignified conditions and equal opportunities for political participation in a broader sense.”

This continues to be a struggle for Guatemalan women, just as it was illustrated by the stark underrepresentation of women in the formal negotiations in the 1990s.

Conclusion

This chapter explored how women in civil society used the ASC as a vehicle to gain access to and influence the formal negotiation process that eventually brought an end to the civil war in Guatemala. This case study contributes uniquely and meaningfully to the existing literature on the subject by elevating the voices of women who were on the frontlines of peace activism, and by documenting in detail the tactics and approaches used by civil society women as they engaged in the peace process. The analysis also highlights their self-perception and retrospective reflection, as well as the perception of others, about the roles and contributions of civil society women to the peace process. In doing so, this case study gives credence to the Women’s Sector both in terms of formulating a negotiation agenda explicitly from women’s perspectives, and developing a network of allies who aided in pushing forward issues that were of the utmost importance for women’s empowerment, community-level reconciliation, equality, justice, human security, and national solidarity. Their activism within the context of the peace process also advanced the broader women’s movement and feminist causes in Guatemala that have had lasting impacts, even after the signing of the peace accords. Without the contribution of civil society women and their allies within and beyond Guatemala’s borders, the negotiations would have been much less inclusive, just as the language and content of agreements would have lacked a focus on gender equality and community well-being.

329 Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, § I (B)(13) (f-g), Accord p. 53).
330 Interview with Maya Alvarado, Member, National Union of Guatemalan Women (UNAMG).
Introduction

This case study examines how women in civil society accessed the formal mediation process following Kenya’s 2007/8 post-election violence. It finds that at the onset of violence, Kenyan women led various sectors of civil society. As a result, this chapter explores the range of roles, agendas, and strategies these women employed to access the formal mediation, as well as the political context that enabled the opportunity for women to participate in this process. At times, however, this chapter primarily focuses on the efforts of the Women’s Consultative Group, a diverse coalition of Kenyan women who sought to influence the mediation explicitly from the perspective of civil society women. This research corroborates the main narrative in the secondary literature that civil society women sought access through consultations, mainly but not exclusively by liaising with the Panel of Eminent African Personalities. Yet, existing literature muddles the efforts of women in various civil society coalitions engaged with the mediation process. As a result, the findings in this case study differ with mainstream accounts, specifically in relation to 1) the fractured nature of civil society in its initial reaction to the violence; 2) the process and strategy behind articulating a united agenda both within the Women’s Consultation Group and amongst civil society sectors; 3) the diverse roles civil society women played surrounding the mediation, as well as


the role of Martha Karua (the one women’s rights activist who directly accessed the mediation); and 4) the variance amongst civil society women in their assessment of their roles in the process. Many studies broadly discuss the activities and impact of civil society, and even when studies segregate coalitions to a degree, these narratives still fail to highlight a unique contribution made by civil society women— at the helm of many civil society coalitions surrounding the mediation, these women allied the various sectors and aligned their messaging, making them a strong bottom-up force within a narrowly structured process. The Women’s Consultation Group (WCG) was key to this accomplishment.

This chapter begins by framing the root causes of the 2007/8 post-election violence with a political economy lens, and situates the mobilization efforts of women in civil society within the context of that lens. This chapter explains that when violence erupted, Kenyan women led an already-robust civil society network and organized in response to the post-election violence, receiving external support, most notably from one member of the mediation team, Graça Machel. Next, this chapter details how women leaders mobilized using their pre-existing networks and skillsets as well as the process undertaken to unite a diverse group of women under the WCG mantle. Then, this chapter shows how women leaders reached out to other constituencies to form alliances. After, it details the procedural process through which the WCG articulated its agenda, followed by an explanation of how the WCG decided to use the mediation process to elevate long-standing issues. Here, it also delves into Karua’s competing identities of political party negotiator and women’s rights activist to show the dynamism of priorities in the context of peace negotiations. This chapter then covers how Kenyan women used informal mechanisms, ad hoc strategies, proxies, and cross-lobby message cohesion to influence a closed mediation process. Finally, this chapter suggests that many civil society coalitions claim credit for the same language articulated in the mediation agenda, making it hard to distill the unique influence of the WCG in outcome documents. Overall, because of their consultative

334 The Panel of Eminent African Personalities.
The political economy of violence in Kenya

Elections sparked the violence but did not cause it. Politicians used similar tactics in the 1990s, but those elections did not result in such widespread and severe violence as compared to 2007/8. Deeper, structural issues explain why violence erupted in 2007. They include: 1) institutionalized ethno-political discrimination that fostered tensions between the state and society; 2) criminalization and corruption of the state; 3) economic shocks from the mid-1970s into the early 1990s, followed by a brief period of growth, and then stagnation by 1997; 4) democratic transition that restructured power bases; and 5) deliberate political strategies that fostered ethno-political violence. Since independence in 1963, political elites used state power to aggrandize one ethnicity at the cost of others. Tensions between groups and between the state and society festered over decades of ethno-political discrimination that turned politics into an ethnic zero-sum game. Reminiscent of Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou’s “politics of the belly” concept, the Kenyan state’s reliance on privatized violence and its endemic corruption eroded the state’s monopoly on legitimate force and its capacity to deliver services for the aggrandizement of a concentrated elite. When Kenyans went to the polls in 2007, poverty was rampant (60 per cent of Kenyans lived on a $1/day), unemployment was high (especially among youth), and fertile land was controlled by elites. So ripe were tensions that the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) foreshadowed the convergence and escalation of these issues in its 2006 report. These intersecting socio-economic and political factors came to a head in December 2007 after Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) was sworn in to the presidency – political elites manipulated long-held inter-group resentments, those who felt institutionally marginalized reacted or were mobilized to exact violence along ethnic lines, and violence quickly spun out of control. In January and February 2008, an estimated 1,000-1,500 people died, 300,000-600,000 more were displaced, and the economy was ruined.

Historically, Kenyan state institutions relied on ethnicity to govern, promoting divisions amongst more than 30 ethnic groups (Kikuyu is the largest) to maintain control. For the first 30 years of independence (under Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi), Kenya operated as a democracy in name only, where politics was mainly restricted to the majority Kikuyu Kenya African National Union (KANU) party. During that period, the Kenyan presidency was an “imperial” position, and electoral politics was an ethnic zero-sum game. Both Kenyatta and Moi ruled with a mix of patronage and state-based repression. After independence, Kenyatta doled out government jobs and land vacated by settlers (e.g., fertile land in the Rift

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335 Where the state becomes the means through which a concentrated elite class manipulates public institutions and power for personal and private gain. In doing so, the state becomes an avenue through which organized crime prospers largely through the state’s addiction to corruption and the privatization of public institutions, including the use of legitimate force. See Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa (International African Institute, 1999).
337 APRM, Country Review, 10-27.
Valley), creating a largely Kikuyu (and “upcountry”) elite ruling class. After assuming the presidency in 1978, Moi faced an increasingly harsh economic climate and correspondingly less political capital than Kenyatta. Kenyatta had already given out the jobs and land once held by settlers to his patrons. In addition, Moi’s government faced a series of economic shocks as it confronted spiking oil prices and initiated inward looking economic policies, all of which negatively impacted the state and its people. To placate supporters and keep his hold on power, Moi stripped power from the Kikuyu elite to bestow benefits upon his Kalenjin co-ethnics. Controlling the state meant securing power and resources for one’s group.

Historically, elites traded land for political patronage, another institutionalized tool for ethno-political discrimination. Since independence, there have been more than an estimated 200,000 illegal allocations, the focal point of which has been the Rift Valley. Leading up to 2007, land grabbing in the Rift created economic disparities between groups, intensifying ethnic segregation and contributing to feelings of indigenous marginalization at the hands of “outsiders.” As the hub of land grabs, the Rift also became the epicenter of violence. National and local elites easily fomented tensions over resentment towards “outsiders.”

Corruption and criminalization dismantled the state’s monopoly on legitimate force. With the economy continuing to deteriorate in the 1980s, Moi relied heavily on violence, increasing state and empowering extra-legal repression. As corruption grew, political largesse eroded state functionality, and Nairobi transformed into an underworld. In Nairobi and other urban centers, gangs (the most notorious was Mungiki) responded to the environment; some even created mafia-style protection rackets to survive. Most gangs were not as well organized as Mungiki, but all drew membership from the disenfranchised and unemployed youth population. Many ultimately operated as gangs for hire, as opposed to perpetrating violence solely along ethnic lines. In fact, many Kikuyu youths displaced by Moi’s ethnic cleansing of the Rift in the 1990s joined Mungiki, which was later hired by Moi’s KANU party and armed by the same security forces responsible for their initial displacement. After Moi, Kibaki unsuccessfully banned Mungiki; it and many other gangs were operating beyond state control prior to 2007.

In the 1990s, many mistakenly believed economic and political opportunity had finally come to Kenya. During this period, the economy enjoyed a brief period of growth, but it stagnated by 1997. Political space also opened vis-à-vis multi-party elections, but largely due to international threats to withhold foreign aid. When faced with elections, Moi hired youth gangs to eliminate the opposition and used anti-Kikuyu rhetoric to consolidate the marginalized. He isolated groups into ethnic zones and erected KANU zones

344 McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers,” 11.
346 APRM, Country Review, 12.
350 Ibid., 188.
351 Ibid., 192.
352 Ibid.
353 Ibid.
354 Ibid., 193.
355 Ibid., 192-193.
356 Ibid., 193.
in strategic areas.\(^{359}\) Moi perverted *majimboism*, a federalist policy elevating communities’ right to return to their ancestral homelands, and forcibly relocated people en masse, permanently changing Rift Valley demographics.\(^{360}\) Calls of voter fraud surrounded both the 1992 and 1997 elections, Moi stayed president, and election violence ensued.\(^{361}\) The 1990s election violence amounted to an estimated 2,000 deaths and 500,000 displaced, mainly in the Rift – 70 per cent of those displaced in the 1990s had not returned to their land by 2002.\(^{362}\) The extra-legal groups perpetrating the violence were not held accountable.

Beginning with the 1990s elections, the democratization process ultimately restructured power bases. The 2002 election represented the turning point – it was a peaceful democratic election and power transition. Moi’s KANU successor Uhuru Kenyatta (Jomo Kenyatta’s son) lost to Mwai Kibaki. Prominent politicians, including Raila Odinga, backed Kibaki under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), formed to depose KANU and usher in constitutional reform via power-sharing.\(^{363}\)

Responding to state deficiencies, civil society (with the support of the international donor community) played prominently in Kenya’s democratization. Many opposition leaders had strong ties to civil society, as it had been a training ground and operational base for opposition leaders during Moi’s reign.\(^{364}\) With the state increasingly unable to conduct effective development work, the donor community looked to civil society to fill the gaps.\(^{365}\) In the 1990s, civil society became more vocal, fighting for multi-party democracy, training the opposition, and helping ally politicians under NARC.\(^{366}\) Women had long been active in development, but with the opening of political space, women civil society leaders looked to secure political gains as well. They worked to improve civic, gender, and human rights awareness, along with conducting policy and advocacy efforts to advance women in public decision-making bodies.\(^{367}\) Taking impetus from the Platform for Action that resulted from the Beijing Conference in 1995, Hon. Charity Ngilu and then Hon. Phoebe Asiyo put forth legislation to increase the participation of women in parliament in the late 1990s; Martha Karua tried again in 2000.\(^{368}\) Though unsuccessful, the efforts of women to devolve centralized power and cement their political access dovetailed with the fight for constitutional reform.

Though the 2002 election left Kenyans brimming with optimism, the new government faced old challenges. Weak institutions and entrenched corruption limited economic output. With civil society and NARC support, Kibaki ran on transparency, national unity, and anti-corruption, but he did not deliver. He failed to upend state corruption or hold accountable those responsible; stifled constitutional reform; ignored truth, justice, and reconciliation; neglected Moi’s victims, including the displaced; and, critically, failed to appoint Odinga as prime minister, despite promising to do so.\(^{369}\) Instead, Kibaki made political appointments and allocated resources along ethno-regional lines, exhuming historic policies favoring Kikuyus.\(^{370}\) Predicated

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363 Odinga signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Kibaki, stating that if Kibaki won the election, he would appoint Odinga as prime minister. See McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers,” 12.


368 Nzomo, “Impacts of Women in Political Leadership.”


370 Murunga, *Spontaneous or Permeated?,* 15.
on the power-sharing promise, the alliance between the NARC constituencies broke. Both parties deliberately used ethnicity in their 2007 political strategies. Odinga blamed the failure of Kibaki on Kikuyus, tying the ethnic group to the corruption and injustices corroding the state since independence. ODM also unearthed majimboism, tacitly condoning the eviction of Kikuyus from the Rift, while PNU encouraged Kikuyus to vote together to maintain control of state resources. As in past elections, people voted along ethno-regional lines. In a too-close-to-call and irregular fashion, Kibaki (PNU) beat Odinga (ODM) for president by two points, but PNU won less than half the parliamentary seats of ODM (43 to 99). Violence erupted after Kibaki was sworn in.

Distinct in magnitude and breadth, the 2007/8 election violence took several forms: reactionary protests, organized attacks and retaliation, excessive use of state force, and individualized defense. The refusal of ODM to accept the results spurred mass protests and mobilized large numbers of marginalized youth to attack PNU supporters, Kikuyus, and their “upcountry” allies. Violence began in the Rift, with Kikuyus as the main targets, but it quickly spread to other regions and targeted other groups. Groups pursued violent majimboism. Organized anti-PNU/Kikuyu strikes occurred in ODM strongholds, against which Kikuyus retaliated. Organized youths, including the Mungiki, perpetrated assaults on both sides. Blaring hate speech over the radio incited what looked like ethnic killings and reprisals, but human rights research later revealed business and political elites organized much of the violence that was gang-related. Many people lashed out due to poverty, and gangs recruited from swaths of unemployed youth. With elite provocation, enduring inter-group resentment and marginalization easily set Kenya ablaze; once unleashed, it was not easily controlled.

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373 Ibid.
374 Ibid.
381 Ibid., 7.
382 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
**The negotiation process**

Both civil society and the international community sought to stop the violence. Civil society group Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP) first tried to push the principals into a localized mediation process; with both sides lacking confidence in local actors, the idea failed. On January 2, 2008, only days after the crisis began, the African Union (AU), with the support of the West, called for the parties to compromise. After, several mediators (including many African heads of state) tried to assemble the principals without success. PNU sought to avoid the crisis’ internationalization, whereas ODM wanted to leverage it. Using shuttle diplomacy, President Kufour (AU Chair) ultimately got both sides to work within an AU-led mediation ultimately called the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation process. Kofi Annan chaired the process with Benjamin Mkapa and Graça Machel; collectively the Panel of Eminent African Personalities – an African-led mediation with the international community providing technical and diplomatic support. Members of each negotiating team were as follows: Martha Karua (then-Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs), Sam Ongeri (then-Minister of Education), Mutula Kilonzo (MP of ODM-K), and Moses Wetang’ula (then-Minister of Foreign Affairs) for PNU; and Musalia Mudavadi, William Ruto, James Orengo, and Sally Kosgei for ODM (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORMAL PEACE PANEL</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WOMEN</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MEN</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PNU – ODM Peace Table Negotiators (2008)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNU</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Mediator</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel of Eminent African Personalities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Coming to a negotiated settlement**

After Annan convinced the principals to publicly shake hands on January 24, 2008, the international community ramped up support of the African-led mediation. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon arrived on February 1, 2008 to call for peace. Pressure mounted from foreign governments, notably the U.S., E.U.,

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386 Nobel Peace Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu was the first international actor to arrive in Kenya, followed by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, and four former heads of state, Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzania), Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique), Ketumile Masire (Botswana), and Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia). AU Chairman and Ghanaian President John Kufuor and Chairman of the Heads of State Summit of the East African Community and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni arrived shortly thereafter. High-profile persons from the US, notably US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and the UK also came to Kenya following the crisis’ onset, while the EU intensified pressure on Kibaki to resolve the crisis. Almost immediately, the US and the World Bank recanted initial statements congratulating Kibaki on his re-election. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon arrived in Kenya on February 1, 2008 to urge the parties to compromise. See Lindenmayer and Kaye, “A Choice for Peace?,” 4-5; Juma, “African Mediation,” 412, 421-422.


388 Notably the US, UK, and EU. See Ibid., 412, 421.


393 Back from the Brink, 27.

394 McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers.”
International financial mechanisms, such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank, drew attention to the crisis’ economic effects. The Panel, along with prominent African and Western leaders, repeatedly reminded the parties of the need to stabilize Kenya, a sentiment echoed fervently by civil society. From both the bottom-up and the top-down, civil society and the international community placed responsibility for the future of Kenya squarely in the hands of the principals.

To proceed, the fragility of the peace required clear guidelines within a narrowly participatory process. The negotiations used a building block approach, leaving the most contentious issues for last. The mediation agenda sought to first stop the violence and restore human rights, as well as address the humanitarian crisis and foster reconciliation (enshrined in Agenda Items 1, 2, and 3). Lastly, Agenda Item 4 sought to address the root causes of the violence – entrenched socio-economic and political inequality rooted in the character of the state. Importantly, the Women’s Memorandum, crafted by the WCG and presented on January 25, articulated the need to address all of these issues. The parties agreed on a strict timetable to address Agenda Items 1, 2, and 3 – seven to 15 days from the mediation start (January 28, 2008) – but allowed up to a year of deliberation to resolve Agenda Item 4. While the mediation process itself occurred only between the official ODM and PNU negotiation delegations (both of which had a woman delegate), the Panel sought to engage the public to create transparency around the high-level process. The Panel also strategically used civil society – leveraging the grassroots and outsider role of civil society to voice the demands of Kenyans and move the parties to a negotiated settlement.

Ultimately, however, peace was a narrowly participatory process. On February 28, after a day of closed-door meetings at Harambee House with Kofi Annan, Benjamin Mkapa and Jakaya Kikwete (AU Chair and President of Tanzania), both Kibaki and Odinga signed the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government. In the end, the principals reached this accord without their negotiation teams or Graça Machel. They agreed to implement a power-sharing system and create a transition government promising constitutional reform. The mediation took 41 days (see Appendix D for the timeline of events).

Within this context, this study focuses on how civil society women accessed the formal mediation, amidst the post-election violence. The following sections explore civil society women’s reasons behind and process

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397 Ibid., 418.
399 *Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation Through the Mediation of H.E. Kofi A. Annan and the Panel of Eminent African Personalities on the Resolution of the Political Crisis Annotated Agenda and Timetable* (outcome document from the fourth session held under the chairmanship of Mr. Kofi Annan, of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, and the Parties to the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation, Nairobi, February 1, 2008), 2.
400 Sally Kosgei was a negotiator for ODM and Martha Karua was chief negotiator for PNU.
402 Ibid., 21-22.
for mobilizing, how they formed alliances, how they shaped agendas and set priorities, the extent to which those priorities changed, how they negotiated their goals, and the extent to which the final agreement reflected their priorities. While this study examines the varied roles and strategies of women leaders across civil society, at times it narrows in on the WCG. Although women led many civil society coalitions that sought to access the formal talks and these coalitions’ agendas often overlapped with the WCG, only the mission of the WCG expressly voiced recommendations from civil society women as a collective. This study often and appropriately focuses on the WCG as a result.

**Why did women in civil society mobilize for peace?**

Women civil society leaders sprang to action when the crisis began. While the overall tone set by the mediation team encouraged civil society participation, Graça Machel in particular roused the efforts of women in civil society to coalesce as a distinct lobby.

The violence galvanized local CSOs, many of which women led (see Appendix E for a diagram of CSO networks). Although each coalition called for peace for different reasons, they coalesced around the AU mediation. Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ) launched an international campaign for an independent mediation. With L. Muthoni Wanyeki and Gladwell Otieno at the helm, KPTJ’s mission went beyond peace to focus also on bringing truth and justice mechanisms to the process. An umbrella coalition, known as the National Civil Society Congress (NCSC), supported the efforts of KPTJ largely through its mediation and political negotiation team (three of the six leaders were women). NCSC, with KPTJ, used the crisis to redress past injustices and reopen the constitutional debate. Vital Voices mobilized as an

—Kofi Annan, Chair, Panel of Eminent African Personalities

403 Directed by the African Centre for Open Governance (AfriCog) and the Kenya Human Rights Commission, KPTJ was a group of 30 organizations and individual academics and researchers that monitored the election outcome, violence, and problems related to the 2007 presidential election.

404 NCSC was established in 2005 to harmonize CSOs’ activities in Kenya.

405 Njeri Kabeberi (Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD) – Kenya), Philo Ikonya (PEN International), and Ann Njogu (Center for Rights Education and Awareness – CREA)

inter-ethnic caucus of women and partnered with other African women to share conflict experiences. Vital Voices elevated the needs of women, arguing the violence affected women and children most severely.

According to Njeri Kabeberi:

Vital Voices aimed to add women’s voices to the call for unity and peace. This group worked under the guidance of Ms. Baudouine Kamatari, a survivor of the Burundian genocide who... patiently and consistently urged us to keep the voice of women alive and to insist that “dialogue is not one more way, it is the only way.”

The business community, including the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) led by Betty Maina and Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) led by Carole Kariuki, focused on the detrimental economic effects of the violence. Maina states, “We were involved in the process of drawing attention to the fact that violence was not good for business and that business was suffering.” The primary and secondary data corroborate the finding that KAM and KEPSA focused their lobbying on the economics of the crisis. However, the secondary literature suggests KAM and KEPSA engaged more heavily in the mediation than either Maina or Kariuki indicate.

Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), consisting of five core members

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408 There is consensus amongst the secondary and primary data on Vital Voices engaging in cross-cultural exchanges with other African women. However, dissonance exists as to whether the other women were only from Burundi or whether representatives from other countries, specifically Rwanda, were also present. Atsango Chesoni, Martha Mugambi, and Josephine Ojiambo support the statement that one Burundian woman consulted with Kenyan women, whereas Margaret Hutchinson, Florence Mpaayei, Njeri Kabeberi, and Mary Wandia indicate that cross-cultural exchanges took place with Burundian and Rwandan women. See Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum, March 16, 2015; Interview with Martha Mugambi, Vice-Chair, Justice and Peace of the Catholic Church Commission on Human Rights and Member, Vital Voices, March 19, 2015; Interview with Josephine Ojiambo, Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee, Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women, Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association, Member, Vital Voices, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum, May 18, 2015; Interview with Margaret Hutchinson, Executive Director, Education Centre for Women in Democracy, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum, March 17, 2015; Interview with Florence Mpaayei, Executive Director, Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa, Member, CCP, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum, March 17, 2015; Interview with Njeri Kabeberi, Executive Director, CMD – Kenya, Leader, Vital Voices, Member, KPTJ, Co-Convener, NCSC, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum, March 20, 2015; Interview with Mary Wandia, Women’s Rights Coordinator, Africa Secretariat of ActionAid International, May 27, 2015; Kabeberi, Marching through Fire, 19.
409 McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers,” 16.
411 Kabeberi, “Dialogue is not one more way,” 48.
412 Interview with Betty Maina, Chief Executive Officer, KAM, March 20, 2015.
(one of whom was peacebuilding expert, Dekha Ibrahim Abdi), rallied for peace and dialogue and proposed a seven-point peace agenda to that effect.

The secondary literature occasionally makes passing mention of but does not elevate the finding that women were leaders in Kenya’s already-robust civil society, except for pieces written by these women leaders.414 Betty Murungi states, “The Kenyan women’s rights movement, the Kenyan human rights movement was already very well established, very well organized, very well aware of what the issues were.”415 In addition to highlighting women’s leadership across civil society, this research uncovered an important nuance in their mobilization for peace – before the crisis, civil society was largely siloed and narrowly focused on specific issues and/or groups.416 They engaged immediately after violence began but remained fractured. Later they allied (via the WCG and across lobbies) to more significantly affect the mediation.


415 Interview with Betty Murungi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum, March 17, 2015.

416 Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview Catherine Mumma, Consultant, Human Rights and Governance, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum, March 16, 2015; Interview with Jane Onyango, Executive Director, FIDA – Kenya, Member, Vital Voices, and Member, WCG, March 15, 2015; Interview with Margaret Hutchinson, Executive Director, Education Centre for Women in Democracy, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Florence Mpaayei, Executive Director, Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa, Member, CCP, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Njeri Kabeberi, Executive Director, CMD – Kenya, Leader, Vital Voices, Member, KPTJ, Co-Convener, NCSC, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with L. Muthoni Wanyeki, Executive Director, Kenya Human Rights Commission and Leader, KPTJ; Interview with Betty Murungi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Mildred Ngesa, Representative, Association of Media Women in Kenya, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum, March 18, 2015; Interview with Martha Mugambi, Vice-Chair, Justice and Peace of the Catholic Church Commission on Human Rights and Member, Vital Voices; Interview with Irene Oloo, Executive Director, League of Kenyan Women Voters and Member, Vital Voices, March 19, 2015; Interview with Ann Njogu, Executive Director, CREAW and Co-Convener, NCSC, March 19, 2015; Interview with Tecla Wanjala, Deputy Chief of Party, Pact – Kenya, Member, WCG, and Consultant, Japan International Cooperation Agency, March 20, 2015; Interview with Gladwell Otieno, Convener, KPTJ and Executive Director/Founder, AfriCog, March 20, 2015; Interview with Josephine Ojiambo, Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee, Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women, Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association, Member, Vital Voices, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Saida Ali, Co-Founder/Executive Director, Young Women’s Leadership Institute, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum, May 21, 2015; Wanyeki, “Lessons from Kenya,” 97; Back from the Brink, 29-30; Nyamwamu, “Ensuring Social Accountability,” 43-45.
It’s the most candid meeting I’ve ever been to in terms of [the] women’s movement in this country… because we had had this honest conversation, that then made it possible to begin to have a conversation about how we were going to put together a team of women that would ensure that women’s concerns were infused into whatever sessions were coming.

Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum

As a Panel member, Machel catalyzed civil society women to be a lobby with distinct interests during the mediation. While women independently responded to the violence via the coalitions above, many of these same women also answered Machel’s request for Kenyan women to participate in the process, a point consistent across the primary and secondary data. Although the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue suggests Machel contacted Kenyan women leaders directly, the primary data collected indicate Mary Wandia reached out at the request of Machel. Machel and Wandia had worked together on women’s rights at the AU. According to Wandia:

...[Machel] told me that she would not want to come into a mediation process in which women are not speaking in one voice across all the divides, that is age, tribe, political party... women will come before that team in a united voice.

When recruiting, Wandia cultivated most women for the WCG based on their leadership roles in civil society and/or their political affiliations (not in spite of them). Of note, UNIFEM (now part of UN Women),

417 McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers,” 17.
418 Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Catherine Mumma, Consultant, Human Rights and Governance, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Jane Onyango, Executive Director, FIDA – Kenya, Member, Vital Voices, and Member, WCG; Interview with Margaret Hutchinson, Executive Director, Education Centre for Women in Democracy, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Florence Mpaaye, Executive Director, Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa, Member, CCP, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with L. Muthoni Wanyeki, Executive Director, Kenya Human Rights Commission and Leader, KPTJ; Interview with Betty Murungi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Mildred Ngesa, Representative, Association of Media Women in Kenya, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Martha Mugambi, Vice-Chair, Justice and Peace of the Catholic Church Commission on Human Rights and Member, Vital Voices; Interview with Irene Oloo, Executive Director, League of Kenyan Women Voters and Member, Vital Voices; Interview with Ann Njogu, Executive Director, CREA and Co-Convenor, NCSC; Interview with Tecla Wanjala, Deputy Chief of Party, Pact – Kenya, Member, WCG, and Consultant, Japan International Cooperation Agency; Interview with Njeri Kabeberi, Executive Director, CMD – Kenya, Leader, Vital Voices, Member, KPTJ, Co-Convenor, NCSC, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Gladwell Otieno, Convener, KPTJ and Executive Director/Founder, AfriCog, March 20, 2015; Interview with Josephine Ojiambo, Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee, Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women, Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association, Member, Vital Voices, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Saida Ali, Co-Founder/Executive Director, Young Women’s Leadership Institute, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Mary Wandia, Women’s Rights Coordinator, Africa Secretariat of ActionAid International.

419 Interview with Mary Wandia, Women’s Rights Coordinator, Africa Secretariat of ActionAid International.
Importantly, all four coalitions (NCSC, Vital Voices, KPTJ, CCP) began mobilizing prior to Machel’s Panel appointment and in advance of the WCG’s formation. The NCSC existed before the crisis, whereas KPTJ and CCP formed directly in response to it. While there appears to be some disagreement in the secondary literature and the primary data collected regarding the timing of Vital Voices’ formation, both imply Vital Voices existed prior to the 2007/8 crisis, but frame its work largely in response to the violence. All four coalitions proved supportive of and informally allied with the WCG.

While overlap existed between coalitions, policy priorities were not uniform. CCP campaigned for peace as an end in itself, while KPTJ and NCSC saw the post-conflict environment as an opportunity to address the violence’s root causes and (also for WCG and Vital Voices) to foster a more gender-sensitive society. Indeed, many priorities raised in the Women’s Memorandum mirrored the 1990s constitutional reform efforts. In stark contrast, KPTJ and CCP fundamentally differed in mission. CCP prioritized peace, whereas KPTJ sought peace only in conjunction with establishing justice mechanisms. While few, if any, people were members of both KPTJ and CCP, the WCG allowed space for KPTJ and CCP members to collaborate.

**How did women in civil society mobilize and organize?**

Leveraging their pre-existing networks and skillsets, civil society women mobilized at every level. Although women of the WCG initially came together at the request of Machel, they had to undergo an emotional process to unify.

To organize effectively, women leaders drew on their existing expertise and networks. As Kofi Annan states, “A lot of the leaders of the civil society groups were women, very well-organized, very effective.” Since the 1990s, women leaders and their CSOs had been influential in Kenyan politics – promoting multi-party democracy, combating political repression, seeking reconciliation, and conducting grassroots activism. These women were adept in advocacy, capacity building, government lobbying, gender mainstreaming, cross-cultural exchange, liaising with the international and donor communities, grassroots organizing, policy-making, and peacebuilding. Murungi attributes the gains women secured from the mediation:

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420 Interview Catherine Mumma, Consultant, Human Rights and Governance, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Betty Murungi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Tecla Wanjala, Deputy Chief of Party, Pact – Kenya, Member, WCG, and Consultant, Japan International Cooperation Agency.

421 Interview with Martha Mugambi, Vice-Chair, Justice and Peace of the Catholic Church Commission on Human Rights and Member, Vital Voices; Interview with Josephine Ojiambo, Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee, Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women, Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association, Member, Vital Voices, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Nyamwamu, “Ensuring Social Accountability,” 43; Kanyinga “Stopping the Conflagration,” 11; Kabeberi, *Marching through Fire*, 20-21; Kabeberi, “Kenya: Dialogue is not one more way,” 48.


423 Interview with Kofi Annan, Chair, Panel of Eminent African Personalities, May 6, 2015.

424 Interview with Jane Onyango, Executive Director, FIDA – Kenya, Member, Vital Voices, and Member, WCG; Interview with Martha Mugambi, Vice-Chair, Justice and Peace of the Catholic Church Commission on Human Rights and Member, Vital Voices; Interview with Josephine Ojiambo, Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee, Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women, Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association, Member, Vital Voices, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Mary Lagat Chepkwony, Peace Campaigner, Rural Women Peace Link, May 20, 2015.
...as a result of work that had been done for 20 years by the women’s movement... everything that we put in that statement [the Women’s Memorandum], you will find that in the 19 preceding human rights commission reports that had been issued... there’s nothing groundbreaking or original... all those things had been canvassed before.425

Women formed coalitions and mobilized at every level (internationally, regionally, nationally, and locally) to press for peace. They organized forums – notably CCP, KPTJ, NCSC, Vital Voices, and the WCG – as well as led the business lobby via KEPSA and KAM. Women lobbied regionally and internationally, meeting with the AU, U.S. Congress, and senior UN officials.426 Collectively, civil society’s pressure helped capture the attention of the international community – few states recognized the new Kenyan government amidst the crisis.427 Women also mobilized the grassroots, focusing on reconciliation and humanitarian aid. Kibera Women for Peace and Fairness worked on crisis-linked gender-based violence, while Rural Women Peace Link focused on community reconciliation in the Rift.428 Regional and international organizations, such as Urgent Action Fund, Nairobi Peace Initiative, and the Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCog), also collaborated with rural CSOs to uncover and address acute needs on the ground.

Machel’s Panel appointment, coupled with her long career in women’s rights advocacy, was seminal to the ability of women in civil society to lobby the mediation. Despite each political party’s negotiation team appointing a woman negotiator (one of whom – Martha Karua – had also been a women’s rights advocate), Machel remained concerned the interests of Kenyan women would be neglected. Both Kosgei and Karua were chosen as negotiators because of their political posts, not because they represented women or civil society. After being contacted by Machel, Wandia used her networks at ActionAid International, FemNet, and PAN Africa, as well as consulted the leaders of KPTJ, Vital Voices, and others (who had already begun organizing), to bring together women civil society leaders. Wandia deliberately recruited a diverse group – both urban and rural, connected to both ODM and PNU, leaders of organizations from varied sectors (human rights, government accountability, women’s rights, peacebuilding, constitutional reform, conflict resolution, etc.), and those who possessed different professional skillsets.

Before they could coalesce as a group, however, the women of the WCG underwent an emotional process. Initially, 24 women leaders429 met to develop a women’s agenda to present to the Panel. Desiring to be more representative, those present brought additional women from their constituencies to a second meeting. The UN’s support of the meeting (in providing some resources for travel and training) did a great deal in this regard. Jane Onyango attributes her comfort in participating to the UN, as it promised safety and indicated the meeting would be unbiased. Ultimately, this second meeting consisted of more than 50 women from varied sectors, as well as affiliated with the feuding political parties and warring ethnic groups.

Quickly apparent, the same political and ethnic tensions that fomented the election violence prevented meaningful cooperation amongst the women assembled. To surmount these obstacles, Wandia (via ActionAid) facilitated a “spitting session” – where women came together to air divisive issues – and Florence Mpaayei moderated it. Conformity exists amongst interviewees and the secondary literature that Machel encouraged the “spitting session,” but it is unclear the degree to which she involved herself: some maintain she was present when the idea for a “spitting session” occurred; others indicate she attended the actual

425 Interview with Betty Murungi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
426 McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers,” 22.
428 McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers,” 17.
429 Interview with Florence Mpaayei, Executive Director, Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa, Member, CCP, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
event. Of Machel, Mpaayei notes, “She was very, very instrumental” in calling on women to “forget about your different identities, right now we need to hear one voice from the Kenyan women.”431 While there are disagreements among interview participants (and no indication in the secondary literature) as to who came up with idea for a “spitting session,”432 there is widespread agreement among interviewees that the “spitting session” unified WCG members.433

The session brought forth emotionally raw accounts, but it enabled women to understand each other’s suffering and move forward. Kabeberi notes:

...the more they spoke out, the more they realized they needed to intervene rather than hold the position of their ethnic community... when they were speaking out, the pain was kind of shared, and they realized that, “It’s not my personal pain, it’s our pain. And we need to end this pain jointly.”434

The majority of those interviewed explain the “spitting session” as a pre-requisite to advancing a unified women’s agenda. Atsango Chesoni reveals:

It’s the most candid meeting I’ve ever been to in terms of [the] women’s movement in this country... because we had had this honest conversation, that then made it possible to begin to have a conversation about how we were going to put together a team of women that would ensure that women’s concerns were infused into whatever sessions were coming.435

Following the session, participating women nominated 12 individuals, based on their identity, values, experience, and political posts, to represent them.436 Those selected already represented robust and distinct constituencies that covered the spectrum of Kenyan civil society. According to Chesoni, a minor disagree-

430 Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Catherine Mumma, Consultant, Human Rights and Governance, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Betty Murungi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Mildred Ngesa, Representative, Association of Media Women in Kenya, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Ann Njogu, Executive Director, CREA and Co-Convener, NCSC; Interview with Carole Kariuki, Chief Executive Officer, KEPSA; Back from the Brink, 30; McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers,” 24.
431 Interview with Florence Mpaayei, Executive Director, Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa, Member, CCP, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
432 Interview with Tecla Wanjala, Deputy Chief of Party, Pact – Kenya, Member, WCG, and Consultant, Japan International Cooperation Agency; Interview with Catherine Mumma, Consultant, Human Rights and Governance, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
434 Interview with Njeri Kabeberi, Executive Director, CMD – Kenya, Leader, Vital Voices, Member, KPTJ, Co-Convener, NCSC, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
435 Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
436 Interviewees generally agreed about the nomination process for the WCG representatives. The WCG nominated 12 representatives, but only 11 accepted. For unknown reasons, Njoki Ndung’u did not accept. The research team was unable to reach her for comment.
ment on who should be a representative occurred, but the WCG did not permit individuals to self-select.437 After the “spitting session,” UNIFEM (now part of UN Women) provided resources to enable women across Kenya to attend various workshops to continue to unify as a constituency.

When the violence erupted, the core members of the CCP, including Ibrahim Abdi, had been working together for 15 years, and collectively they had an array of peacebuilding experience at local, national, and international levels.438 They convened quickly because they already had peace networks in place, including but not limited to Inter-Religious Forum, Women’s Coalition for Peace, Media Council, and KEPSA.439 They analyzed the situation daily, crafted strategy to meet the changing conflict dynamics, and deployed those in their network most suitable to fit the needs of the moment.440 Beyond its core, CCP had high-level, mid-level, and grassroots engagement teams that did everything from lobbying the mediation to hosting the Open Forum, a dialogue amongst diverse groups that met for two to three hours daily.441 Kabeberi’s Marching Through Fire only makes one passing mention of a meeting held at the Pan Afrique Hotel hosted by Vital Voices in response to the crisis, in which 300 attendees were present.442

Though the NCSC began in 2005, the group kicked into high gear after the election, mobilizing its diverse network of more than 400 civil society and community-based organizations.443 The NCSC’s mobilization team worked with religious and political leaders to support Kenyans who faced death threats.444 During the mediation, the core team held regular coordination breakfast meetings at the Serena Hotel to share information, assess the situation, and provide direct support to each working group on the day’s priorities, which they set based on the mediation’s agenda.445

How did they form coalitions and alliances?

Kenyan women reached out to other constituencies to form alliances. Coalitions drew strength and legitimacy from the diversity of their constituencies and the synergy of their messaging, allowing them to claim broad social support as the voices of Kenya. The WCG built horizontal and vertical alliances. Using pre-existing networks, they used formal and informal mechanisms to develop relationships across diverse political allegiances and sectors, including with leaders and members of other lobbies, the mediators, and, wherever possible, the negotiators. They used caucuses and workshops as opportunities to engage with and solicit input from civil society women across sectors. Similarly, the NCSC, led by Cyprian Nyamwamu and Ann Njogu, reached out to trade unions, the private sector, religious leaders, political parties, and CSOs to promote message synergy across civil society lobbies.446 Although each structure had its core, members considered each coalition relatively non-hierarchical and consisting of fluid alliances. Members and leaders often straddled different movements, or at least had relationships that crossed coalitions. One coalition’s views invariably and often, perhaps inadvertently, influenced others.447 Groups brought together diverse expertise; they combined their capabilities and leveraged their unique capacities. Although coalitions like

437 Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum. Other interviewees and the secondary literature make no mention of this event, nor was additional information regarding this incident or the women involved provided during the course of this research.
439 Ibid., 7.
440 Ibid.
441 Ibid., 9-11.
442 Kabeberi, Marching through Fire, 20.
443 Ibid., 13.
444 Nyamwamu, “Ensuring Social Accountability,” 44.
445 Ibid., Kabeberi, Marching through Fire, 15.
446 Nyamwamu, “Ensuring Social Accountability,” 44.
447 Interview with Gladwell Otieno, Convener, KPTJ and Executive Director/Founder, AfriCog.
CCP and KPTJ did not collaborate, the WCG received support from both – CCP’s Ibrahim Abdi advised the WCG, and KPTJ provided it with technical and propaganda support. The coalition structure allowed information sharing to improve credibility and visibility. KPTJ shared evidence it collected to bolster the human rights agenda it wanted echoed across lobbies. The strong leadership of women defined these coalitions, as many groups allied voluntarily despite diverse and often distinct interests, and bridged power structures to unite stakeholders around common issues.

How did they assemble and shape agendas?

The WCG agenda evolved procedurally. After overcoming barriers via the “spitting session,” the WCG met to discuss the message they would convey to the Panel. However, the details of their agenda formulation are unclear in the mainstream narrative. Participants indicate that the WCG decided a committee should formulate the agenda for larger group discussion and consensus. Smaller spin-off meetings formed to focus on specific subjects, while a core team of technical experts developed the Women’s Memorandum – the formal recommendations it would present to the Panel. The technical group then circulated the draft Memorandum to the larger WCG for comment. Each individual chose the issue on which they worked and pulled in outside experts to assist where necessary. When crafting the Memorandum, they called on members whose organizations worked with or at the grassroots level to draw upon feedback from women who were displaced and those in areas where violence occurred – this ensured they grounded the Memorandum in the expressed needs of affected women. Catherine Mumma explains:

We then came up with a memorandum as women, which we took back to the women.... We would listen to the women, receive the views the women wanted to be included in the negotiations and the agreement, then retreat back to the small group, categorize the issues, and then go back to the women to validate them. In the end, we came up with a memorandum of understanding agreeable to the women, which we submitted to the formal [mediation] team.

The women divided the Memorandum to deal with immediate issues (i.e., cessation of violence and return to the rule of law); medium-term issues (i.e., addressing humanitarian needs, the impact of displacement on women and children, etc.); and long-term issues (i.e., electoral and constitutional reform, reconciliation, transitional justice, and peacemaking). They recommended resolving the causes of conflict (rooted in

448 Dekha’s role in CCP fits with the mainstream narrative of CCP. However, the details of her role within CCP and in relation to the WCG are not evident in the secondary literature or in interviews she has given. As explained by Florence Mpaayei and Betty Murungi, the overlap between the WCG and CCP, regarding Dekha in particular, fits with the narrative and is possible to see when looking at members of the WCG and CCP. There is no dissonance amongst participants in this regard, but very few address the role of CCP generally or Dekha’s in particular. Participants mentioned the organization in passing, but focused more on explaining KPTJ’s or the WCG’s strategies and activities. This might be because the participant sample for this research only included one member of CCP. Florence Mpaayei was a member of Nairobi Peace Initiative, which was a key member of CCP. See Interview with Florence Mpaayei, Executive Director, Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa, Member, CCP, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Betty Murungi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Back from the Brink, 30; Ibrahim Abdi, “Working for Peace;” George Wachira, Citizens in Action: Making Peace in the Post-Election Crisis in Kenya – 2008 (Nairobi: NPI – Africa, 2010), 8-13, 36-49, 54; Irungu Houghton, “Raising Voices for Peace in Kenya: A Personal Reflection,” last modified March 7, 2014, https://irunguh.wordpress.com/2014/03/07/raising-voices-for-peace-in-kenya-a-personal-reflection/

449 Interview with Catherine Mumma, Consultant, Human Rights and Governance, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.

450 Interview with Florence Mpaayei, Executive Director, Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa, Member, CCP, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview Catherine Mumma, Consultant, Human Rights and Governance, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
entrenched neo-patrimonial politics and social and gender inequalities) through transitional justice and constitutional and electoral reform.\textsuperscript{451} The Memorandum categorized different forms of violence perpetrated amidst the crisis, articulated the gender dimensions of that violence, and highlighted how women and children disproportionately made up the internally displaced. WCG members canvassed other coalitions to ensure the WCG agenda synergized with and echoed across lobbies. In the Memorandum, the WCG articulated the importance of women’s participation in conflict resolution and prevention as referenced in international and regional frameworks such as UNSCR 1325, the Constitutive Act of the AU, the AU’s Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality Constitutive Act, and the Protocol of the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa. As noted, the WCG purposefully recruited a diverse membership, likely contributing to the shared sentiment amongst many interviewed that the issues raised in the Memorandum fairly represented the needs of Kenyan women.

How did they set priorities for their activism? How, if at all, did their priorities change when they participated in high-level peace negotiations?

Using intensive dialogue, sector-to-sector information sharing, the media, and Machel’s guidance, the WCG set priorities for their activism. A deeper look at Karua’s role in the process illuminates how priorities can change when participating in high-level peace negotiations.

Ultimately, the WCG desired to use the mediation as an opportunity to elevate long-standing issues. After dialoguing for hours amongst themselves, the WCG reached consensus on their key priorities. Their agenda first dealt with the political violence. They then looked to seize the opportunity presented and incorporate a number of pre-existing issues on gender and the constitutional reform process (especially 50 per cent and 30 per cent quotas on women’s participation in political decision-making processes). Simultaneously, women’s and human rights organizations, especially those under KPTJ, built credibility by developing reliable real-time research and analysis focusing on the dynamics and root causes of the conflict. They used (and shared) well-documented evidence to engender support for victims of sexual violence and call for action on internally displaced persons. With this evidence, women’s organizations strategically used the media to highlight the violence perpetrated against women during the crisis. The resultant public attention to and larger discussion of violence against women allowed women’s organizations to turn the issue into a concern across lobbies, and thus further pressure the mediation to take it more seriously.\textsuperscript{452} To make their efforts most effective, the women setting the WCG agenda sought to align the internal deliberations of the group with the ever-changing mood of the mediation. They took cues from press coverage of the mediation, as well as from Machel, to help dovetail their agenda with the immediate focus of the talks. In final form, the Memorandum focused on stopping the violence, advocating for humanitarian needs, calling for constitutional reform, and highlighting the gendered violence in the crisis.

The Kenya case unveils the dynamism of priorities regarding women’s access to high-level peace negotiations, and reveals that the physical presence of women at the table is not sufficient to ensure the concerns of women are formally represented. Interestingly, a Kenyan women’s rights advocate directly accessed the mediation – Martha Karua. However, Kibaki appointed her as a negotiator due to her political prowess – she served as minister of justice. With a political mandate from her president, Karua negotiated for the PNU. While she personally felt discriminated against as a female negotiator, Karua prioritized her party.\textsuperscript{453}

\textsuperscript{451} McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers,” 20.
\textsuperscript{452} Antje Daniel, “Women’s Organizations in the Post-Conflict Situation in Kenya – Recovering Social and Political Spaces,” University of Bayreuth, 10.
\textsuperscript{453} Interview with Martha Karua, Chief Negotiator, PNU, May 11, 2015.
The mainstream accounts do not delve into Karua’s ties to the women’s movement, but those interviewed (including Karua herself) reveal Karua’s negotiator role trumped her identity as a women’s rights activist. Of her role at the table, Karua states, “The fact that women should be at the peace table is not something I thought about just then. It was a crisis. I must go negotiate. I am not thinking about the issue of inclusion.” When reflecting, most civil society women interviewed expressed betrayal and/or disappointment in Karua for this, but the sentiment was not unanimous. Two participants indicated they understood Karua’s actions related to her role as a political appointee.

How did they negotiate their goals?

Women in civil society relied on informal mechanisms, *ad hoc* strategies, proxies, and cross-lobby message cohesion to negotiate their goals.

The Panel served as the primary channel through which civil society women participated in and made recommendations to the mediation. Participating at the Panel’s discretion, civil society women’s roles in the process never formalized. Though women asked to discuss their agenda in the mediation room, they were denied the opportunity – as Josephine Ojiambo puts it, “The formal negotiation process was drawn up on party lines.” Yet, the Panel consulted the WCG (and other lobbies) throughout the process, as what the Panel purported to be critical to its strategy. While most consultations occurred informally and at

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454 McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers,” 18; *Back from the Brink*, 27; Lindenmayer and Kaye, “A Choice for Peace?,” 10. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) discusses that Karua was appointed because of her political position and explains there was tension between civil society women and the women negotiators as a result of the women negotiators not lobbying on behalf of women. Using Kenya as a case study, CHD also contends that having a woman as a negotiator at the peace table is not sufficient to have women’s views represented. However, CHD does not discuss Karua’s background as a women’s rights activist. In contrast, this report highlights Karua’s women’s rights background and thus shows not only that having a woman at the peace table is not sufficient to have women’s voices adequately represented, but also that peace processes seeking to include women’s perspectives must create a mandated role within the process that empowers a formal participant to speak for civil society women, without which their agenda is not guaranteed to be championed inside the negotiation room. See McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers,” 18.

455 Interview with Martha Karua, Chief Negotiator, PNU.

456 Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Jane Onyango, Executive Director, FIDA – Kenya, Member, Vital Voices, and Member, WCG; Interview with Betty Muringi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Mildred Ngesa, Representative, Association of Media Women in Kenya, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Irene Oloo, Executive Director, League of Kenyan Women Voters and Member, Vital Voices; Interview with Kofi Annan, Chair, Panel of Eminent African Personalities; Interview with Josephine Ojiambo, Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee, Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women, Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association, Member, Vital Voices, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with L. Muthoni Wanyeki, Executive Director, Kenya Human Rights Commission and Leader, KPTJ; Interview with Florence Mpaayei, Executive Director, Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa, Member, CCP, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Neha Sanghrajka, Staff, Panel of Eminent African Personalities, March 18, 2015; Interview with Tecla Wanjala, Deputy Chief of Party, Pact – Kenya, Member, WCG, and Consultant, Japan International Cooperation Agency.

457 Interview with Mildred Ngesa, Representative, Association of Media Women in Kenya, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Tecla Wanjala, Deputy Chief of Party, Pact – Kenya, Member, WCG, and Consultant, Japan International Cooperation Agency.


460 Interview with Josephine Ojiambo, Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee, Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women, Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association, Member, Vital Voices, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.

the margins, the WCG (and other coalitions) became useful resources for the Panel as it mediated between the parties. They served as the mechanism that the mediators used to voice the interests of the Kenyan people. The liaising between civil society and the mediators was so overt that, at one point, the Panel had to distance itself from civil society to prevent undue influence.

With no formal mechanism to engage, the WCG used *ad hoc* strategies to influence the process. First, they convened at the Serena Hotel, and, by doing so, kept a constant presence where the mediation took place. The Serena served as a strategic and operational base for many different coalitions, such as the WCG, NCSC, KPTJ, and CCP, because it offered opportunities to encounter actors working within and around the mediation. Informally, the WCG passed documents and information to Panel aides, waylaid mediators en route to the bathroom or to breakfast, and sought out male delegates who were supportive of their goals. They worked with female leaders who shared political positions, lobbied wives of party leaders, and held morning meetings (formally and informally) with Panel members to advocate for WCG issues.462

Some felt selecting women with deep ties to the mediators and the political parties enabled the WCG to influence the process effectively.463 Although some disagreement amongst interview participants occurred regarding Machel’s role – many viewed her as their entry point into the process, while few did not distill her civil society engagement from that of the Panel’s more broadly – most said the WCG’s relationship with Machel proved indispensable.464 According to Mumma, Machel went out of her way to encourage and build confidence in the women as they drafted the Memorandum.465 She listened to them and advocated for them since they did not have a seat at the table. She guided their efforts to make their lobbying more effective vis-à-vis the mediation and its surrounding dynamics. Using their personal ties, WCG women with PNU and ODM political links held informal talks to lobby and soften the stance of each party.466 Njogu discussed similar tactics used by the NCSC. The NCSC engaged the Panel directly and informally

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462 Betty Murungi’s husband, James Orengo, served as an ODM negotiator, and she purportedly informally lobbied him. Other participants interviewed gave off-the-record comments about working closely with male negotiators and male advisors to the negotiations. See Interview participant 1; Interview participant 2; Interview participant 3; Interview with Martha Mugambi, Vice-Chair, Justice and Peace of the Catholic Church Commission on Human Rights and Member, Vital Voices; Interview with Irene Oloo, Executive Director, League of Kenyan Women Voters and Member, Vital Voices; McGhie and Wamai, “Beyond the Numbers,” 20-22.

463 Interview with Betty Murungi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.

464 Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Catherine Mumma, Consultant, Human Rights and Governance, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Margaret Hutchinson, Executive Director, Education Centre for Women in Democracy, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Florence Mpaayei, Executive Director, Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa, Member, CCP, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Betty Murungi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Mildred Ngesa, Representative, Association of Media Women in Kenya, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Irene Oloo, Executive Director, League of Kenyan Women Voters and Member, Vital Voices; Interview with Tecla Wanjala, Deputy Chief of Party, Pact – Kenya, Member, WCG, and Consultant, Japan International Cooperation Agency; Interview with Njeri Kabeberi, Executive Director, CMD – Kenya, Leader, Vital Voices, Member, KPTJ, Co-Convener, NCSC, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Josephine Ojiambo, Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee, Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women, Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association, Member, Vital Voices, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.

465 Interview with Catherine Mumma, Consultant, Human Rights and Governance, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.

466 Interview with Florence Mpaayei, Executive Director, Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa, Member, CCP, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
dialogued with PNU and ODM. They lobbied foreign ambassadors, relayed information to the mediators in the hotel corridors, and built a reputation with Panel aides as a reliable data source. Ultimately, women's efforts from the bottom-up dovetailed with the mediators and the international community's efforts from the top-down.

Another critical strategy, issues articulated in the Memorandum echoed across lobbies. Personal ties between lobby leaders presented the opportunity for this message synergy and the corresponding multi-pronged approach to influence. Many felt this cross-lobby message cohesion was ultimately key for civil society to influence the process. As an example, the Memorandum references Vital Voices as a consultation facilitator responsible in part for the interests expressed therein, and key members of KPTJ, NCSC, Vital Voices, and CCP comprise some of its signatories. Even where no calculated message alignment occurred, sectors' priorities still overlapped. CCP, KPTJ, and KEPSA all expressed issues important to the WCG. In this way, civil society broadly carried the WCG mantle.

To what extent were their objectives or priorities represented in the resulting peace agreement?

It is difficult to solely credit the WCG for the language in the Annotated Agenda because of the synergies in the agendas amongst many civil society lobbies. Due to the consultative approach to access, Kenya's civil society women present a mix of views when assessing their influence on the mediation process. The Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government and its complement, the National Accord and Reconciliation Act, focus exclusively on power-sharing and forming a coalition government. Instead, women interviewed tied their impact assessment to the similarity in language between the Women's Memorandum and the Annotated Agenda for the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation agreed to at the start of the mediation process. Thus, the analysis below focuses on the Annotated Agenda. Of note, the Annotated Agenda makes no explicit reference to "women," "woman," or "gender." The Memorandum and Annotated Agenda share language, but other sectors’ platforms reveal similar synergies, making it hard to draw causal links between the WCG proposal and the Annotated Agenda. Several lobbies championed Agenda Item 1 – "immediate action to stop violence and restore fundamental rights and liberties." The WCG called for "an immediate end to the killings" and the "immediate reinstatement of constitutional freedoms." KPTJ and NCSC rooted the mediation’s “foundational principles” in fundamental liberties, such as “the acceptance of universally accepted human rights, the protection and promo-

467 Interview with Ann Njogu, Executive Director, CREAW and Co-Convener, NCSC; Nyamwamu, “Ensuring Social Accountability,” 43.
469 Interview with L. Muthoni Wanyeki, Executive Director, Kenya Human Rights Commission and Leader, KPTJ; Interview with Gladwell Otieno, Convener, KPTJ and Executive Director/Founder, AfriCog; Interview with Betty Maina, Chief Executive Officer, KAM.
470 Annotated Agenda.
471 Ibid., 1.
tion of democracy and the rule of law, accountability, transparency, and the achievement of justice for all.”

CCP prioritized “restoring peace,” requiring “an immediate end to the violence.”

Agenda Item 2 – “immediate measures to address the humanitarian crisis, promote reconciliation, healing, and restoration,” including an “impartial, effective and expeditious investigation of gross and systematic violations of human rights and that those found guilty are brought to justice” – tracks to the WCG, KPTJ, NCSC, and to some extent CCP. The Memorandum stated resettlement must “take account of the special needs of women and children,” called for an “independent investigation into the trigger event,” and an “end to impunity for violations of human rights (by all parties) by investigating crimes that are being committed and prosecuting perpetrators.”

KPTJ and NCSC demanded “due attention be paid to the safety and rights of the 350-500,000 Internally Displaced,” and indicated “discussions on Truth, Justice and Reconciliation must address independent, impartial, effective and expeditious mechanisms of restorative justice for all victims.” CCP’s Citizen’s Agenda elevated “restoring peace, reconciliation and national healing;” called to “actively engage in reconciling communities;” and “restore normalcy and dignity of internally displaced persons, rehabilitation and reconstruction.”

Agenda Item 3 stipulates a process “to overcome the current political crisis” with specific reference to “power and the functioning of state institutions” and “adjustments to the current constitutional, legal and institutional frameworks.” This mirrors WCG, KPTJ, NCSC, and CCP priorities. The WCG called for “strengthening... institutions that support democratic constitutional governance... through immediate legislative reform pending comprehensive constitutional reform.” In a mutual statement, KPTJ and NCSC stated, “Constitutional reform must be fast-tracked.” CCP promoted “a grand coalition” government that creates an “improved electoral framework, revised mechanisms for transfer of power, devolution and distribution of resources,” and legal reforms “to address the weaknesses identified in the electoral process.”

Agenda Item 4 deals with root causes, specifically: constitutional, legal, and institutional reform; poverty and regional inequity; unemployment, especially for the youth; land reform; and transparency, accountability, and impunity. The WCG, KPTJ, NCSC, and CCP all elevated these issues. The Memorandum demanded “urgent reform of institutions that support a constitutional democracy grounded on sound legal framework;” a “comprehensive constitutional reform that would ensure equitable distribution of national resources, gender equality, affirmative action, equal rights for minorities and persons with disabilities including rights to political participation;” and “transitional justice mechanisms that deal with the question of historical injustices... creating accountability for human rights violations and ultimately reconciling Kenyan communities.” To reach a viable peace, KPTJ and NCSC suggested the process deal with “the underlying issues of electoral, institutional and constitutional failure, impunity, political corruption and the ethnicization of politics.”

Including the constitutional reforms noted in the preceding paragraph, CCP called for “priority initiatives to deliver equitable economic growth...a comprehensive framework to address land... an
anti-corruption agenda and a robust transparent Public Accountability framework,” as well as “establishing the truth of the allegations of all forms of ethnic cleansing and genocide by both PNU and ODM with a view to restitution and justice.”

On process, the mediation did not conform to the wishes of civil society, specifically regarding direct access to the mediation. To make the process accountable to Kenyan women, the WCG recommended a local gender adviser join the mediation team, but to no avail. Elevating transparency and accountability, KPTJ and NCSC demanded, “The Kenyan people must have ownership of the process” and fought for a process “open to receive the views of Kenyans” and “bound to give feedback to them promptly... in the form of a timely and periodic two-way feedback mechanism.” Instead, civil society participated on an ad hoc basis at the Panel’s discretion. Some observers suggest the mediation was both inclusive of civil society and narrowly structured between the official ODM and PNU negotiation teams. Primary data collected for this study finds that despite civil society engaging with the Panel, it was near impossible for civil society to access the negotiators formally or directly. As a result, civil society women used their personal networks to reach negotiators with whom they had pre-existing relations, and looked to the WCG members with ties to PNU and ODM (e.g., Chesoni and Mumma for ODM and Ojiambo for PNU) to do the same. Despite the mainstream narrative celebrating the Kenya case as largely participatory for civil society women, Onyango describes the negotiations as “a political process that kind of locked us [WCG] out.” The Harambee House negotiation, which ultimately concluded the talks, serves as exemplar. So closed-door was this meeting that the WCG was concurrently at the Serena drafting a proposal to lobby the mediation – they had no idea Annan was negotiating an end to the crisis; that process excluded them entirely.

To a certain extent, however, the mediation process gave civil society participants the sense they were involved, or at least heard, even if it was symbolic. Of the mediation, Ojiambo states, “The Panel appreciated us but they didn’t want to feel that we were directing their negotiations or dialogue. Rather, they wanted to know that we were present and that we felt our voices were being heard.” While the WCG and

487 Kenyan Women’s Consultation Group, “Women’s Memorandum.”
489 Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; *Back from the Brink*, 29-31; Kanyinga, “Stopping the Conflagration,” 16.
490 Interview with Jane Onyango, Executive Director, FIDA – Kenya, Member, Vital Voices, and Member, WCG; Interview with Irene Oloo, Executive Director, League of Kenyan Women Voters and Member, Vital Voices; Interview with Betty Maina, Chief Executive Officer, KAM.
491 Interview with Jane Onyango, Executive Director, FIDA – Kenya, Member, Vital Voices, and Member, WCG.
492 Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
493 Interview with L. Muthoni Wanyeki, Executive Director, Kenya Human Rights Commission and Leader, KPTJ; Interview with Betty Maina, Chief Executive Officer, KAM; Interview with Mildred Ngese, Representative, Association of Media Women in Kenya, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Tecla Wanjala, Deputy Chief of Party, Pact – Kenya, Member, WCG, and Consultant, Japan International Cooperation Agency; Interview with Betty Murungi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Catherine Mumma, Consultant, Human Rights and Governance, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Irene Oloo, Executive Director, League of Kenyan Women Voters and Member, Vital Voices; Interview with Njeri Kabeberi, Leader, Vital Voices, Member, KPTJ, Co-Convener, NCSC, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Mary Wandia, Women’s Rights Coordinator, Africa Secretariat of ActionAid International.
494 Interview with Josephine Ojiambo, Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee, Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women, Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association, Member, Vital Voices, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
the Panel had an ongoing back-and-forth, lack of direct access, coupled with the coalitions’ overlapping agendas, makes it difficult to distill influence. Lack of direct attribution compounds the problem. When Machel echoed a WCG sentiment, she did not directly attribute it to them.496 Upon reflection, women differ in how they view their impact on the mediation – some felt these obstacles prevented them from fully lobbying the negotiation and are correspondingly more critical of the influence of a parallel consultative forum;497 others were content with the access they had and thus felt women participated in the political conversation and influenced the process.498 Otieno sums up the mediation dynamics: “They consulted us… our views may have had some legitimacy and credibility, but in the end it was reduced to a problem of the opposing political parties.”499

Although beyond the scope of this study, many interviewed for this report pointed to women’s leadership in the post-agreement mechanisms as evidence of their impact on the process. Three women served as commissioners to the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. One woman acted as vice-chair to the Independent Review Commission and two served as commissioners. Only the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-election Violence lacked women in its leadership posts. In addition, the 2010 constitutional reform called for a one-third quota on female representation in elective and appointive positions.

The Panel appreciated us but they didn’t want to feel that we were directing their negotiations or dialogue. Rather, they wanted to know that we were present and that we felt our voices were being heard.

Josephine Ojiambo, Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee, Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women, Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association, Member, Vital Voices, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum

Conclusion

This case study explores how women in civil society accessed the formal mediation process following Kenya’s 2007/8 post-election violence. At the onset of violence, Kenyan women were leaders in an already-established network of civil society. Many of these women leaders mobilized in response to the violence, organizing coalitions using pre-existing networks and skillsets. While the WCG initially organized at Machel’s request, the women of the WCG underwent an emotional process to unify. They then formed alliances

496 Interview with Njeri Kabeberi, Executive Director, CMD – Kenya, Leader, Vital Voices, Member, KPTJ, Co-Convener, NCSC, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
497 Interview with Atsango Chesoni, Member, ODM, Consultant, Human Rights, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Betty Murungi, Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum; Interview with Josephine Ojiambo, Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee, Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women, Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association, Member, Vital Voices, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
498 Interview with Catherine Mumma, Consultant, Human Rights and Governance, Member, WCG, and Signatory, Women’s Memorandum.
499 Interview with Gladwell Otieno, Convener, KPTJ and Executive Director/Founder, AfriCog.
by actively reaching out to other constituencies. Developing its agenda through a procedural process, the WCG ultimately used the mediation to elevate long-standing issues. As detailed here, Karua’s role shows how the priorities of those seemingly but informally aligned with one’s interests can change in the context of formal negotiations. With no official role in the mediation, civil society women relied on informal mechanisms, *ad hoc* strategies, proxies, and cross-lobby message cohesion to influence the process. While several issues articulated in the Women’s Memorandum appear in the mediation’s agenda, synergies across civil society coalition agendas make it challenging draw causal links. Similarly, because of their unofficial role in the process, civil society women hold mixed reviews regarding their influence, but generally express the mediation agenda reflected issues they championed.

This study uniquely contributes to the existing literature on the subject by articulating the details and the differences among civil society women (and the coalitions they led) as they engaged in the process. Specifically, this research illuminates the fractured nature of civil society’s initial reaction to the violence, the process and strategy behind formulating a united agenda both within the WCG and across civil society sectors, the diverse roles civil society women played surrounding the mediation as well as the role of Karua, and the variance amongst civil society women in how they assess their roles in the process. Ultimately, this case study gives credence to the Women’s Consultative Group both in terms of formulating a peace agenda explicitly from the perspective of civil society women, and for providing the mechanism through which women civil society leaders built alliances and developed message cohesion across the disparate sectors lobbying the mediation. Without this contribution, civil society would have had comparatively less influence in the narrowly structured negotiations.
Introduction

This case study focuses on how women in civil society moved from networks and coalitions to gain access to the formal Mindanao peace negotiations. This study applies a political economy lens to analyze the peace process from 2001 to 2014. In general, the formal peace negotiation has a relatively high representation of women in the process, with the first woman panel chair signing a peace agreement in the 40-years-long peace process, under the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, who is also a woman. Additionally, the majority of women on the peace panels came from civil society that had overlapping networks and held firm links with their organizations and constituencies. While these women aim for objectivity, transparency, accountability, and a consistent position during the formal peace negotiations, the strategic links between actors in Tracks 1, 1.5, 2, and 3 fostered communication from the top down and bottom up. Moreover, the gradual increasing participation of women in the formal peace negotiations has, for the most part, diffused tensions and reduced competition amongst parties to the conflict, especially when compared to earlier periods when women were not present. This chapter begins with an assessment of the political economy of conflict in the Philippines. It then moves to examine the political peace negotiation process, and lastly the process of women’s participation in the formal peace negotiations.

Political economy of the conflict in the Philippines

The separatist conflict in Mindanao was one of five major conflicts that occurred in the Philippines since its independence in 1946 (for a concise timeline of events, see Appendix D).Traditionally, the Moro struggle for self-determination in Mindanao was framed by observers as a war in the Muslim majority regions of
central and southwestern Mindanao driven by religion, culture, and ethnicity. The historical antecedents of the conflict date back to the Spanish colonial era of the 16th century, where intermittent warfare sowed the seeds of animosity between Muslim and Christian peoples, and to the early 20th century, where the U.S. colonial power forcibly incorporated Mindanao into the Philippine state, passing laws that dispossessed land from Muslims and Lumads. Indeed, separatist insurgent groups used this narrative to emphasize a timeless ethno-history that justified their struggle as a continuation of colonial resistance movements. Yet, McKenna argued convincingly that the glorification of pre-colonial Islamic polity in the southern Philippines was based on an erroneous historiography, and that the region was the site of incessant feuding between competing Muslim sultanates and Datu elites (or Muslim tribal chiefs). Furthermore, this traditional frame provided only a partial understanding of the dynamics of conflict and discounts the complexity of class division, economic exclusion and exploitation, and dispossession of and displacement from ancestral land. Two types of conflict punctuated the political economy of Mindanao: one that was rebellion-related against the state and one that was clan-related and served the interests of those with access to economic and political power.


501 The struggle for self-determination by the Moro population began in 1565 under Spanish colonial rule. Today, these areas consist of administrative Region IX (Western Mindanao), Region XII (Central Mindanao), and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (AARM), and the four provinces in Region XI (Southern Mindanao, namely Davao del Sur, Sarangani, South Cotabato, and Sulta Kudarat).


The Philippines was relatively calm after independence, but conflict erupted in the late 1960s as a result of the rapidly growing numbers of Christian Filipinos that migrated to the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. Ferdinand Marcos’ regime (1965-1986) encouraged this northern in-migration through state-sponsored resettlement policies, such as the Land Registration Act and Public Land Act that seized communal land to redistribute to Christian settlers from the islands of Luzon and Visayas. Illiteracy prevented the pre-existing inhabitants, the Moro people, from registering their land, and, as a result, unclaimed lands became state properties. The demographic shift in population was significant. Central Mindanao, which received the highest Christian in-migration, saw the population soar from 0.7 million persons in 1948 to approximately 2.3 million persons in 1970. While economic development of Mindanao stagnated in the Moro region, the government of the Philippines encouraged transnational corporations to engage in export-driven plantation agriculture (i.e., production of rubber, pineapples, and bananas) rather than orienting production to benefit local needs. Logging companies also received large concessions to operate in the region to the detriment of the surrounding environment. The influx of Christian settlers displaced Muslim communities who were not absorbed by the logging, mining, or planation businesses. A Philippine Senate Committee reported in 1970 that the mass migration created conspicuous socio-economic disparities in access to land and government resources between the Christian and Moro communities. As Brown notes, the demographic shift exacerbated socio-economic horizontal inequalities and group grievances. In 1971, Christian electoral majorities in formerly Muslim areas became increasingly powerful, weakening Muslim political influence and contributing to their further marginalization.

Control of political office determined entry into businesses and the emergence of new and powerful clans and families with access to new sources of economic power. Up until the 1970s, Mindanao was impervious to state regulation, and an underground economy flourished with smuggling, gun trafficking, illegal gambling, narcotics trafficking, and unregulated land transfers. Powerful clans and datus controlled the informal economy by mediating relations between the government and other economic actors. In the absence of economic opportunities, the underground economy provided the alternative for a growing number of unemployed in the region.

At the outset, the violence was not a product of an outright rejection of the Philippine state by the Moro population; rather it was localized and intercommunal in character. Some powerful clans and datus considered the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) a threat to their political fiefdoms. They often prioritized their personal and clan interests ahead of common Moro welfare. This forced rebel groups to form fluid alliances with local elites that shifted in response to changing circumstances. Challenges to existing authority networks created insecurity and high levels of violence. In addition, communal sectarian violence erupted sporadically in the late 1960s to early 1970s, instigated

506 Spanish colonizers of the 16th century referred to native Muslim residents as “Moro” after the Moors that conquered Spain and were forced back to North Africa. Today, the term denotes Muslim inhabitants in the southern islands of the Philippines and is not considered a pejorative term. The Moro consist of a collection of groups (i.e., Tausug, Maquindanao, Maranao, and Sulu) united by Sunni Islam.
507 McKenna, “Governing Muslims in the Philippines.”
508 Christian settlers received legal ownership of the best land and government assistance. They were also better linked to trade centers and roads, while Muslim communities remained relatively isolated. See: ibid.
predominately by Christian landowners toward local Muslim chiefs and ordinary Muslims. Many anxieties over the loss of territory and revenue streams from the illegal economy played a central role in parallel with the Christian and Muslim elite’s strategies to foment violence.

Escalation of state violence and the formation of separatist insurgencies

A series of events politicized Moro resentment toward Christian communities and the central government in Manila, especially in light of the loss of land ownership and economic rights, perceived exploitation, and cultural hegemony. In 1968, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) reportedly massacred Moro commandos who tried to escape a covert training, which intended to reclaim the eastern part of Sabah from Malaysia in an incident known as the “Jabidah massacre.” Many Muslims believed the incident showed the Christian government not only failed to protect Muslims but were also oppressing the minority population. Women were amongst the group of Muslim university students who organized in Manila in 1968 protesting the massacre. The incident mobilized Muslims to revive their aspirations for an independent Islamic nation, which had first emerged in the early 20th century. In the same year, the Muslim governor of Cotabato province announced the formation of the Muslim Independence Movement (later known as the Mindanao Independence Movement or MIM, which included non-Christian and non-Muslim groups), calling for a holy war and secession from the state. MIM was a weak political movement that failed to find traction amongst the Mindanao Muslim population. The organization disbanded after the government co-opted its leader by asking him to serve as a presidential adviser on Muslim affairs. In 1969, the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO) emerged, resurrecting the secessionist movement, notably with members that would ultimately break away to form an underground organization known as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1971. However, the BMLO splintered due to inter-generational feuding between elites and students. The MNLF, which became the prominent group representing the Moro population in Mindanao in the early 1970s, called for the creation of a separate Moro nation consisting of the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu archipelago. The insurgency consisted of approximately 50,000 fighters. In response, the Marcos regime declared martial law, cracking down on all types of dissidents, and a ferocious war broke out in Mindanao between the MNLF and the AFP from 1972 to 1976. Christian groups also organized to combat the growing violence, the most notorious of which was the Ilaga (or “Rats”), a Christian paramilitary group intent on eradicating the Moro population from Christian majority areas within parts of Mindanao.

Muslim scholars and students schooled in political activism broke away from the MIM and BMLO, and mobilized to form the MNLF. A number of them, including the MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari experienced anti-Muslim bias first hand. As a nationalist and secular rebel organization, the MNLF appealed to the frustrations of Muslim students that experienced Christian cultural hegemony in Manila and marginalized Muslims in Mindanao. Unlike the BMLO, the MNLF believed the problem plaguing Muslims in Mindanao was partly due to their own Muslim elites colluding with Manila political elites. Women in the MNLF served a variety of support roles and were trained to fight, but saw limited actual combat. Muslim women

512 McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels.
517 In particular, Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat.
519 McKenna, “Governing Muslims in the Philippines.”
typically became aware of the MNLF through relatives, family members, or religious student associations. Women joined the insurgency out of sympathy for fellow Muslims after the Jabidah massacre, for justice, and for equal treatment. Women were integrated into different levels of the organizational structure. The MNLF leadership created two women's organizations to raise community consciousness and morale on issues affecting Muslims, and to ensure that women's needs would be addressed in a future Bangsamoro government. In 1972, the MNLF formed the Women's Committee to support general recruitment and propaganda activities, and in 1986, the Bangsamoro Women's Professional and Employees Association was established to engage in propaganda and fund-raising, and to coordinate with the Women's Committee. The insurgency changed, to some extent, the way women and families viewed traditional roles in rural society. Women that supported the MNLF came from diverse socio-economic and educational backgrounds. They worked as nurses, prepared food in camps, transported weapons, and functioned as couriers for the MNLF. Although women had a limited role as combatants, the MNLF trained women first to defend themselves against government attacks, and subsequently in 1974, to produce bombs and bullets in the Women's Auxiliary Forces.

A rift between the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the MNLF, Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat respectively, developed in 1977. By 1984, the MILF, led by Salamat, a Muslim cleric, emerged as a distinct separatist rebel organization that emphasized a more Islamic orientation than the MNLF. The split occurred after Salamat accused Misuari of autocratic leadership and shifting the organization towards a Marxist-Maoist orientation, as well as Salamat's rejection of the Philippine government's offer of semi-autonomy in 1987. Based in central Mindanao, the MILF was well-organized and received broad support from rural villages in the form of supplies, intelligence, and shelter. The group began with 5,000 former MNLF combatants, and by the late 1990s had grown to approximately 35,000 to 45,000 combatants. Women were not permitted to serve as combatants in the MILF, but provided communications and medical support through the Bangsamoro Women Islamic Auxiliary. The MILF initially sought an independent Islamic state for Muslims to preserve their cultural identity, but by 2010 dropped the demand for full independence in favor of autonomy.

Other militant groups also operate across the Philippines. Since the 1960s, the Community People's Party, and its military wing, National People's Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF), fought a guerrilla war against the government of the Philippines, with the aim of seizing political power and establishing a regime free from foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism, and bureaucrat capitalism. The government of the Philippines began peace talks with the leftist rebels in 2011. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) sought an independent Islamic state in Mindanao through acts of terrorism, and claimed responsibility for the June 1993 kidnapping of 70 Christians, the December 1993 bombing of Philippines Airlines 747, and the kidnapping of 21 businessmen in April 23, 2000.
Peace negotiations towards the Tripoli Agreement

From 1972 until 1976, armed forces in Mindanao targeted both Christians and Muslims. But by 1976, the fighting stalemated between the government of the Philippines and the MNLF, a ceasefire was reached and peace negotiations began. The negotiations occurred in Tripoli, Libya through mediation efforts by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Taking an interest because of the connection to Filipino Muslims, the OIC worked through diplomatic channels to call for the government to find a peaceful end to the conflict and negotiate with the MNLF. The MNLF began by demanding independence for Mindanao, but ultimately agreed to accept autonomy and self-rule for Muslim communities in Mindanao. On December 23, 1976, the Philippine government and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement, ostensibly ending the conflict and providing a framework for 13 of the 23 provinces within Mindanao to gain autonomy. However, President Marcos declared autonomy in Southern Philippines and held a plebiscite that resulted in 10 rather than 13 provinces and the creation of two autonomous regions. The MNLF regarded this move as a blatant violation of the Tripoli agreement, and it later resulted in a breakdown in the peace negotiations. The successor of Marcos, President Maria Corazon Aquino, came into power in 1986 and added a stipulation to the Tripoli Agreement prior to establishing the autonomous region. On the grounds of respect for the constitutional process, she called for a plebiscite within each of the 13 provinces to opt to become part of the autonomous region. Given that most of the provinces had a Christian majority, only four of the provinces voted to join the autonomous region.

Following the Tripoli Agreement and the failure to establish even an autonomous Mindanao, additional Muslim militant groups became active alongside the MNLF. The most prominent was the MILF, as mentioned above. Tensions within the MNLF stemmed from the Tripoli Agreement. Some MNLF factions viewed the abandonment of the demand for independence as weakness amongst the leadership. The failure of the government to create an autonomous region with 13 provinces increased support for the MILF.

Peace negotiations towards the Jeddah Accord

To end the violence and achieve national reconciliation, President Aquino revived peace talks with the MNLF in 1987. Prior to the negotiations, a delegation met with the MNLF in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. This meeting resulted in both the MNLF agreeing to peace talks, as well as the Jeddah Accord. The Jeddah Accord promised a mandate written into the constitution to establish the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). As stipulated, the region would remain under the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines, but would include all 23 provinces within Mindanao. The Jeddah Accord, while key to bringing the MNLF to the table, stalled the peace talks. As written, the accord listed only five provinces to be part of the autonomous region, while the MNLF stated the parties verbally agreed all of Mindanao would become part of the autonomous region. Denying the contention of the MNLF, the

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532 Lingga, “Negotiating Peace in Mindanao.”
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
537 Ringuet, "The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in Mindanao.”
539 Abubakar, "Review of the Mindanao Peace Process.”
540 Ibid.
government issued statements saying they only agreed to further discussion on the topic. The talks ended without a resolution.  

*Establishment of the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development*

Peace negotiations with the MNLF started again under President Fidel Ramos in 1992, and were monitored by OIC Monitoring Team Commander, Zainal Abidin.  

Ramos sought peace to improve the welfare of the nation, especially the economic development of the country. The conflict had fragmented the population and taken a toll on the nation’s economic production. After establishing a ceasefire, President Ramos and MNLF Chairman Misuari met in 1996. Misuari signed a peace accord with the government to end the fighting and establish the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). The accord created an autonomous region within Mindanao known as the Special Zone of Peace and Development controlled by the SPCPD. Misuari headed the SPCPD. The SPCPD would supervise development projects in the 13 provinces as specified in the Tripoli Agreement. A vote would determine if the people within the 13 provinces joined the SPCPD.

Vitally important, only the MNLF was party to the 1996 accord. The agreement excluded other Muslim groups, most notably the MILF, under the proviso that they had not been signatories to the Tripoli Agreement. Additionally, the OIC only recognized the MNLF as a legitimate representative of Philippine Muslims. Since the peace negotiations focused on how to implement an autonomous region based on the Tripoli Agreement, the government chose to only negotiate with the group that signed that peace deal. Following the 1996 accord, many MNLF members joined the government or reduced their public presence, thus diminishing the MNLF’s prominence as a revolutionary organization. However, the MILF refused to accept the terms presented to the MNLF; the MILF continued to seek an Islamic region in Mindanao.

*Continued hostilities and failed reform efforts*

To end the MILF separatist movement, Ruben Torres, the Executive Secretary for the Philippine government, met with MILF Vice-Chairman Ghadzali Jaafar to discuss the possibility of negotiations in August 1996. The MILF and the government sent technical committees to create key discussion points for peace talks in January 1997. Although the government and MILF agreed to a ceasefire in July 1997, the peace negotiations ultimately broke down, with the MILF demanding additional geographical areas to promote Islam and the government seeking to maintain the region for Muslim autonomy already created in the 1996 agreement with the MNLF. Conflict resumed in the region following breakdown of talks in 1999, and the MILF gained strength through a shift in support by the Muslim nationalist base that had previously supported the MNLF.

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545 Angeles, “Women and Revolution.”
546 Lingga, “Negotiating Peace in Mindanao.”
The government shifted its peacemaking approach under President Gloria Arroyo, who began another round of peace talks with the MILF in 2005. President Arroyo reached an agreement with the MILF on land issues in 2008, referring specifically to the land taken from Muslims and obtained by Christians in the mid-20th century, and granting Muslims the right to reclaim ancestral land as their own.\textsuperscript{551} In 2009, however, the Supreme Court intervened in the implementation of the accord, and the government ultimately never signed the agreement.\textsuperscript{552} The MILF resumed military attacks, and the government launched reprisals and supplied weaponry to local Christian militia groups to do the same.\textsuperscript{553}

Renewed peace talks under Aquino presidency

Conflict persisted until negotiations with the MILF began again under President Benigno Aquino III. As its motivation for peace, the government sought to stabilize the situation that had deteriorated as of 2009, as intense fighting between the MILF and government forces displaced thousands of civilians in parts of Mindanao. The MILF returned to the negotiating table, in part due to the leadership of a third party facilitator, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad. The negotiations did not grant the MILF an independent region, but granted Mindanao more autonomy, particularly regarding local authority in the Muslim-majority provinces, and created the Bangsamoro region, an autonomous political entity within Mindanao. The Malaysian International Monitoring Team observed the talks, along with an international contact team consisting of Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the U.K., as well as the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Asia Foundation, Conciliation Resources and Muhammadiya. The Malaysian government also used bilateral diplomacy to push the MILF to the peace table and into signing the agreement, ending the conflict and giving Mindanao Muslims a version of self-rule.\textsuperscript{554}

With the signing of the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro on October 15, 2012, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on March 27, 2014, the MILF and the government agreed to a transitional process to create an autonomous region, as well as a framework for power-sharing between the Philippine and Bangsamoro governments. On January 25, 2015, armed skirmishes between MILF militants and the police in Maguindano province left 44 police and seven civilians dead. The incident threatened to derail the peace process as lawmakers suspended parliamentary hearings on the passage of the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). A week later, the government of the Philippines and the MILF signed a protocol for decommisioning the rebels. On July 12, 2015, the House of Representatives Ad Hoc Committee on the BBL stated the BBL’s 115 provisions underwent either minor or major changes.\textsuperscript{555} Currently, the draft law to create the autonomous region of Mindanao awaits passage in the Congress and Senate.

\textsuperscript{551} Ibid.; “Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain,” (2008).
\textsuperscript{552} Brown, “The Long and Winding Road: The Peace Process in Mindanao, Philippines.”
Women at the peace table

While acknowledging a number of parallel peace negotiations are underway in the Philippines, this and succeeding sections examine only the peace negotiation between the government of the Philippines and the MILF, as it stands out as an example of how women in civil society fought for inclusion in the formal peace talks, gained access, and gradually became recognized as critical actors – notably as leaders, negotiators, and technical experts – in the process (See Table 4). The case of the Philippines is one of the few instances where women are leading and contributing substantively in the formal peace negotiations. This case demonstrates how women’s direct participation in the peace talks, coupled with the lobbying efforts of women in CSOs, changed perceptions of the main parties to the conflict over time. Even though the women at the negotiation table were selected based on their skills and expertise, the majority gained experience working in CSOs, and maintained ties as members of women’s associations or in women’s movements (see Appendix E for a diagram of civil society networks). It is for these reasons that the following sections focus exclusively on women with direct access to the peace negotiations, and select CSOs that played an essential role in monitoring and advocating for women, peace and security.

Table 4: Women Participating in Formal Peace Negotiating Teams and Technical Working Groups in the Philippines, 2013-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORMAL PEACE PANELS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF WOMEN</th>
<th>NUMBER OF MEN</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government of the Philippines – MILF Peace Table Negotiators (2013-14)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t of the Philippines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gov’t of the Philippines-CPP-NPA-NDF Peace Negotiators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gov’t of the Philippines</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP-NPA-NDF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical Working Groups on the Framework Agreement of Bangsamoro Annexes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t of Philippines TWG (2013-14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normalization</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth Sharing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Sharing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MILF TWG (2013-14)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normalization</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth Sharing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Sharing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was never a formal mechanism to guarantee the participation of women in the Mindanao peace negotiations, and, as a result, women were neither formally represented nor participated in the peace talks in 1997. Nevertheless, women began to gain direct access to the negotiations as the political space began to open incrementally beginning from the early 2000s. The government of the Philippines first appointed women’s rights advocate and peacemaker Irene Santiago and scholar Emily Marohombsar to their five-member team in 2001. In 2003, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) was headed for the first time by a woman, Secretary Teresita Quintos Deles. She served in this position until 2005 and was re-appointed in 2010. During her tenure, Deles has overseen five peace tables (i.e., MILF, 556 Lourdes Veneracion-Rallonza, “Women Count: Security Council Resolution 1325: Civil Society Monitoring Report Philippines,” (WE ACT 1325, 2014).
MNLF, CPP/NPA/NDA, CBA-CPLA, and RPM-P/RPA/ABB. In 2010, Iona Jalijali (a lawyer) became head of the government of the Philippines’ peace panel secretariat, and Miriam Coronel Ferrer (a well-known academic, human rights expert, and activist) was appointed to the government’s peace panel. The year 2012 marked two pinnacle events: the appointment of two women who were the first to serve on the MILF Board of Consultants as technical staff, Raisass Jajurie (a legal advisor) and Bai Cabaybay Abubakar (an educator), and the appointment of Coronel Ferrer as the first female chief negotiator of the government panel and signatory of a peace accord with the MILF. In fact, the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro was achieved through negotiations led by Coronel Ferrer, with the support of Undersecretary Yasmin Busran-Lao (a peace and gender justice advocate), on behalf of the Philippine government. Two female attorneys, Johaira Wahab and Anna Tarhata Sumande Basman, led the legal team of government of the Philippines. A member of Lupah Sug Bangsamoro Women, Gettie Sandoval joined OPAPP as the Undersecretary of the Executive Office. Lastly, four out of the 15 members of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission are women.

**Why did women in civil society mobilize for peace?**

CSOs in the Philippines have a history of mobilizing during political change and crisis, advocating Filipino independence from Spain and the United States, as well as toppling the Marcos regime. There is a sizable, highly organized, and complex web of CSOs, networks, alliances and coalitions working to bring peace to the war-torn regions of Mindanao, especially since 1986. During President Corazon Aquino’s administration (1986-1992), CSOs proliferated with the opening up of democratic space. CSOs also became the vehicle through which foreign donors preferred to channel their funds during this period to ensure success of a newly restored democracy and to avoid misappropriation of resources. CSOs collaborated with the government during President Fidel Ramos’ administration (1992-1998), when he encouraged their involvement in multi-stakeholder mechanisms to promote peace in Mindanao. As a result, CSOs became progressively institutionalized, and increasingly engaged in Track 1.5 and 2 of the Mindanao peace process through participatory consultations. One of the goals of CSOs was to influence the formal (Track 1) peace process – be it as an insider with access to the formal peace negotiation panels or as an objective outsider.

Women in CSOs were active in peacemaking, gender equality advocacy, lobbying, and social welfare for over two decades. The Philippines was one of the first Southeast Asian countries to ratify CEDAW. Some organizations worked at the grassroots level and linked to larger CSO networks or international NGOs and donor groups. There were secular CSOs that fought for women’s rights and human rights, economic development, or conflict resolution. Organizations such as the Mindanao Commission on Women, Gaston

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557 The Cordillera Bodong Administration – Cordillera People’s Liberation Army.
558 The Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas-Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade.
560 Lourdes Veneracion-Rallonza, “How two young Moro women under 30 guided the GPH panel on the legal issues that clinched the peace agreement,” in Kababaihan at Kapayapaan (Ortigas Center, Pasig City: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 2014).
561 Interview with Fatmawati Salapuddin, Director of Lupah Sug Bangsamoro Women, May 2, 2015.
562 They are Johaira Wahab, Raisass Jajurie, Fatmawati Salapuddin, and Froilyn Mendoza.
564 Civil society organizations were suppressed during Marcos’ dictatorship, but played a decisive role in the “people power” revolution in 1986 that overthrew the regime. The succeeding administration passed a number of laws favorable to the development of CSOs, after which organizations proliferated. For a concise history see: G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Noble, Organizing for democracy: NGOs, civil society, and the Philippine State (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998).
Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, and the Mindanao People’s Caucus mobilized for peacebuilding (e.g., mediation, observation of ceasefires, protection of vulnerable groups, etc.). Jo Genna Jover, a member of the Kutawato Council for Justice and Peace, noted:

“We need to participate to be involved in this peace process, because after all, we are victims, and we are living in this conflict situation. We indigenous women would like to help and experience a peaceful community, so part of our path is organizing indigenous women to participate and become part of peace, not just the victim.”

Members of other organizations came together at various stages of the peace process to give voice to women and raise awareness of issues affecting women in conflict. For example, the Mindanao Commission on Women was formed in 2000 to raise awareness on the cost of violence against women in conflict; grassroots campaigns such as the Mothers for Peace (a national movement of women) and the Mindanao Women’s Peace Caravan drew public attention to the effects of violence on women in Mindanao. Irene Santiago, the convener of the Mother’s for Peace movement, revealed:

“We wanted to let the whole country know the pain of war. So we chose to initiate the campaign on Mother’s Day and made it emotional. Because we managed to get the co-sponsorship of the major advertising group, we got all the major newspapers and all the electronic media outlets to give us prime air time. Apart from one TV spot and three radio spots, we had print ads on Mother’s Day with a dead child covered by a piece of cloth and the question: “How many children will be left to celebrate Mother’s Day today?”

In 2007, Fatmawati Salapuddin broke away from Mindanao women’s networks to form her own CSO called Lupah Sug Bangsamoro Women, a Sulu-based organization to advocate for the women’s rights and human rights in the region. As Sulu was geographically distinct from Mindanao, Salapuddin felt the networks catering to community women’s empowerment in Mindanao did not adequately cover issues affecting Sulu women.

The National Council of Women of the Philippines (NCWP) focused on the active participation of women in decision-making processes, political life, and economic development. Networks such as the WE Act 1325, the Women and Gender Institute (WAGI), Tèduray Lambangian Women’s Organization, the Center for Peace Education, and Nisa Ul Haqq Bangsamoro collaborated with the government to implement the national action plan on UNSCRs 1325 and 1820, and brought it to areas where women were affected by conflict. Members of WE Act 1325 also had four members who were appointed to the formal peace negotiation panels after extensive lobbying efforts by the organization. While some women’s organizations may not have had an overt feminist agenda, gender equality and mainstreaming gender was still part of their work. The Tèduray Lambangian Women’s Organization, founded in 1994, is a federation of 35 community-based organizations of indigenous people in the province of Maguindanao that supports Tèduray and Lambangian women in attaining sustainable and environmental development. The organization upholds

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566 Interview with Jo Genna Jover, WE Act 1325 member, April 29, 2015.
567 The movement involved women of different faiths and cultures gathering in solidarity for peace in Mindanao. It started as a campaign to demand a cease-fire between the Philippine army and MILF after the 2003 bombing of Buliok. It used mass media and face-to-face encounters to draw attention to the lives lost, especially women and children. The movement drew critical praise from the public.
568 Santiago is also the co-founder of the Mindanao Commission on Women. See: “Interview with Irene Santiago, Mindanao Commission on Women and Women’s Peace Table,” (May 21, 2015).
569 Interview with Fatmawati Salapuddin, Director of Lupah Sug Bangsamoro Women, May 2, 2015.
570 This alliance is a coordinative mechanism to monitor and push for the National Action Plan targets.
571 These are: Miriam Coronel Ferrer (Sulong CARHRIHL), Raissa Jajurie (Nisa Ul Haqq), Yasmin Busran-Lao (Nisa UlHaqq), and Froilyn Mendoza (Tèduray & Lambangian Women’s Organization).
572 Interview with Carmen Lauzon-Gatmaytan, WE Act 1325 member, June 1, 2015.
Civil society in the Philippines is really dynamic and we know each other, more or less. So we were able to identify these groups and we just started informally as a loose network, so that’s how we came together because we know each other. That’s how we got them and that’s how we were also able to expand.

*Carmen Lauzon-Gatmaytan, WE Act 1325 member*

the basic rights of tribal women on decision-making, community development projects, and the promotion of peace and justice. The head of Têduray Lambangian Women’s Organization, Froilyn Mendoza, is also on the Bangsamoro Transition Commission and drafted annexes that would eventually become part of the draft BBL.

The largest network of CSOs was the Caucus of Development NGOs (CODE-NGO) and the regional equivalent, the Mindanao Coalition of Development NGO Networks (MINCODE). The Caucus of Development formed in 1991 to promote professionalism and increase the effectiveness of organizations. Both CODE-NGO and MINCODE focused on improving the economic well-being of its members. While the activities of these organizations indirectly contributed to peace by building trust in communities and improving individual’s lives, these organizations did not explicitly work on improving sustainable peace. However, from 2001 to 2004, the government appointed former Chair of MINCODE Sylvia Paraguya to the peace negotiation panel, and subsequently in 2013 appointed the current Chair of MINCODE and the Caucus of Development NGOs, Patricia Sarenas, as an observer to the formal peace negotiations. CODE-NGO and MINCODE gained access to the formal peace negotiation panels as observers through friendship with members of the MILF, the government’s negotiation panel and members of the Office of the Presidential Assistant.573

Several women’s organizations focused specifically on promoting Islamic views and women. The grassroots organization Al-Mujadilah Development Foundation was founded in 1997 by the government of the Philippines panel Undersecretary Yasmin Busran-Lao, who, among other positions, was the Provincial Chapter Chair and Board Member of a national movement known as PILIPINA,574 and one of the founding chairs of Nisa Ul Haqq.575 Shortly after attending the Beijing Conference, Busran-Lao created Al-Mujadilah to highlight Islamic teachings on women and work on human development in Lanao del Sur.576 Similarly, the regionally oriented Nisa Ul Haqq used Islamic teaching for women’s and men’s empowerment and for the promotion of women’s human rights, sustainable development and peace in the ARMM. Members of this organization mobilized to engage with the peace negotiations in Mindanao. Lastly, Noorus Salam (or “light of peace”) at the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID) was a network of women religious scholars and leaders. The network formed in 2010 to work with Muslim women in more conservative areas

573 Interview with Patricia Sarenas, Chair of the Mindanao Coalition of Development NGOs and the Caucus of Development NGOs, May 13, 2015.
574 OPAPP Secretary Teresita Quintos Deles is also a member.
575 A national organization of Filipino women that promotes gender equality, reproductive health, peacebuilding and political participation. It counts attorney and MILF technical working group member Raissa Jajurie as a co-founder and the legal head of the government panel, Johaira Wahab, as a member.
of conflict-ridden Mindanao, build capacity, and counteract the negative misrepresentation and rhetoric toward Muslims.\textsuperscript{577}

It is worth noting that a number of the CSOs were founded and/or led by women who were middle class, urban-based professionals. CSOs were also a recruiting ground for technical advisors and peace negotiators.

**How did women in civil society mobilize and organize?**

The majority of women in civil society used their personal and professional networks to mobilize individuals and alliances, as well as organize activities. For example, WE Act 1325 aimed to create a fluid network across the Philippines to coordinate and monitor the national action plan. Carmen Lauzon-Gatmaytan described the mobilization of their network:

> When we started the network, it was really an invitation open to everybody, but everybody means those involved in peace and conflict issues. Civil society in the Philippines is really dynamic and we know each other, more or less. So we were able to identify these groups and we just started informally as a loose network, so that’s how we came together because we know each other. That’s how we got them and that’s how we were also able to expand.\textsuperscript{578}

The networks encountered in the Philippines seem to be locally-driven and aim for an exchange in knowledge.

In line with Warkentin and Mingst’s views of the new civil society, the nature of relationships among CSOs in the Philippines was also structured around human and electronic networks to build a wide web of connections.\textsuperscript{579} Women in civil society created vertical linkages from the top-down (i.e., government to people) and from the bottom-up (i.e., grassroots to government), as well as horizontal linkages between organizations (at different levels) to share information and build trust. This type of networking ensured a broad-based engagement with diverse actors, and contributes to the sustainability of the network. The ability to cultivate horizontal and vertical linkages also enabled CSOs to expand their audience and increase their influence.\textsuperscript{580} For instance, WE Act 1325 members include organizations at the national and grassroots level.\textsuperscript{581} This form of horizontal linkage was vital to information sharing and organizational learning across its membership and with other CSOs, as well as vertically with government officials. The WE Act 1325 Secretariat collected information on the national action plan and updated its members through email, text, and face-to-face meetings. The network also updated government agencies through text and emails and sent updates on the implementation of the national action plan in the Philippines. Its international partner, the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) subsequently disseminated the information worldwide to its members and global policymakers. WE Act 1325 worked with international groups such as Conciliation Resources, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, and the Women Peacemakers’ Program.\textsuperscript{582} In

\textsuperscript{577} Interview with Amina Rasul, President of the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy and co-convener of the Women’s Peace Table, April 27, 2015.

\textsuperscript{578} Interview with Carmen Lauzon-Gatmaytan, WE Act 1325 member, June 1, 2015.


\textsuperscript{580} Heather M. Farley, *Sustainability : if it’s everything, is it nothing?*, Critical issues in global politics (Routledge, 2013).

\textsuperscript{581} In this study’s sample they are: Nisa Ul Haqq, Balay Rehabilitation Center, Ortigas Institute, Women & Gender Institute, Al-Mujadilah Development Foundation, Teduray & Lambangian Women Organization, Mindanao People’s Caucus, Sulong CARHRIHL, and Mindanao Commission on Women.

this manner, information and knowledge was shared from local to global and global to local, using face-to-face networking and technology. In terms of organizing, WE Act 1325 carried out support functions for its members by assisting organizations in getting in touch with each other, and building organizational and individual capacities by holding workshops and trainings using a participatory approach. The network also consistently dialogued with government officials and its members on the peace panels to monitor and push for the national action plan targets.

Some CSOs were successful in mobilizing members from different sectors to create unity from diversity. This characteristic was valuable to peace negotiations, particularly in bringing together players that might not otherwise collaborate. An illustrative example was the PCID, which started as an idea amongst three friends to counter the negative image of Muslims after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Amina Rasul, the President of PCID, noted:

“We started working with development partners like USAID and the US Institute for Peace so that we could get resources to start doing the research, organize, and create a think tank. We finally got the resources and were able to establish ourselves, now accredited by the government. We realized we were probably one of the very few institutions of Muslim leaders and intellectuals doing research, coming out with publications that analyzed the 1996 final peace agreement with the MNLF and dared to present a contrarian point of view to the government and the World Bank. [...] the national government, development partners like the World Bank, and the liberation fronts do engage with us because they know we represent a perspective that is a little rare. [...] We've got fundamental religious leaders with us, we have got feminists with us, we have politicians, we have a retired general who was part of the peace process, we have businessmen, people who are with the ARMM government, and we have people who are still associated with the national government. When we come together, we have passed through the filters of all these different sectors and you can't find that in too many organizations.”

In short, the PCID was strong in mobilizing a diverse membership that included insiders to the peace negotiations, such as government officials, traditionally marginalized grassroots organizations, and individuals who represent a range of conservative to moderate religious views. It relied on its conference conveners to reach out to an array of different individuals in the peace process and remained cohesive through consensus, as well as tolerated a high degree of difference. The PCID partnered with the Women and Gender Institute to organize and train women alongside male meetings of the Ulama. It counted Nisa Ul Haqq, Noorus Salam, and the Mindanao Commission on Women as part of its network. Government officials preferred to consult with the PCID, as it was perceived to represent a wide range of civil society voices, rather than numerous atomized groups. More importantly, through its women’s agenda, the PCID contributed to softening the MILF’s resistance towards the inclusion of women in the peace negotiations.

Lastly, the sense of solidarity and mutual support was an important feature of the networks. Jasmin Nario-Galace recalled the sense of solidarity the government’s chief negotiator Miriam Coronel Ferrer felt toward CSOs, especially how she always highlighted the role civil society played in the peace process, the support she received, and the strength she drew from these organizations. Being in a network also pro-

583 Interview with Amina Rasul, President of the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy and co-convener of the Women’s Peace Table.
584 Ibid.
585 Interview with Aurora Javate de Dios, Women and Gender Institute and Co-convener of the Women’s Peace Table, April 29, 2015.
586 Ibid.
587 Interview of Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Chief Negotiator for the Government of the Philippines.
588 Interview with Jasmin Nario-Galace, convener of WE Act 1325, April 28, 2015.
vided more influence in advocacy than a solitary organization. For example, the Mindanao People’s Caucus, a network of over 100 grassroots organizations led by Mary Ann Arnado, successfully lobbied for an international monitoring team in Mindanao, and contributed to forging the ceasefire in 2001 by orchestrating a large demonstration on the highway.589 Because of its wide network of grassroots organizations and access to on-the-ground information, the MILF engaged closely with the Mindanao People’s Caucus and held regular consultations, as indicated below.590

How did they form coalitions and alliances?

The majority of participants interviewed belonged to a number of local, national, regional, and/or global alliances and coalitions that overlapped or intersected with other networks. The building of coalitions with partners enabled greater reach, the ability to leverage comparative advantage of each member, and combine resources. For example, the Women’s Peace Table was a coalition of women committed to building a broad-based global movement of organizations that support peacebuilding in areas affected by conflict in Mindanao. It was formed through an alliance of the PCID, the Mindanao Commission on Women, and the Women and Gender Institute, the latter of which served as the secretariat. Building coalitions through nurturing and expanding relationships within professional networks appeared to be major factor for a number of interview participants.591 Large coalitions tended to create layers of representation and enable different CSOs to engage in the peace process in multifaceted ways. CODE-NGO, chaired by Patricia Sarenas, was one such coalition. It was established with 10 of the largest NGO networks in the Philippines, and is the country’s largest coalition engaged in development activities. Currently, the coalition has six national and six regional member networks, representing more than 1,600 development NGOs, grassroots organizations, and cooperatives. In a series of consultations organized by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 1988, CODE-NGO was created out of a desire to improve NGO impact on national development by serving as the “voice” of the sector in policy issues.592 The coalition used its scale and synergy to influence public policy, enhance advocacy efforts, foster more influence, and realize its objectives. Its members include a number of organizations that focus on peacemaking, including the Mindanao People’s Caucus, United Youth for Peace Development, and the Bangsamoro Alliance for Peace. The advantages of forming alliances or coalitions, particularly one that is fluid, is that it allows groups to cost-share and pool contacts, as well as increases the different frames and discourses a CSO can employ to improve their chances of attracting the attention of government officials, rebel groups, and the general public.

Of the coalitions that worked explicitly on peace, the Mindanao Peace Weavers, a coalition launched in 2004, aimed to promote people’s participation in the peace processes, consensus-building, joint campaigns, and dialogues. It consisted of seven peace networks, of which the Mindanao People’s Caucus was a member, and the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute was a partner through the Mindanao Solidary Network.593 Smaller, issues-specific coalitions such as Bantay Ceasefire and Sulong CARHRIHL were citizen-mediation and oriented exclusively on implementing ceasefires and partial peace agreements between the rebel groups and the government of the Philippines. The Mindanao People’s Caucus was the main convener of the

589 Interview with Mary Ann Arnado, Secretary General of the Mindanao People’s Caucus, April 30, 2015.  
590 Interview with Mohagher Iqbal, Chair of the MILF negotiation panel, April 29, 2015.  
591 Interview with Aurora Javate de Dios, Women and Gender Institute and Co-convener of the Women’s Peace Table; Interview with Carmen Lauzon-Gatmaytan, WE Act 1325 member; Interview with Irene Santiago, Mindanao Commission on Women and Women’s Peace Table.  
Bantay Ceasefire as indicated above. This coalition organized four missions in 2003, and coordinated with the government of the Philippines-MILF Joint Monitoring Committee and Local Monitoring Teams.\textsuperscript{594} The Program on Peace, Democratization and Human Rights of the University of the Philippines was the national secretariat of Sulong CARHRIHL, which was co-founded by Coronel Ferrer in 2005. Sulong CARHRIHL monitored the Government’s and the Maoist rebels’ compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian advocacy, and was also a member of WE Act 1325.

As WE Act 1325 had the most number of members participating directly in the peace process, its members used their personal connections with the negotiation panels to submit proposals for the peace agreement, provide informal moral support during critical moments of the negotiations, and update each other during consultations.\textsuperscript{595} WE Act 1325 also formed alliances with Muslim’s women’s organizations such as Nisa Ul Haqq and Al-Mujadilah Development Foundation to engage more with Muslim women through their seminars.

### How did they assemble and shape agendas?

A number of women in civil society list organizing workshops, trainings, forums, lobbying, rallying, summits, symposiums, conferences, and campaigns as the primary modes of gathering women together to contribute to the peace process.

Both an organization’s agenda and the “women’s agenda” were shaped through open facilitated dialogues with a diverse range of women constituents. Grassroots organizations like Al-Mujadilah Development Foundation consulted community leaders such as women theologians and farm technicians to understand how peace affected them as women, their livelihoods, and their families. They spoke with women in the youth leadership program and invited them to national conferences to ensure their voices were heard. PILIPINA held Provincial Island consultations with its constituents, and Nisa Ul Haqq conducted regional consultations with its constituents to ground the organizations’ respective agendas in the expressed needs of their constituent bases. All the different constituents were then brought together to consolidate a national agenda in a national assembly. It was through this multi-staged process that women from the north and the south and from different tribes realized their commonalities through collective discussions.\textsuperscript{596}

This inclusive consultative approach also played a critical role in shaping the agenda of Amina Rasul’s organization. She recounted realizing the need to account for the interest of Muslim women based on 14 women leaders invited to the first inaugural PCID conference:

> [...] these women told us, you are spending so much time and effort organizing the religious, you should pay attention to your sisters, because we have a slightly different agenda. We want to secure our families, we want to secure the peace of our communities, we want to secure the health of our communities. So they had a different take on the issue of peace and development. Not the political peace process, but strengthening the communities by empowering women to help families and children.\textsuperscript{597}

\textsuperscript{594} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{595} Interview of Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Chief Negotiator for the Government of the Philippines; Interview with Jasmin Nario-Galace, convener of WE Act 1325.

\textsuperscript{596} Interview with Yasmin Busran-Lao, Undersecretary of the OPAPP, April 30, 2015.

\textsuperscript{597} Ibid.
WE Act 1325 held 13 consultations with different women including women working for normalization, women in the media, women in political participation and training, indigenous peoples, and Moro women.598

For organizations that focus exclusively on peace, like the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, their approach of open dialogue did not stress the immediate need to develop an agenda, rather to listen to the perspectives of different women. This is because the organization hosted participatory workshops using the “art of meaningful conversations” (or appreciative inquiry)599 with inter-generational women.600

How did they set priorities for the activism? How, if at all, did their priorities change when they participated in high-level peace negotiations?

Women in civil society have a diverse set of priorities based on their mandates and constituencies. Virtually all of the women interviewed in civil society sought to influence the on-going peace negotiations formally and/or informally. As there was a diverse set of women in civil society, the issues put forward on the women’s agenda were items that would have received the greatest probability of acceptance as determined through the approaches described in the preceding section.

Members of WE Act 1325 worked on two levels. They consulted with local communities to ascertain their needs, and then dialogue with the negotiation panels to get them to pay attention to their demands.601 WE Act 1325 and the Mindanao Commission on Women lobbied the government of the Philippines and MILF to have more women participate in the peace negotiations.602 They recommended female nominees to peace panels and other mechanisms of the peace process, and lobbied for certain issues to be discussed during the negotiations. All four women603 who were appointed to the various mechanisms of the peace process were also founding members of WE Act 1325. As recounted by WE Act 1325 member Carmen Lauzon-Gatmaytan:

We started getting involved directly in the official peace process. But that does not prevent us also from doing our strictly civil society engagement amongst ourselves, so in fact what happens is in the official negotiations we have maintained the alliance with our members who are in the official process. This exchange of information, points, and especially contentious issues we get to have this information going back and forth so that between our women and those in the official peace processes. Somehow it informs and helps us in developing our own activities, and helps engage the official peace process.604

In short, WE Act 1325 developed its priorities according to the developing political environment and served as a mediator between the government of the Philippines and the MILF.605

598 Interview with Jo Genna Jover, WE Act 1325 member.
599 This is a method used in mediation and conflict resolution that revolves around a four or five step rubric of Define, Discover, Dream, Design, and Deliver, which aims to ascertain what works rather than strictly problem-solve. See: Diana Kaplin Whitney and Amanda Trosten-Bloom, The power of appreciative inquiry: a practical guide to positive change, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2010).
600 Interview with Karen Tanada, Director of the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, April 28, 2015.
601 Interview with Jasmin Nario-Galace, Convenor of WE Act 1325.
602 The Mindanao Women’s Commission wrote two key proposal papers: “If women negotiated the peace agreement,” “If women drafted the Bangsamoro Basic Law”. See: Interview with Irene Santiago, Mindanao Commission on Women and Women’s Peace Table.
603 These are Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Raissa Jajurie, Yasmin Busran-Lao, and Froilyn Mendoza.
604 Interview with Carmen Lauzon-Gatmaytan, June 1, 2015.
605 Interview with Yasmin Busran-Lao, Undersecretary of the OPAPP.
Mary Ann Arnado was involved in the Mindanao peace process since 2000. From the outset her organization, the Mindanao People’s Caucus, led the grassroots campaign to call for ceasefires. Her organization focused on peace advocacy with the “stop the war” campaign.606 When the President Joseph Estrada declared an “all-out war” against the MILF in 2000, the Mindanao People’s Caucus called for the protection of the internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance. When the Mindanao People’s Caucus gained “observer status” in the on-going peace negotiations from 2001 to 2014, they were able to attend select discussions on wealth sharing and power-sharing. They lobbied for women’s participation and in the Bangsamoro recognition of the rights of women. They also focused on disseminating information from the discussions and feedback to the communities.607 The Mindanao People’s Caucus was closer to the MILF than other CSOs since they were perceived to be consistent in their agenda throughout the negotiations. As a result, the Mindanao People’s Caucus and the MILF held repeated informal consultations.

For the Téduray Lambangian Women’s Organization, priorities included the right to their people’s land and identity, participating in governance and electoral processes, and countering public perception of indigenous women as traditional housewives.608 These priorities were set by regional and general assembly meetings because the organization aimed to advance the rights of indigenous women, especially in terms of how they access basic services and participate in community development.

The PCID focused on activities that foster equality, protection of women’s rights, their political participation, engagement, and leadership. Its main priority has been to counter discrimination against Muslims, bringing a progressive mix of leaders that have a deep knowledge of religion and development issues to provide a voice to the Muslim majority. Its priorities were set through consultations with members and agreeing to issues by consensus. Unlike a number of CSOs, the organization preferred to be on the outside of the peace negotiations to maintain objectivity. Its work aimed to build trust in a non-confrontational manner. With the submission of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in 2014, PCID priorities shifted to networking with the Senate and Congress to bring in legislators in their discussions.609

How did they negotiate their goals?

Women’s issues became a priority during the on-going peace negotiations due to three factors: (1) The shift in desire for the peace process to be all inclusive, transparent, and accountable from April 2012; (2) A debate ensuing over whether to include the phrase “the right of women to meaningful political participation and protection from all forms of violence” in the draft 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro; and (3) The encouragement of some members of the official peace negotiation panel.610

April 2012 marked the moment when the peace process became increasingly all inclusive. This was because women leaders in the peace talks laid the foundation in 2010 to open up the peace process in a series of national consultations known as Dialogue Mindanao. The consultations set out to promote understanding and public participation in the peace process. In the course of five months, over 300 CSOs participated in consultations across different parts of the Philippines. The government and MILF negotiation representatives also participated in these consultations with different sectors of society, including women in civil society. According to Senen Bacani:

“[…] There are a lot of roundtable discussions involving a number of women participants, position papers advocating women empowerment, that’s why when you look at this comprehensive agree-

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606 Interview with Mary Ann Arnado, Secretary General of the Mindanao People’s Caucus.
607 Ibid.
608 Interview with Froilyn Mendoza, Téduray Lambangian Women’s Organization, April 27, 2015.
609 Interview with Amina Rasul, President of the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy and co-convener of the Women’s Peace Table.
610 Interview with Johaira Wahab, Legal advisor to the government of the Philippines, April 27, 2015.
ment of the Bangsamoro there’s a lot about women. We have reserved seats in parliament for women. Whenever there’s a council or organization of some sort we make sure that women are at least represented, although we know that by themselves they will really be represented because people here – women win elections. Even though we know that, we want to make sure that in the worst case we have the minorities represented like women, indigenous peoples, Christian settlers, and youth.”

At the same time, Johaira Wahab noted that since women were not often directly involved in politics, the ad hoc drafting team composed of herself, Anna Tarhata Basman, Raissa Jajurie, and Mike Pasigan wanted to add the phrase “meaningful political participation” in drafting the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. A number of interview participants reveal that this phrase was perceived as the most difficult part of the negotiations for the government of the Philippines and the MILF. Similarly, Coronel Ferrer recalled that in the beginning it was very hard to introduce phrases like “the meaningful political participation of women” because of the resistance to the word ‘meaningful.’ The MILF negotiation team asked native English speakers from the International Contact Group for clarification of the term, and debated if it meant numbers or quality. The MILF thought quotas would be introduced, which they were against. Wahab was unclear whether Raissa Jajurie was consulted by other members of the MILF panel to weigh in on this matter. As a result, a defined quota for women could not be agreed upon. Nevertheless, Tanada, Wahab, and Coronel Ferrer believe that the lobbying of CSO women to place more women on the MILF technical assistance team contributed to softening this debate, as well as enabled the MILF to grow more open-minded of women in civil society and participating in the peace negotiations over time.

When discussing the relationship between the government panel and the MILF panel, Coronel Ferrer noted that a large part of the negotiations was building trust between the two panels. She now considers the MILF panel to be “full partners,” stating, “that’s part of the victory that we were able to achieve, that we were able to build the trust... that’s how the change happened over three years. On the women’s front, I think we’ve really made a dent in bringing in the agenda and changing the minds of the leadership.” She recalled that it took time for the MILF to be open to women’s groups, but over time it had “grown more open-minded precisely because of the kind of intervention from women’s groups and other groups where

611 Interview with Senen Bacani, member of the government negotiation panel, April 27, 2015.
612 Interview with Johaira Wahab, Legal advisor to the government of the Philippines.
613 Interview of Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Chief Negotiator for the Government of the Philippines; Interview with Karen Tanada, Director of the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute; Interview with Emma Leslie, Conciliation Resources and International Contact Group, May 18, 2015.
614 Interview of Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Chief Negotiator for the Government of the Philippines.
615 Ibid.
617 Interview of Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Chief Negotiator for the Government of the Philippines.
When women are involved in the peace process, their primary concerns are issues that are mainly about women (and children). What is good in this is that these issues are not forgotten, because they always consider them as priority. Their presence influences the deliberations as well as the output of the negotiations.

Mohager Iqbal, Chair, MILF Negotiation Panel

you had a strong women’s agenda.”618 The MILF negotiation panel chair Mohagher Iqbal described the challenge of negotiating with women, as Moro culture believes that it is not good for men to argue with women. He noted how the presence of women in the negotiations meant the MILF panel had to strategize to engage with them without breaking cultural traditions to keep the peace process going forward.619 Commenting on the participation of women in peace negotiations, he stated:

When women are involved in the peace process, their primary concerns are issues that are mainly about women (and children). What is good in this is that these issues are not forgotten, because they always consider them as priority. Their presence influences the deliberations as well as the output of the negotiations.620

While the MILF leadership was traditionally male, and still is highly male dominated, OPAPP Secretary Quintos Deles emphasized that, “I think they got the message that women are important, that women are going to have to sit at the table, women are going to have to be seen, to be playing roles in every phase as they move forward.”621

Women in civil society also cultivated strategic links with key actors in Tracks 1, 1.5, 2, and 3; acting as a conduit of information from local communities to negotiation panels, pushing for issues, and passing information back from the negotiation panels to the community level. Women leaders in the peace talks in turn pushed for broader inclusion at every stage of peace process, drawing on their extensive experience in CSOs and advocacy campaigns.622 The fact that both negotiation team panels had individuals affiliated with CSOs was not problematic. For instance, the OPAPP Secretary Quintos Deles remarked that she would always make time for CSO women.623 Many women in civil society used their personal and professional relationships to serve as links between different parties, networking between the two sides of the negotiation, as well as with local communities.624 This tactic was how WE Act 1325 and the Mindanao Commission on

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618 Ibid.
619 Interview with Mohagher Iqbal, Chair of the MILF negotiation panel.
620 Ibid.
621 Interview with Teresita Quintos Deles, Secretary of the OPAPP, April 30, 2015.
622 Interview with Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Chief Negotiator for the Government of the Philippines; Interview with Teresita Quintos Deles, Secretary of the OPAPP.
623 Interview with Teresita Quintos Deles, Secretary of the OPAPP.
624 Interview with Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Chief Negotiator for the Government of the Philippines; Interview with Amina Rasul, President of the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy and co-convener of the Women’s Peace Table; Interview with Johaira Wahab, Legal advisor to the government of the Philippines; Interview with Jasmin Nario-Galace, convener of WE Act 1325; Interview with Karen Tanada, Director of the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute; Interview with Analiza Ugay, Balay Rehabilitation Center, WE Act 1325, and Mindanao People’s Caucus; Interview with Mary Ann Arnado, Secretary General of the Mindanao People’s Caucus; Interview with Patricia Sarenas, Chair of the Mindanao Coalition of Development NGOs and the Caucus of Development NGOs; Interview with Irene Santiago, Mindanao Coalition on Women and PEace Table. See also Anderlini, “Peace Negotiations and Agreements,” in Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action (2004).
Women leverage their relationships with key members of the negotiation panels to push its agenda. They lobbied for basic rights of women and meaningful political participation through these consultations. As a member of Nisa Ul Haqq and the head of the legal team for the government of the Philippines, Johaira Wahab recalled how consultations towards the drafting of the Framework Agreement became an opportunity for women in civil society, especially the grassroots, to consolidate their positions and bring them to the attention of the Government and the MILF Peace Panels. Certain members of the panel, including her, encouraged women in civil society to speak up: “It reminded me that this women’s issue cannot just come from women in the panel, it has to come from the grassroots. Something we in Nisa already believe in.”

Other ways that women in civil society would negotiate their goals would be through the presentation of position papers and back channeling. For example, the Téduray Lambangian Women’s Organization sent organizational statements, attended public hearings, presented position papers in consultations on the basic law, and submitted proposal provisions for consideration in drafting the BBL to advocate for the rights of indigenous women. Several civil society members served as “observers” at various stages of the peace negotiation from 2001 to 2014. Although some individuals or groups were not specifically invited, they used their personal relationships or networks to request permission to observe the peace negotiations. Others simply showed up and announced their presence, relying on pure luck to enter the proceedings. Limited funding meant these individuals did not continuously access the process over the course of 13 years. Often members of the peace negotiation panel acted as gatekeepers and decided the degree of inclusivity for each issue, so civil society participation was piecemeal. Gaining observer status also meant women in civil society could not engage in discussions during any part of the proceedings. As a result, some used breaks in the proceedings to advocate their issues informally. Some women in civil society used text messages to reach out to members of the peace negotiation panels to provide moral support and update each other on the advancement of certain women’s issues. Concomitantly, there were individuals inside the formal peace negotiations who preferred to distance themselves from their CSOs to avoid the appearance of collusion, which may undermine each other’s efforts during the peace talks.

To what extent were their objectives or priorities represented in the resulting peace agreement?

One observable effect of women in civil society’s advocacy is that the 2012 Framework Agreement and 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro have explicit gender provisions throughout. There was a general sense that the dual forces of having women at the peace table and external pressure from women’s networks influenced the language, agenda, and format of the power-sharing agreement. The main drafters of this agreement on both negotiation teams were women. A number of Annexes that build off of the 2014 Agreement called for specific provisions for women. For instance, on development of the Bangsamoro, one Annex called for at least five per cent of the official development funds to be set aside for women’s programs. The Annex on power-sharing called for women’s political participation as council lead-

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625 Interview with Johaira Wahab, Legal advisor to the government of the Philippines.
627 Interview with Analiza Ugay, Balay Rehabilitation Center, WE Act 1325, and Mindanao People’s Caucus member; Interview with Mary Ann Arnado, Secretary General of the Mindanao People’s Caucus; Interview with Patricia Sarenas, Chair of the Mindanao Coalition of Development NGOs and the Caucus of Development NGOs. See also Steven Rood, “Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The role of civil society” in Policy Studies, ed. East-West Center (Washington, D.C., 2005).
628 Interview with Jasmin Nario-Galace, convener of WE Act 1325.
629 Interview of Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Chief Negotiator for the Government of the Philippines; Interview with Yasmin Busran-Lao, Undersecretary of the OPAPP; Interview with Raissa Jajurie, Legal advisor to the MILF negotiation panel, May 2, 2015.
ers, provincial governors, mayors, and indigenous representatives, as well as the creation of a consultation mechanism for women. And economic programs were proposed for decommissioned female forces of the MILF.

The draft BBL also provided similar guarantees for women as the 2014 Agreement and its Annexes. It proposed that the Bangsamoro parliament would ensure women’s participation in statebuilding and development, that a minimum of one qualified woman would be appointed to the Bangsamoro cabinet, and would guarantee a designated seat for a women’s representative in Parliament. As mentioned above, it remains to be seen whether the newly revised BBL will be accepted by all parties.

The participation of women in the Mindanao peace process also contributed to a sense that women can participate directly in political processes. As Miriam Coronel Ferrer noted:

“When we did training with a group of community women, they [WE Act 1325] did a pre-test on the attitudes of women as to how they appreciate their own role in the peace process. Then they went through the seminar where they familiarized the women with the agreements and asked them about their own issues and how they can participate. They gave them examples of how some other women have participated when they did a post-test. There was a complete change in attitude. Like from feeling they cannot do much or they do not see any role that they can play, to one that is very positive.”

At the same time, there is a limited view that despite the addition of women to the MILF panel, their participation in decision-making was still narrow. There was a sense that while women supported the MILF panel, ultimately men dominated the decision-making role and processes.

**Conclusion**

In sum, women leaders and women in civil society worked in unison to push for greater inclusion in the peace negotiations between the government of the Philippines and the MILF through consistent public engagement, transparency, and accessibility. More so than preceding peace agreements, the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement was notable for its inclusivity and gender responsiveness. The case of the Philippines demonstrates that a concerted action derived from direct participation of women in the peace talks, designated spaces for civil society consultations, and mass action influenced the main parties to the conflict to be more conciliatory. While beyond the scope of this case study, the influence attained by women inside and outside the peace negotiation may be only applicable to the MILF peace process, as similar gains were not met in parallel peace negotiations with other rebel groups in the Philippines.

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630 Interview with Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Chief Negotiator for the Government of the Philippines.
REVIEW OF KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED

General observations

The preceding cases of Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines demonstrate the diverse ways in which women in civil society and women’s CSOs were included in formal peace negotiations or mediations. The most direct forms of participation were exemplified by the cases of Northern Ireland and the Philippines. The former gained access to Track 1 negotiations through an election process, whereas the latter successfully lobbied for the inclusion of women leaders in the peace talks. In both cases, women’s coalitions seized the opportunity to mobilize their networks and alliances at a critical juncture when the political space opened up to permit inclusiveness. The same can be said for Guatemala with the creation of the ASC and the Women’s Sector, however, women’s access to the formal peace negotiations was less direct by way of parallel consultations and predominately with the URNG. Yet, the pressure from women’s advocacy groups was reflected in the gender specific language of the peace accord, even if it was somewhat watered-down. Access for Kenya, in turn, was also in the form of parallel consultations in the mediation process. However, as noted in the case study, there was no formal mechanism for women to participate and as a result women in civil society relied on ad hoc strategies and proxies in an effort to influence the principals in the mediation process. Both the cases of Guatemala and Kenya exhibit more narrow access or traditional forms of engagement with the parties to the conflict, relative to Northern Ireland and the Philippines. Interestingly, Northern Ireland, Guatemala, and Kenya exhibited mixed results in terms of the outcome of women’s participation in the peace process. The Philippines, in contrast, had the most gender-responsive peace agreement, but it remains to be seen whether the BBL will be adopted by all parties to the conflict and whether the peace will hold.

While all cases had a minimum of one or more female negotiator, mediator, and/or signatory, ultimately the dynamics between these individuals and the women’s coalitions varied. The majority of women who were elected or appointed to these positions were educated, activists, or career professionals that had extensive experience in their own fields. Most came from civil society and were part of the women’s movement in their country, although technical expertise rather than their affiliation with a particular CSO led to their appointment. Nevertheless, the four cases show that the sheer presence of women at the peace talks was an insufficient guarantee of the reflection of women’s issues in peace agreements, notably in Guatemala and Kenya. Having a cohort of like-minded individuals who could push for women’s issues at the very top, as seen in Northern Ireland and the Philippines, or a formal mechanism to include women in political processes increased the likelihood of a gender-responsive peace agreement. In addition, women who were appointed or elected to participate in high-level peace negotiations said they experienced (and sometimes suffered from) a steep learning curve for understanding the rules and procedures of peace negotiations. This is understandable given the exclusive and elite character of most peace negotiations. The only exception was in Kenya where the women appointed to the mediation process were seasoned politicians and peacemakers. For women’s coalitions and networks, their experience in organizing, mobilizing, and lobbying enabled them to use similar skills to help them navigate access to Track 1 whether formally or informally.

Women’s coalitions, networks, and alliances in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines also behaved similarly to what Lederach calls middle-range leadership, where women in CSOs brought the top and bottom levels of society together to resolve conflict.631 Many believe that middle-range leadership

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has the most potential in building peace. Attempts to transform dialogue and act as intermediaries both vertically amongst parties to the conflict and horizontally between parties to the conflict and the grassroots were evident in the cases of Northern Ireland and the Philippines. Women’s coalitions in Guatemala and Kenya engaged in information politics by generating and disseminating information to a variety of audiences. Lastly, to gain cooperation and reconcile disparate views, both Kenya and Northern Ireland engaged in transversal politics. Virtually all coalitions aimed at an inclusive and consensus-based approach, however all cases encountered challenges with achieving total inclusivity given the diversity of women participating and the limits of geography.

The following section breaks down the key findings and lessons learned.

**Northern Ireland**
- Women in civil society used pre-existing and new networks to mobilize and organize coalitions and alliances;
- Women in civil society created a coalition based on inclusive political dialogue;
- Women in civil society formed a non-traditional political party with shared core values and principles;
- NIWC was not a unified voice;
- NIWC built trust and fostered relationships to connect information from the top to the bottom;
- NIWC used an emergent process to shape their agenda;
- NIWC lacked real experience in peace negotiations and learnt by doing;
- The language of the peace agreement reflected the proposals of the NIWC, including the creation of a Civic Forum, victim’s recognition, reconciliation, mixed housing, integrated education, and rights of youth;
- NIWC broadened political dialogue.

**Lessons learned**
- Process of developing a coalition developed confidence in members;
- Needed to allocate resources to better capacity building;
  - Difficult to switch roles in coalitions because of fast pace and short timeline;
  - Should have had a better understanding and agreement on the identity of NIWC and their role as a civil society movement;
- Needed a systematic long-term strategy to support elected candidates.

**Guatemala**
- Women in civil society engaged in outreach and built alliances to mobilize and organize;
- Women’s Sector forged strategic alliances through cross-sector outreach;
- Women’s Sector shaped and promoted their agenda, maintaining an unwavering determination based on collective action and compromise;
  - Women’s Sector prioritized issues which all could agree upon by consensus;
  - Provisions were inserted in the peace agreement on land access, credit and development assistance, to end discrimination against indigenous women, support for women’s rights and equality within home, equal rights for working women, greater access to education for women, increased opportunities for women to serve in armed forces;
- Several clauses in peace agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous People include commitment to implement CEDAW, to classify ethnic discrimination as a criminal offense, and to eliminate existing laws on discrimination against indigenous men and women;
• Language weak on Mayan women's redress on sexual abuse and assault;
• Several clauses attributed to Mayan women on the rights to speak native languages, dress in traditional clothing, practice cultural traditions without fear or repercussion, and be recognized as Guatemalan;
• Agreement on constitutional reform contained an article guaranteeing women's rights to organize and participate in politics;
• Overall language on gender lacked strength and depth that the Women's Sector desired and proposed within the ASC.

Lessons learned
• Women's Sector's efforts opened space for women's political participation;
• Needed more capacity building in peace negotiations;
  › Training in drafting and pushing proposals forward;
  › Working in short-time period.

Kenya
• Women leaders in civil society used pre-existing networks to mobilize and organize;
• Women in civil society reached out to constituencies to form coalitions and alliances;
• Built horizontal and vertical alliances with other coalitions, mediators, and wherever possible, negotiators;
• WCG developed agenda procedurally;
• WCG used the mediation process to elevate long-standing women's issues and priorities;
• WCG used informal mechanisms, ad hoc strategies, proxies, and cross-lobby message cohesion to influence the process;
• Difficult to disentangle attribution in Memorandum and Annotated Agenda from WCG and other sectors due to cross-lobby strategy and similar issue proposals;
• Process enabled women to feel like they participated in political conversation;
• WCG enabled women to participate in political conversation;
• Annotated Agenda and National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 make no explicit reference to women or gender;
• Appointing women (even one with a women's rights background) to the negotiating teams did not guarantee the process would deliberate on women's issues or that those issues will be reflected in outcome agreements;
• Limits of influence: Women in civil society participated through ad hoc consultations with the Panel at the Panel's discretion. The mediators shut out all sectors of civil society when reaching a final deal on power-sharing and bringing the crisis to a close.

Lesson learned
• Creating a safe space to share experiences and air grievances turned pain into power, breaking down barriers and unifying women from warring factions of society;
• Alliance formation and message synergy across varied sectors of civil society amplified message and improved ability to influence;
• Women in civil society needed a formal mechanism through which they could engage directly with those at the table in real time or a representative in the room that could champion their interests as a constituency (e.g., Machel, gender advisor, etc.);
• Physically surrounding the negotiation process provided opportunities to influence;
• Pre-existing relationships help move an agenda forward.

The Philippines

• Women in civil society used pre-existing networks to mobilize and organize;
• Women in civil society developed a complex network of local, national, regional, and global alliances;
• Women in civil society shaped agenda through open facilitated dialogues with diverse women’s constituencies;
• Women in civil society used personal connections and women’s coalitions to pressure parties to the peace process to make women’s participation and women’s issues a priority on the agenda;
• Explicit gender previsions mentioned throughout 2012 Framework Agreement and 2014 Comprehensive Agreement;
• Having women at the peace talks and external pressure from women’s networks and coalitions influenced the language, agenda, and format of power-sharing agreement;
• Women in civil society participated substantively to the peace negotiations, yet there is a sense that with regard to the MILF they are not the key decision-makers of the process.

Lessons learned

• The participation of women in the peace process contributed to a sense that women can participate directly in political processes;
• Concerted action from direct participation of women in the peace talks, pressure from women in civil society outside of the formal peace negotiations, and advocacy influenced the main parties to the conflict to be open-minded about women’s participation in the peace process;
• A shared sense of solidarity and mutual support was an important feature of women’s networks, coalitions, and alliances;
• Women in civil society cultivated strategic links with key actors in Tracks 1, 1.5, 2, and 3, acting as a conduit of information from local communities to negotiation panels, pushing for issues, and passing information back from the negotiation panels to the community level;
• Women in civil society used their personal connections with the negotiation panels to submit proposals for the peace agreement, provide informal moral support during critical moments of the negotiations, and update each other during consultations.
CONCLUSION

This research explores how women in civil society accessed high-level peace negotiations in four distinct cases: Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines. Not intended to compare between cases, this research looks deeply into each case to identify and highlight diverse motivations, methods, and strategies women in civil society applied to access high-level peace negotiations in their respective countries. What follows is a summation of the research questions this study aimed to answer for each case.

Why did women in civil society mobilize for peace?

Women in all cases mobilized to end the violence that had engulfed their countries and communities. In each case, women also expressly responded to an opportunity to play a more robust role in the formal negotiation process. Northern Irish women reacted to the list party system and created the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC), a cross-community women’s political party to promote women, foster peace, and break the political deadlock. Guatemalan women began actively mobilizing as a collective with the establishment of the Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (ASC) and the corresponding avenue it presented to influence the formal peace process. Graça Machel galvanized the efforts of Kenyan women to form the Women’s Consultation Group (WCG), while the overall tone set by the mediation team fueled civil society engagement more broadly amidst a narrowly constructed mediation process. Some Filipino women, with a long history of activism, saw the negotiations as an opportunity to mainstream UNSCR 1325. In all cases, actors and events external to the conflict (e.g., mediators, international donor community, Beijing Conference, global feminist movement, etc.) generated pressure and support to create the spaces in which women mobilized, formulated, and pursued their agendas for peace.

How did women mobilize and organize?

Women in all case studies called upon their pre-existing networks and used their already-established skills in advocacy, mobilization, grassroots organizing, etc. to pursue their goals of accessing the peace processes in their respective countries. In Northern Ireland, pre-existing and new networks proved vital to mobilization. With only six weeks to organize before the election, the NIWC required rapid mobilization. To succeed, they drew up a “kitchen table” strategy where 100 women were tasked to collect 100 votes each. NIWC core members leveraged their expansive networks and diverse capacities, already developed from the civil rights movement and cross-community dialogue work, to achieve those ends. The party drew members and cultivated candidates to stand for election from these networks, purposefully recruiting women from both sides of the political divide and seeking out those with cross-community and political experience, as well as professionally diverse skillsets. To campaign effectively, they led by example, engaged in women’s political consciousness-raising, and used innovative tactics to play on the party’s newcomer status. They took an inclusive approach to membership; women did not have to choose between identities, but rather could remain part of their political party and still join the NIWC.

In Guatemala, women forged alliances, often across political divisions. Comprised of a diverse cross-section of society, the Women’s Sector formed out of 32 organizations (e.g., feminists, Marxists, activists for indigenous rights, religious, and peasants). Initially intensely fragmented, these organizations united with the intent of joining the ASC as a distinct sector and collectively organized to solve the problems of women. Time was a factor: to join the ASC, the Women’s Sector only had a week to organize. To ease unification, they organized thematically instead of hierarchically. Those with specific competencies took on roles to support the Sector’s overarching goals.

In Kenya, women leaders organized using their pre-existing networks and skillsets, and at Machel’s request. Women led various sectors across an already-robust Kenyan civil society network, and thus drew upon networks and expertise built over decades of political and grassroots activism. Several coa-
litions formed as a result (KPTJ, CCP, Vital Voices, NCSC, and WCG). Individuals and networks overlapped and intersected, as women mobilized at every level. At Machel’s request, Wandia invited CSO leaders to join the WCG based on their professional and ethnic backgrounds and political alliances, leveraging her networks, as well as already-mobilizing coalitions to cultivate these individuals. After initially bringing these women together, the “spitting session” unified them, as it allowed women to air grievances over the divisive issues that had split the country apart. Following the session, participating women nominated 12 individuals, who already led diverse civil society constituencies, to represent them to the Panel.

In the Philippines, women used their personal and professional networks to build coalitions, organize activities, and advocate their positions. Using locally-driven networks, women exchanged information and knowledge. Maintaining contact through electronic networks, they relied on these local networks to develop human resources and capacity, as well as to build vertical and horizontal linkages (government-to-grassroots, grassroots-to-government). As a strategy, network development ensured broad engagement with diverse actors and sustainability of the capacities developed, thereby expanding audiences and increasing influence. Some organizations mobilized to create unity in diversity.

How did they form coalitions and alliances?

The NIWC formed a non-traditional party with shared core values, relying on common principles to foster alliances. The NIWC leveraged its “newcomer” status both in how it campaigned and how it cultivated alliances. As an alternative to the status quo, the NIWC attracted the politically disenfranchised. Instead of taking a stand on contentious issues, the party aimed to create space for compromise and accommodate alternative positions, as well as involve more women in the formal political sphere. Taking impetus from the Beijing Conference, the NIWC championed three core principles (inclusion, human rights, and equality) over contentious policies. In doing so, they sought to break stereotypes and find a new path forward. The NIWC created a coalition of inclusive political dialogue and was by all accounts non-traditional. The party structured itself as a cross-community party with binary leadership drawn from both sides of the political divide. They promoted fresh, often provocative ideas to capture the media’s and the public’s attention and openly oppose the status quo. Using the media, the NIWC innovatively played on identity and gender symbolism as a means to highlight to the public the importance of women’s political participation. They also capitalized on the abuse they endured as women in politics and publicized their victimization, so as to garner compassion and support from those watching the process unfold.

In Guatemala, the Women’s Sector forged strategic alliances based on practical needs through cross-sector outreach. They leveraged pre-existing personal ties, identified advantageous new connections, and offered assistance to other sectors where necessary. Out of these alliances, they sourced information and expertise on themes with which they were unfamiliar, and cultivated support from men to present their ideas. They developed these cross-sector partnerships by relying on similar social identities and by broadening their proposals to capture other sectors’ interests. Where they could identify and foster such synergies, constituent parts of the Women’s Sector collaborated on issues with representatives of other sectors, especially women. Issues that failed to garner consensus within the Women’s Sector were set aside in favor of those more likely to be adopted by the ASC and incorporated by the negotiation panels into the peace accords.

In Kenya, women reached out to other constituencies to form alliances. Using their pre-existing networks and both formal and informal mechanisms, they built horizontal and vertical alliances with other coalitions, the mediators, the feuding political sides, and wherever possible the negotiators. The WCG drew legitimacy from the diversity of constituencies it represented and created message synergy across different coalitions consulting with the Panel. Leaders and members alike straddled different coalitions, which invariably fostered fluid alliances and synergies across coalitions. With diverse expertise, these coalitions combined their capabilities and leveraged their unique capacities, improving the credibility and visibility of their shared agenda. Strong female leadership defined several coalitions that lobbied the mediation.
In the Philippines, civil society women formed a complex web of local, national, regional, and global alliances, many of which overlapped and intersected. They built coalitions by nurturing and expanding relationships in their professional networks. Large coalitions created layers of representation and enabled women in civil society to engage in the peace process in multifaceted ways. The majority of women on the peace panels came from civil society and held firm links with their organizations and constituencies. Coalitions that had personal connections with the negotiation panels leveraged their relationships to push their agenda forward. The strategic links built within networks and alliances between actors in Tracks 1, 1.5, 2, and 3 fostered communications from the top-down and bottom-up.

**How did they assemble and shape agendas?**

**An emergent process shaped the NIWC agenda.** Not specified in advance, policies and activities emerged over time as knowledge gained from earlier interactions shaped and refined existing positions and tactics. Instead of a party platform, the NIWC embraced its guiding principles and leveraged its “newcomer” status to set its agenda, adopting a cross-sectarian approach and remaining flexible where mainstream parties could not (e.g., refusing to take a position on constitutionalism).

The Women’s Sector used a consensus-based approach to articulate their agenda. Non-hierarchical in structure, the Women’s Sector engaged in exhaustive dialogue to create a unified agenda. In addition to building consensus, they organized themselves thematically and produced draft proposals on each substantive theme. To push the Women’s Sector agenda through the ASC, they relied on information politics both within the ASC and via backchannels with the URNG. They met internal challenges, as they navigated through a diverse group to articulate a shared agenda. Conflicting priorities sometimes surfaced, which allowed the Women’s Sector to fracture. Such diversity also engendered mixed reactions as to whether the sector represented all salient issues.

In Kenya, the WCG agenda evolved procedurally. The WCG’s selected representatives drafted the agenda and then circulated it for feedback amongst the larger group. Small spin-off meetings took place on specific subjects, while a core of technical experts drafted the Memorandum, which was then circulated for comment amongst the wider WCG. They pulled in experts from outside to assist where necessary. Calling upon members and organizations that worked at the grassroots level, the WCG ensured their agenda captured the needs expressed by women most affected by the violence. They divided issues in the Memorandum temporally (immediate, medium-term, long-term), as well as categorized the different forms of violence and the gender dimensions of the crisis. Canvassing other coalitions, WCG members ensured messages were synchronized and amplified across the sectors. The group was non-hierarchical, inter-generational, broadly representative, and inclusive, which left many feeling that the Memorandum fairly represented the needs of Kenyan women.

Filipino women pursued community input and open, facilitated dialogue with a diverse range of women constituents to craft an agenda. They emphasized transparent dialogue. National-level organizations consulted with grassroots partners and held national and regional consultations with their constituents. The multi-staged consultation process enabled different women to realize their commonalities through collective discussions.

**How did they set priorities for their activism? How, if at all, did their priorities change when they participated in high-level peace negotiations?**

Initially horizontal in structure, the NIWC grew more centralized and hierarchical over time, as it professionalized into a political party and increasingly focused its core operatives on the peace process. The NIWC developed a feedback loop to connect NIWC actions at the peace table to its constituents on the ground. Despite those efforts, cleavages emerged. Women outside the core felt increasingly left behind as the
talks progressed. The NIWC faced challenges reconciling identity and politics, class, geography (urban vs. rural), intergenerational divides, and priorities in issue selection.

**The Women’s Sector prioritized issues upon which they agreed.** They engaged in extensive dialogue and compromise, often tabling issues upon which they could not agree. As a last resort, they voted. Navigating through a consensus-based approach amongst a diverse group under tight time constraints, the Women’s Sector often agreed to the lowest common denominator. On certain issues, the Women’s Sector lobbied other sectors to push their ideas forward when ideas proposed did not make it through the consensus-based approach in their own sector. Procedurally, to move the Women’s Sector agenda forward within the ASC, two representatives from each sector would form an *ad hoc* commission on each theme to draft a consensus document from the ASC to present to the formal negotiations. This multi-layer process diluted issue positions. Compromise occurred at every step of the process.

Through intensive discussion, sector-to-sector information sharing, the media, and Machel’s guidance, the WCG ultimately decided to use the mediation process to elevate long-standing issues. The majority of issues the WCG prioritized can be traced back to earlier debates on constitutional reform, as well as the human rights commission and the women’s movement. The WCG dialogued for hours to reach consensus on these key priorities. Through sector-to-sector information sharing and the media, the WCG generated public attention around their priority issues. Similarly, the media and Machel guided their prioritization efforts, helping them to align their agenda with the immediate focus of the mediation. Importantly, women as negotiators – even Karua, who had a women’s rights background – did not guarantee the women’s agenda would be represented adequately at the negotiation table.

In the Philippines, women in civil society had a diverse set of priorities based on their mandates and constituencies. To gain more access to the formal process, Filipino women prioritized the most centrist and non-controversial issues in their agenda. Some coalitions developed their priorities based on the changing political environment, whereas others prided themselves on maintaining a consistent agenda throughout the negotiations. Larger coalitions worked on two levels, consulting local communities to understand their needs and relaying and drawing attention to the issues with members of the negotiation panels.

**How did they negotiate their goals?**

As the party of inclusion, the NIWC positioned itself as an intermediary throughout the peace talks. Using its guiding principles, the NIWC became a vehicle of communication, promoted understanding, encouraged dialogue, listened, compromised, and developed into an honest broker that worked with all political parties to move the talks closer to a negotiated settlement. The NIWC fostered relationships wherever possible. Although not always reciprocated, the NIWC established personal contact with other parties and backchanneled as a means to not derail the talks. They developed ties with the staff in the independent chairperson’s office (in particular with Martha Pope), the secretaries and support staff of political party offices, technical experts that helped them with drafting and capacity building, and organizations and supporters outside of Ireland. They leveraged their relationships with powerbrokers (Mo Mowlam, Liz O’Donnell, George Mitchell, Hillary Clinton, and David Irvine) to be taken more seriously, as well as remained committed to staying connected with their constituencies on the ground. They used impromptu encounters to push their agenda forward. They used the coffee bar to pick up and exchange information, eavesdropped on smoking breaks, and met in the ladies bathroom to hold private conversations. They leveraged the media to push for peace amidst political deadlock by purposefully getting the “truth” on air ahead of the messages of spoilers. NIWC members climbed a steep learning curve. Members had technical expertise and ground knowledge but lacked actual experience in electioneering and peace negotiations. To mitigate these weaknesses, members published policy papers rooted in NIWC guiding principles, came prepared to every meeting, understood other parties’ platforms, and never reacted to misogyny.
Through unrelenting determination, collective action, compromise, and consensus-building, the Women’s Sector negotiated their goals. The Women’s Sector established themselves as professionals and equals to all other sectors within the ASC. They earned a reputation for diligence and competence through hard work, which helped them develop cross-sector alliances. They gained influence by producing useful information and disseminating proposals through networks and alliances. They maintained a constant presence in all ASC meetings, often showing up in groups and including members of other sectors in their lobbying. Persistence became the hallmark of their engagement and a key part of their strategy for legitimacy. Drawing on new alliances, they leveraged the moderator’s respected position and international backing to be heard, and sought private and public audiences with members of the government and URNG negotiation panels (although they never presented proposals to the official negotiating panels). Some women noted the challenges of presenting a clear message and being heard in the ASC.

Kenyan women used informal mechanisms, ad hoc strategies, proxies, and cross-lobby message cohesion to influence a closed peace process. Several coalitions, including the WCG, kept a constant presence at the Serena Hotel, where the mediation took place. Using the Serena as an operational base, the WCG waylaid mediators during breaks, relied on members with political affiliations and those with personal connections to informally lobby, and used the media to their advantage. Coalitions collaborated to engage in information politics, producing useful information and disseminating proposals to formal participants. The Memorandum produced by the WCG echoed across other coalitions’ lobbying efforts, creating cross-coalition message cohesion. Personal ties between coalition and network leaders enabled these synergies. In all efforts surrounding the mediation, the Panel generally but Machel particularly proved indispensable to the ability of the WCG (and other civil society coalitions, which women led) to access the formal process.

In the Philippines, women in civil society engaged directly and consistently with the peace panel members and the grassroots. Women in civil society cultivated strategic links with key actors in Tracks 1, 1.5, 2, and 3. Several official members of the peace negotiation teams came from the women’s movement and had worked with CSOs before, allowing civil society women to lobby through both formal and informal avenues. Civil society women used these professional and personal links to network between the two sides of the negotiation and to backchannel where necessary. They also presented position papers, from which they received the greatest acceptance among women officials. Through all modes at their disposal, CSO women consistently encouraged peace panel members who championed their agenda. More recently, the women’s agenda, especially women’s political participation, became a priority in on-going peace negotiations. A shift occurred in 2012 for the peace process to be all-inclusive, transparent, and accountable. A debate followed on what constitutes “meaningful” political participation in negotiations explicitly for women. As external pressure mounted to include more women, CSO women collectively lobbied to include more women in the MILF panel, which facilitated the rebel negotiation team in opening their operations to more women in civil society.

To what extent were their objectives or priorities represented in the resulting peace agreement?

In Northern Ireland, the NIWC established a precedent for political participation and engaged in women’s collective political consciousness-raising. They established process-based legitimacy to allow women’s voices to be heard by successfully winning seats at the negotiating table. The language in the agreement reflected NIWC proposals, specifically regarding the Civic Forum, victims’ recognition, reconciliation, mixed housing, integrated education, and the rights of youth. Generally speaking, the NIWC served as an “honest broker” between opposing parties during the Multi-Party Talks, integrated issues into the final agreement that otherwise may have been omitted, and opened space for women to participate formally in politics.

In Guatemala, provisions inserted in the final agreement tracked back to the Women’s Sector’s agenda, but overall the language on gender lacked the strength and depth the Women’s Sector desired. The final
agreement references the Sector’s agenda, specifically with regard to land access, credit and development assistance, an end to discrimination against indigenous women, support for women’s rights and equality within the home, equal rights for women, greater access to education for women, and increased opportunities for women to serve in armed forces. Several clauses in the Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous People include a commitment to implement CEDAW, to classify ethnic discrimination as a criminal offense, and to eliminate laws on discrimination against indigenous men and women. The language addressing Mayan women’s redress on sexual abuse and assault is weak, although several clauses noted Mayan women’s rights to speak native languages, dress in traditional clothing, practice cultural traditions without fear of reprisal, and be recognized as Guatemalan. The accord on constitutional reform contained an article guaranteeing women’s rights to organize and participate in politics.

In Kenya, it is difficult to distill the influence of the WCG from the influence of civil society more broadly, especially when comparing the Annotated Agenda against proposals put forth by various coalitions. Indeed, all coalitions surrounding the mediation claim credit for the same language in the Annotated Agenda. Importantly, the Annotated Agenda makes no explicit mention of women or gender. Women in CSOs held mixed sentiments about their degree of influence on the process, but generally felt the mediation agenda reflected the issues for which they lobbied. Ultimately though, women in civil society participated through *ad hoc* consultations with the Panel at the Panel’s discretion. When it suited them, the mediators shut out all sectors of civil society, especially when reaching the final deal that brought the crisis to a close.

In the Philippines, both the 2012 Framework Agreement and the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement explicitly mention gender several times. The Annexes that build off of the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement also call for specific provisions for women, including at least five per cent of the official development funds to be set aside for women’s programs, the political participation of women in the Bangsamoro, and economic programs for female MILF soldiers. The draft BBL also has similar guarantees for women. The dual effects of women officially embedded in the peace talks as well as external pressure from civil society women’s networks influenced the language, agenda, and format of the power-sharing agreement. Yet, while women participated substantively in the peace negotiations, there remains some sense that especially concerning the MILF panel, women are still not the key decision-makers of the process.

To conclude, this research examines the diverse ways women in civil society gained access to high-level peace negotiations in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines. Each case offers a rich and unique understanding of why women mobilized for peace; how they organized; how they formed coalitions and alliances; how they assembled and shaped agendas; how they set priorities for their activism and the extent to which those priorities changed as a result of gaining access to the high-level negotiations; how they negotiated their goals; and the extent to which the final agreement reflected the priorities they championed. Each case study should be taken as a descriptive analysis of that single case. While this research was not compiled to compare across case studies, the hope is that the lessons learned from each case and from all the cases in total can help women in other contexts succeed in mobilizing for peace, gaining access to high-level peace negotiations, and having their priorities codified in the peace agreements that ultimately pave the way for the next chapter in the histories of their respective countries.
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

This section discusses the methodology for the systematic literature review and the case study data collection and analysis.

Methods for systematic literature review

The systematic literature review for this study was led by the following questions:

- What has been written on the relationship between women’s participation in formal and informal peace negotiations?
- Who has been writing on this subject (i.e., gender, nationality, region, institutional affiliation)?
- How have the authors covered the subject (i.e., research questions, analytical frameworks, methodological frameworks, etc.)?
- What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of the literature?
- What are the main arguments, findings, and disagreements on this subject?
- What has been the impact of women’s participation on peace negotiations and/or peace agreements?
- What issues have not been covered in the literature on the subject?
- What issues for future research does the literature point out?

Data sources

As no existing annotated bibliographies could be found on this subject, the research team conducted a wide search with the following online databases: JSTOR, MUSE, WorldCat, Lexis Nexis Academic, ProQuest Research Library, United Nations Official Documents Systems, Georgetown Women, Peace and Security Research Repository, and Google Scholar for studies that discussed women and high-level peace negotiations, using the time frame 1990 to 2014. The research team also searched the bibliographies and footnotes of the most frequently cited studies on this subject for additional references. A wide spectrum of literature was considered including, but not limited to books, monographs, policy briefs and reports, conference reports, theses, peer-reviewed journal articles, and grey literature published in any language.

Search terms

A string of key search words was entered into the online databases, yielding a number of hits (or sources). The abstracts of such hits were reviewed for inclusion and exclusion based on the criterion indicated below. For a comprehensive list of sources, the following search terms were used: women + peace + security; women + civil society; women + peace negotiations; women + peace processes; women + grassroots organizing; women + security sector reform; women + coalition; women + coalition + building; women + peace + treaty; women + peace + agreement; women + peace + grassroots; women + peace + activists; women + peace + civil society; civil society + peace; civil society + peace + negotiations; civil society + peace + process; formal + women + peace; informal + women + peace; women + peace + reconciliation; women + peace + dialogue; women + peace + mediation; women + peace + security + Northern Ireland; women + peace + security + Guatemala; women + peace + security + Kenya; women + peace + security + Philippines; women + peace + civil society + Northern Ireland; women + peace + civil society + Guatemala; women + peace + civil society + Kenya; and women + peace + civil society + Philippines.

Study selection

A source was included in the database (see Table 1 below) if the focus related directly to the research subject and the review questions irrespective of discipline and practice (i.e., anthropology, economics, political science, international relations, politics, feminist studies, area studies, women, peace and security, development studies, international law, etc.). A source was excluded from the database if the focus related tangen-
entially to the subject of the study. A total of 198 documents were retrieved during phase I of the search and entered into a database (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Phase I of study section**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author's affiliation</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Type of publication</th>
<th>Collaborators</th>
<th>Funders</th>
<th>Duration of study</th>
<th>Type of source (primary/secondary)</th>
<th>Methods (Theoretical/Empirical/Qualitative/Quantitative/Advocacy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Once the initial overview was completed, these sources were then vetted according to a grading template (see Table 2) to assess the quality of the literature (e.g., methods used, reliability and validity of evidence, key findings, lessons learned, etc.).

**Table 2: Summary of information assessed in each source**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary sources</th>
<th>Secondary sources</th>
<th>Non-research sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author/year/title</td>
<td>Author/year/title</td>
<td>Author/year/title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of study</td>
<td>Type of study</td>
<td>Purpose of paper or brief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>Credibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of study</td>
<td>Review boundaries</td>
<td>Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection method and quality (reliability &amp; validity)</td>
<td>Appraisal criteria</td>
<td>Coherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major findings</td>
<td>Major findings</td>
<td>Main findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengths/weaknesses</td>
<td>Strengths/weaknesses</td>
<td>Strengths/weaknesses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 76 sources were selected based on their scores of “good” or “excellent” for critical review and inclusion in the systematic literature review.

**Data collection methodology and primary data analysis**

**Case study approach**

The process of how women in local CSOs are able to move from women’s coalitions to influencing and participating in high-level peace negotiations may differ from one context to another. For this reason, this project uses a case study approach, which traces the process in the specific contexts of Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines. It draws on scholarly and policy literature on women’s involvement in CSOs and coalitions participating in high-level peace negotiations, content analysis of conference proceedings, speeches, communiqués issued by women’s coalitions, audio and visual documentation of events, peace negotiation documents, peace agreements, as well as additional outcome documents to gain insight on the process examined. Firsthand information was collected from a diverse sample of women peacemakers, including leaders in CSOs working toward peacemaking, leaders of women’s coalitions, key activists, and constitutive members of these groups to enable a comprehensive understanding that captured different perspectives and experiences. The data were collected through semi-structured interviews to obtain deep insights and rich information. Where possible, government officials and international mediators that participated in the peace negotiations were interviewed as well. Additionally, a gendered political economy analysis of each case study was produced to understand the environment within which women in CSOs and women’s coalitions operated.
Reliability and validity

To ensure reliability and validity of findings, the multiple sources were triangulated to cross-validate the degree of consistency against the mainstream literature. Deviations from the mainstream literature were reconciled and new information was assessed and indicated in each case study. Interview quotes and meanings were validated with member checks632 to ensure accuracy. The combined methods permitted a better understanding of the dynamics between the tools and strategies used by women in CSOs and women’s coalitions and their influence and participation in high-level peace negotiations, as well as the views of government officials and international mediators.633

Case studies selection and justification

The cases in this study were selected according to the following criteria:

- The presence of women and/or women’s coalitions that made the transition to formal, Track I peace negotiations;
- A diverse illustration of women’s roles and strategies for organizing and advocacy to end a violent conflict in relation to the formal, Track I peace negotiation process;
- The conclusion of a formal, peace negotiation process culminating in a codified peace agreement signed by parties to the conflict;
- Existence of and access to robust civil society networks involved in peacemaking;
- Geographic and historical diversity; and
- Accessibility for travel and field-data collection.

Instead of generalizing from the four case studies, this study provides a holistic analysis for each case study alongside a narrow analysis of particular themes related to civil society women’s participation in peacemaking efforts that surround formal, Track I negotiations.634 The research team traced the process pathway in each case and compared the variations within each case but did not compare cases against each other, given the heterogeneity of circumstances surrounding the conflicts and peace negotiations, as well as the small sample size. Non-probabilistic sampling techniques were used to identify interview subjects based on reputational and positional credibility and because this study used process tracing methodology. This study focuses on the process rather than the outcome of each of the formal, Track I peace negotiations in question. Each case study presents distinct examples of the varied ways in which women’s civil society participation could be gleaned from the data gathered.

A brief overview of each of the four case studies is provided below as a means to further outline the rationale for the study’s case selection strategy.635 Please refer to Appendix D for historical timelines for each case study.

Northern Ireland: Belfast Agreement (Good Friday Agreement) (concluded April 10, 1998)

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632 By sending sections of the analyses to participants for review to confirm the accuracy of the interpretations. This was done via email and Skype.
The conflict in Northern Ireland was steeped with religious, ethnic, and geographic dimensions. The Troubles, which is the common name for the conflict, began in the 1960s and escalated steadily into the 1990s until the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998. The peace agreement, which ostensibly grants greater autonomy to the region while keeping it a part of the United Kingdom, was brokered between the government of Tony Blair and representatives from different political factions in Northern Ireland including Sinn Féin and unionists loyal to Great Britain.

The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) was a political party that emerged from a women’s civil society-led peace movement that brought together Catholic and Protestant women with common goals. The coalition of women activists did not set out with political ambitions but rather, due to a combination of circumstance and necessity shaped by the high-level peace negotiations, evolved into a political party. During the formal peace negotiations, the NIWC appointed two representatives to the formal peace table, including one republican and one unionist. The NIWC helped shape the agenda of the high-level peace negotiations by raising issues relating to human rights, transitional justice, reconciliation, and women’s political participation.

Guatemala: Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace (concluded December 29, 1996)

The Guatemalan civil war, fought between the government of Guatemala and several leftist rebel groups, spanned almost four decades. The gross human rights abuses committed by the government are alleged to be genocidal, and since the end of the war, charges of genocide have been brought against former military leaders. The civil war formally ended with the signing of the internationally mediated Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace in December 1996.

In Guatemala, women served as 11 per cent of signatories on the December 29, 1996 Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. The formal negotiating delegations included just two women on the part of the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity. However, women within civil society mobilized and advocated for the inclusion of their perspectives and aspirations within the formal, high-level peace negotiations. The UN and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Jean Arnault, supported the “formal tabling of women’s concerns and recommendations for the parties’ consideration,” and this enabled the inclusion of a number of important provisions within the formal peace accord related to gender equality. Women within civil society were also part of a broader consultative process as members of the Assembly of Civil Society.


Following the announcement of the contested presidential election results of December 27, 2007 between incumbent President Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) and opposition leader Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), political violence unfolded at unprecedented levels in six out of the eight regions (with the Rift Valley the most heavily affected) of Kenya. The magnitude of violence spread within the span of 59 days, upon which a political compromise was reached on February 28, 2008 through the mediation efforts of the African Union’s Panel of Eminent Personalities, consisting of Kofi Annan, Benjamin Mkapa, and Graça Machel.

Both the PNU and ODM negotiation teams included a woman representative. The AU mediation panel included Graça Machel, and under her guidance, the Women’s Consultative Group (a diverse representation of Kenyan women) was formed. The Women’s Consultative Group presented the Women’s Memorandum to the Panel of Eminent African Personalities during the mediation process; it consisted of key issues women’s groups wanted addressed.
The Philippines: The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (concluded March 27, 2014)

The Philippines is a predominantly Catholic country, but the Mindanao region in the south is home to its Muslim minority population. For almost five decades, armed rebel groups within Mindanao led a secessionist movement on behalf of regions with Muslim-majority communities. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) reached an agreement with the government in 1996, which gave autonomy to some majority Muslim areas. However, this did not end the conflict or quell the secessionist aims of certain Muslim separatists. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group of the MNLF, continued to fight against the government in Mindanao on grounds of religious persecution, economic deprivation and with demands for greater control over the natural resource-rich province.

This final stage of the high-level peace negotiations, which resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on Bangsamoro, came after decades of failed peace talks. It granted greater autonomy – but not independence – to local authorities in the majority-Muslim area, now known as Bangsamoro. The Bangsamoro Agreement has the unique distinction of being the first-ever peace negotiation process to have a woman as chief negotiator, Miriam Coronel Ferrer. President Benigno Aquino III and the MILF signed the accord into effect on March 27, 2014. Beyond Ferrer’s leadership on behalf of the government, civil society women, such as the Mindanao Commission on Women and others, also played active roles in advocating for peace, while Secretary Teresita Quintos Deles serves as President Aquino’s chief adviser on the peace process, and Raissa Jajurie serves as the legal adviser to the MILF. It is worthwhile to note that the majority of women who accessed the high-level peace negotiations came from civil society.

Description of the data collection and its limitations

Secondary data

Scholarly and policy literature on coalition building, interest group formation and behavior, the causal mechanisms for women to participate in peace processes, and the models of civil society inclusion in peace negotiations were consulted to compare and contrast whether the groups mentioned above conform to mainstream theories. Biographies, memoirs, and autobiographies of leaders of women’s coalitions were also consulted where possible. Knowledge products produced by local CSOs dedicated to peacemaking and women’s coalitions were analyzed, as well as audio-visual recordings of individuals and groups involved in peacemaking in the four cases were considered. Content analysis was conducted on speeches, communiqés, and official peace negotiation documents, as well as peace agreements and outcome commitments.

Primary data

The study samples four participant categories based on the individual’s level of participation in high-level peace negotiations: (1) women in CSOs working towards peacemaking, (2) leaders of women’s coalitions, (3) constitutive members of both groups, and (4) government officials that participated in the peace negotiations, representatives of rebel or opposition groups (where applicable), and international mediators.

To mitigate sample selection bias, the sample selected for categories 1-3 (above) were divided into individuals in organizations and coalitions that accessed high-level peace negotiations and those that did not within each country. “Access” in this study is defined as “being in the spaces where decisions are made” – as in the inclusion in a formal peace process. This definition moves past the traditional definition of access, which has been defined as informal consultations, either via Track 1.5 or 2. Semi-structured interviews

636 Coe, “Being in the Spaces where Decisions are Made.”
were conducted with categories 1-3 to ascertain the motives and process for mobilizing for peace, how coalitions were formed, how agendas were shaped, and how priorities were set for their activism. The study is also interested in the obstacles they faced, how priorities changed over time, especially when their organizations and coalitions began to participate in high-level peace negotiations. Additionally, this study explored to what extent their objectives or priorities were represented in the resulting peace agreement (for individuals in organizations and coalitions that accessed high-level peace negotiations), and compared against the responses of government officials. Participants of the fourth category were interviewed to obtain a better understanding of the government’s, rebels’, and/or opposition’s perspective of the peace process and their views on the process of women participating in high-level peace negotiations.

Individuals from categories 1-3 were identified through a mapping exercise, which sought to build a list of contacts and organizations relating to women and/or peacemaking in each of the four case study countries. Particular weight was given to organizations that gained access to high-level peace negotiations. Using the years 1990 to 2014 as the time period under investigation, researchers gathered names of women that fell within categories 1-3 using the following mechanisms: 1) reviewing the aforementioned secondary literature; 2) performing Boolean searches (noted above) in both internationally syndicated and local new agencies; 3) culling bibliographies of works selected in the initial literature review; 4) conducting a search for international NGOs that worked and/or published on issues relating to the research inquiry in each case study and noting local partners; 5) contacting local organizations on the ground; and 6) consulting with experts of women’s organizations and institutions that work on gender and/or peacebuilding issues to build a comprehensive list.

On average, 23 participants were sampled from each country or when saturation was reached within and across categories. The total number of individuals sampled in all the case studies was 93 (or N=93). Face-to-face, one-on-one, semi-structured interviews lasted between 45 minutes and one and a half hours. A team of three to four researchers administered the semi-structured interviews. Each semi-structured interview followed a standard script, which was piloted on a sample of individuals in each country that were not part of the original sample of the study. Piloting the script in advance of researchers arriving to the field sites allowed the opportunity to revise questions for clarity and comprehension based on the feedback from local individuals. Understanding that participants may want to tell the research team what they wish to hear and present themselves in a favorable light, the questions were designed to maximize neutrality and to minimize leading questions.

A training workshop was held two months prior to field deployment to guarantee the research protocols and ethics were adopted and understood by the research team. To ensure accuracy in and completeness of the information collected and reduce interviewer bias, all interviews were digitally recorded; researchers in each team had a note-taker, an observer, and an interviewer. These roles were rotated throughout each country. For Guatemala, a Spanish-speaking translator was necessary. All interviews were transcribed ad verbatim within 12 hours of each session, and all field and observer notes were typed up after a full day of interviews. Digital recording of the interviews were used, since it allowed the interviewer to concentrate on listening and responding to the participants and not to be distracted by trying to impose immediate meaning and importance on what has been said. The accuracy and completeness of the ad verbatim transcripts were verified through a comparison of the digital recordings coupled with the note-taker’s notes (which included documentation of what has been said, notes on behavior, silences, and body language of the participants). During the drafting phase, sections concerning the interpretation of analysis based on participant interviews were verified through member checks.

The ad verbatim transcripts used simultaneous coding based on patterns emerging from the data, characterized by:

The codes were defined during the data analysis and derived from the data. A training workshop for the research team was conducted immediately after the first field visit to ensure agreement on the coding and thematic matrix development protocols. Three coders (two researchers that collected data from a field site and a researcher that did not) were assigned to each case study to independently code and develop the thematic matrix. The codes and thematic matrices were compared amongst each coding team and areas of disagreement were discussed to improve the coding system and for reliability. Each case study defined between five to eight themes based on two levels of coding (e.g., open-codes and sub-codes). The thematic matrices present a broad and detailed overview of the interview participants’ views relating to the research topic, and were used for identifying and reporting patterns within the data collected. The percentage of agreement amongst the three coders for each case study was calculated by average pairwise per cent agreement. The thematic matrices were then used to develop an analysis of each case study, which applied an inductive, grounded theory approach.

The design of the study was attentive to ethical considerations. In particular, the study was conducted on the basis of voluntary participation and a principle of do no harm. The confidentiality of the participants was strictly guaranteed throughout the data collection, analysis, and report writing stages. Prospective participants’ names and personal information were only shared with the research team. Ad verbatim transcript interviews were stored on a password protected computer hard drive for the duration of the study, after which all the transcripts were destroyed within three months of completion date. During the initial contact with each prospective participant, the research team explained the nature and purpose of the study, and solicited voluntary participation. Where necessary, correspondence and questions were translated into the local language. Individuals that volunteered to participate in the study were required to review and sign a written informed consent form on the day of the interview per the Georgetown University Institutional Review Board (IRB). Individuals that opted to participate in the study were instructed not to repeat what was discussed in their interviews with other community members in order to preserve their confidentiality. All interview participants that permitted the public identification of their name and/or organization in this study through written consent are listed in Appendix B.

Coming into this study, the research team was also cognizant of issues of positionality and power that are part and parcel to interviewing, especially in terms of researchers coming from the global North and how diverse perspectives and meanings would be interpreted and presented. Member checks discussed above permitted participatory engagement between the researchers and the interview participants and enabled open channels of communication to reduce the extractive nature of data collection. Additionally, the rotation of different roles helped the researchers maintain a check on each other and their behavior toward the interview participants. Moreover, the role of the observer enabled self-reflection on the interaction between the researchers and the interview participants over the course of the study, as did the systematic debriefing sessions.

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638 Each coding team discussed the problems with the code definitions and proposed clarifications, leading to revisions in the codebook.

639 This process is also known as thematic analysis, a method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns within the data.

640 The pre-consensus coding inter-rater reliability measured as average pairwise per cent agreement of coding across raters was 90.48 per cent for Northern Ireland, 33.33 per cent for Guatemala, 90.48 per cent for Kenya, and 61.90 per cent for the Philippines.
Limitations

An analysis that uses semi-structured interviews raises a number of difficult issues in interpretation. Much has been written about memory especially in terms of reliability, accuracy, and trustworthiness. Interviewees often get names and dates wrong, conflate different events into one, or recount stories of questionable truthfulness. Cultural and social processes can reshape memories of political events, however well remembered, over time. Memories of war can be shaped by post-war outcomes, and systematically misrepresented due to security considerations, exaggerated, or re-rationalized post hoc to be more coherent to the subject under study. In the case of the countries selected, the amount of time that has passed between the events surrounding the peace negotiations and retelling them range from 18 years to 8 months, which may affect interpretation of the data if taken at face value. In order to improve reliability, attention was paid to the internal consistency of the interviews, and comparing it with other interviews in the sample in a single case study and with related documentary evidence (i.e., secondary data). If the interviews were consistent and supported by other types of evidence, if it built on or supplemented the supporting evidence in a logical manner, the researchers assumed a certain level of reliability in the account. Inconsistencies that appeared in the data were reconciled through analysis of the reasons why it occurred.

With limited time and resources, the research team chose to focus exclusively on women in CSOs and women’s coalitions that successfully gained access to formal Track I peace negotiation processes, and those that did not, in only four countries. The cases selected reflect the distinct process the team chose to study within the appropriated means and resources at their disposal. The research team visited each country to collect data for seven days. This study built a comprehensive list of interviewees to mitigate the problems of participant self-identification in research; however, given the time and resources available, those who were interviewed were, in general, elite, urban, and literate women, and thus more easily accessible to international actors. Nevertheless, the sample does include women constituent members of CSOs and members of rural CSOs, which expand the scope of perspectives in the dataset. It goes without saying that no list can exhume all the voices and experiences of those who participated in a complex political phenomenon such as the one on which this study focuses. The majority of contact between the research team and the prospective participants prior to the data collection phase took place via email and phone. As such, the prospective participant group is somewhat limited to those who have and/or maintain active email accounts, or who were recommended by another participant.


APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Northern Ireland

1. Beattie, May – Democratic Unionist Party
2. Bell, Eileen – Alliance Party
3. Callaghan, Brenda – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
4. Campbell, Annie – Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
5. Carr, Anne – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
6. Cooke, Catherine – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
7. Donnelly, Marian – The Workers Party
8. Fearon, Kate – Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
9. Gildernew, Michelle – Sinn Féin
10. Greer, Diane – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
11. Hinds, Bronagh – Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
12. Hope, Ann – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
13. Kilmurray, Avila – Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
14. Logue, Margaret – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
15. McNulty, Eithne – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
16. McWilliams, Monica – Founding Member, Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
17. Morrice, Jane – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
18. O’Donnell, Liz – Minister of State, Government of Ireland
19. O’Hare, Rita – Sinn Féin
20. Purvis, Dawn – Progressive Unionist Party
21. Rodgers, Brid – Social Democratic and Labour Party
22. Roulston, Carmel – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
23. Steele, May – Ulster Unionist Party
25. Wilde, Jane – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition

Guatemala

1. Alvarado, Maya – Member, National Union of Guatemalan Women (UNAMG)
2. de León, Anabella – General Secretary of the State, Land Registrar
3. de León-Escribano, Carmen Rosa – Member, The Academic Sector, ASC; Representative, Instituto de Enseñanza Para el Desarrollo Sostenible (IEPADES)
4. Escobedo, Sonia – Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC
5. García, María Guadalupe – Leader, Mamá Maquín
6. Godínez, Martha – Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC
7. Granados, Héctor Rosado – Member, Government Negotiation Panel
8. Jolón, María Rosario – Member, The Indigenous Persons Sector, ASC; Representative, Guatemalan Peasant Committee of the Highlands
9. Klee, Walda Barrios – Member, National Union of Guatemalan Women (UNAMG)
10. Mack, Helen – Founder, Myrna Mack Foundation
11. Marroquín, María – Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC
12. Méndez, Luz – Delegate, Political-Diplomatic Team, URNG
13. Montenegro, Nineth García – Member, The Human Rights Sector, ASC; Founder, Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo, (GAM)
14. Morán, Sandra – Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC; Founder, Women Constructing Peace
15. Porras, Gustavo – Member, Government Negotiation Panel
16. Román, Ricardo Rosales – Secretary General, URNG Negotiation Panel
17. Rosales, Raquel Zelaya – Member, Government Negotiation Panel
18. Tuyuc, Rosalina – Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC; Founder, Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala, (CONAVIGUA)
19. Vásquez, María Raquel – Founder, Madre Tierra
20. Wantland, Rosa María – Member, The Women’s Sector, ASC
Kenya

1. Interview Participant A
2. Ali, Saida – Co-Founder/Executive Director, Young Women’s Leadership Institute; Member, WCG; Signatory, Women’s Memorandum
3. Annan, Kofi – Chair, Panel of Eminent African Personalities
4. Chepkwony, Mary Lagat – Peace Campaigner, Rural Women Peace Link
5. Chesoni, Atsango – Member, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM); Consultant, Human Rights; Member, WCG; Signatory, Women’s Memorandum
6. Hutchinson, Margaret – Executive Director, Education Centre for Women in Democracy; Member, WCG; Signatory, Women’s Memorandum
7. Kabeberi, Njeri – Executive Director, Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD) – Kenya; Leader, Vital Voices; Member, Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ); Co-Convener, National Civil Society Congress (NCSC); Member, WCG; Signatory, Women’s Memorandum
8. Kariuki, Carole – Chief Executive Officer, Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA)
9. Karua, Martha – Chief Negotiator, Party of National Unity (PNU)
10. Maina, Betty – Chief Executive Officer, Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM)
11. Mpaayei, Florence – Executive Director, Nairobi Peace Initiative – Africa; Member, Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP); Member, WCG; Signatory, Women’s Memorandum
12. Mugambi, Martha – Vice-Chair, Justice and Peace of the Catholic Church Commission on Human Rights; Member, Vital Voices
13. Mumma, Catherine – Consultant, Human Rights and Governance; Member, WCG; Signatory, Women’s Memorandum
14. Murungi, Betty – Founder/Director, Urgent Action Fund – Africa; Member, WCG; Signatory, Women’s Memorandum
15. Ngesa, Mildred – Representative, Association of Media Women in Kenya; Member, WCG; Signatory, Women’s Memorandum
16. Njogu, Ann – Executive Director, Center for Rights Education and Awareness; Co-Convener, NCSC
17. Oloo, Irene – Executive Director, League of Kenyan Women Voters; Member, Vital Voices; Member, WCG
18. Ojiambo, Josephine – Member, PNU National Coordinating Committee; Founding Member, Center for Advancement of Women; Chair, Kenya Medical Women’s Association; Member, Vital Voices; Member, WCG; Signatory, Women’s Memorandum
19. Otieno, Gladwell – Convener, KPTJ; Executive Director/Founder; Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCog)
20. Onyango, Jane – Executive Director, Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) – Kenya; Member, WCG; Member, Vital Voices
22. Wandia, Mary – Women’s Rights Coordinator, Africa Secretariat of ActionAid International
23. Wanjala, Tecla – Deputy Chief of Party, Pact – Kenya; Member, WCG; Consultant, Japan International Cooperation Agency
24. Wanyeki, L. Muthoni – Executive Director, Kenya Human Rights Commission; Leader, KPTJ

The Philippines

1. Arguillas, Carol – Founder, MindaNews
2. Arnado, Mary Ann – Secretary General, Mindanao People’s Caucus
4. Busran-Lao, Yasmin – Negotiator, Government Negotiation Panel; Undersecretary of the OPAPP; Member, Nisa Ul Haqq Fi Bangsamoro
5. Coronel Ferrer, Miriam – Chief Negotiator, Government Negotiation Panel; Member, WE Act 1325; Co-Founder, Sulong CARHRIHL
6. de Dios, Aurora Javate – Co-Convener, Women’s Peace Table
8. Iqbal, Mohagher – Chair, MILF Negotiation Panel
10. Jover, Jo Genna – Member, WE Act 1325
11. Jajurie, Raissa – Legal Advisor, MILF Negotiation Panel; Co-Founder Nisa Ul Haqq Fi Bangsamoro
12. Lauzon-Gatmaytan, Carmen – Member, WE Act 1325
13. Leslie, Emma – Member, International Contact Group; Representative, Conciliation Resources
14. Mabanes, Omuhani – Member, Noorus Salam
15. Mendoza, Froilyn – Founder, Têduray Lambangian Women’s Organization
16. Nario-Galace, Jasmin – Leader, WE ACT 1325; Member, Steering Committee, Sulong CARHRIHL; Member, Philippine Action Network to Control Arms (PHILANCA),
17. Paraguya, Sylvia – Chief Executive Officer, National Confederation of the Cooperatives (NATCCO)
18. Rasul, Amina – President, Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID); Co-convener, Women’s Peace Table
19. Salapuddin, Fatmawati – Director, Lupah Sug Bangsamoro Women
20. Santiago, Irene – Convener, Women’s Peace Table; Founder, Mothers for Peace
21. Sarenas, Patricia – Chair, Mindanao Coalition of Development NGOs (MINCODE) and Caucus of Development NGOs (CODE-NGO)
22. Tanada, Karen – Director, Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute
23. Ugay, Analiza – Balay Rehabilitation Center; Member, WE ACT 1325; Member, Mindanao People’s Caucus
24. Wahab, Johaira – Legal Head, Government Negotiation Panel; Member, Nisa Ul Haqq Fi Bangsamoro
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Civil Society Members

1. Tell me a little bit about yourself. Where are you from? Where did you grow up and where were you educated? Why did you join/establish this organization? Describe what [name of organization] was trying to achieve. Who were you working on behalf of?
2. To what extent did the constituents change in the lifespan of this organization? In what way, if at all, did the structure change in the lifespan of the organization?
3. To what extent do you think you achieved your goals? How so? Why?
4. What activities and approaches did you use to try to gain access to formal peace negotiations? Did some of these activities and approaches change over time? In what way?
5. What tools and tactics were effective to maintain access over time? What tools and tactics did not work, in your opinion? Why?
6. To what extent do you think you tried to gain access to the formal peace negotiations?
7. How did you gain access to formal peace negotiations? Describe the nature of that access.
8. What would you consider to be your biggest obstacle in trying to gain access to formal peace negotiations? How did you (try to) overcome this obstacle?
9. What does meaningful participation in the peace negotiations mean to you?
10. Can you describe any issues that were important to you that you think were not paid attention to during the formal peace negotiations?
11. What difference do you think you made during the course of the formal peace process?
12. What impact do you think you made on the outcomes of the peace process?

Members of the Official Negotiation Teams and the International Mediators

1. Tell us a little bit about yourself. Where did you grow up? What is your educational background?
2. During the negotiation period, what were you doing professionally? Who were you representing? What did your role encompass? What were your goals?
3. To what extent do you think you achieved your goals? How so? Why?
4. Can you describe how, if at all, civil society engaged with the formal negotiations?
5. Was there a way for women in civil society to present their views and issues to the formal negotiation panel?
6. To what extent did you interact with women in civil society as part of the formal peace negotiations?
7. Were there any bilateral meetings between the negotiation panel and women in civil society? Did you ever personally meet with women’s organizations?
8. Do you think women were taken seriously by the negotiators? Why?
9. What, if any, impact did women have on the negotiations and the subsequent agreement?
10. Can you give an example of language or an issue that was included in the agreement that was largely there due to the inclusion of women in the negotiations?
11. Can you describe any issues that were important to you that you think were not paid attention to during the formal peace negotiations?
12. Do you think the peace agreement addressed the needs and experiences of women? How so?
13. What difference do you think women in civil society, who had access to the peace negotiations, made on the peace process and the outcomes of the peace process?
## APPENDIX D: TIMELINES

### NORTHERN IRELAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>NICRA established, one of a number of newly active civil rights groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Aug 12-14: ‘Battle of the Bogside,’ British Government sends troops to quell riots in Derry, riots erupt across Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Special Powers Act introduces policy of internment without trial for suspects of political violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Jan 30: ‘Bloody Sunday,’ British troops kill 13 protesters in Derry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>British Government suspends Stormont Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td><em>Sunningdale Agreement</em> signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>British and Irish Governments sign Anglo-Irish Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Fair Employment Act amended, aided by support for MacBride Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Dec 15: British Prime Minister and Irish Taoiseach issue Downing Street Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>IRA announces cessation of military activities, Combined Loyalist Military Command announces ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>First official meeting between Sinn Féin and British Government in 20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>“Twin-Track” process announced by British and Irish governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Clintons visit Belfast and call for peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>British and Irish Prime Ministers set date for Multi-Party talks, outline Mitchell Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>May 30: Forum Elections, UUP wins 30 seats, SDLP 21, DUP 24, Sinn Féin 17, AP 7, UKUP 3, PUP 2, UDP 2, NIWC 2, and Labour 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Jun 10: Multi-Party Talks begin at Stormont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Jun 14: Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue meets for the first time, excluding Sinn Féin after ceasefire breach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Jul 16: DUP and UKUP withdraw from Multi-Party Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Sep 15: Sinn Féin joins Multi-Party Talks after second IRA ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Apr 10: Good Friday Agreement signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>May 22: Good Friday Agreement referendum passed with 71.1% in favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Jun 25: Northern Ireland Assembly Elections. UUP wins 28 seats, SDLP 24, DUP 20, SF 18, AP 5, UKUP 5, PUP 2, NIWC 2, IU 1, UU 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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For a more comprehensive chronology of the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process, see the Ulster University Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN): http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron.htm
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>José Arévalo ousted military dictator Jorge Ubico during the democratic nationalist revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio ascended to power; institutionalized counterinsurgency against Communist-leaning rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>URNG formed by four leftist insurgent groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>GAM established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>CONAVIGUA established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Basic Agreement on the Search for Peace by Political Means (The Oslo Agreement) is signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Agreement on the Procedure for the Search for Peace by Political Means (The Mexico Agreement) signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Framework Agreement on Democratization in the Search for Peace by Political Means signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Agreement on the Resumption of Negotiations signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Agreement on a Timetable for Negotiations on a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>ASC established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Agreement on the Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Agreement for the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Agreement on the Identify and Rights of Indigenous People signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Agreement on Socio-economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Agreement on a Definitive Ceasefire signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace signed by the URNG and Government of Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Dec 27: General Election occurred; delay in announcement of results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Dec 29: ODM denounces the election; claims ballot boxes were rigged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Dec 20: Violence breaks out in Kisumu and spreads throughout Western Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Dec 30: Mwai Kibaki, member of the PNU Party, declared winner over Raila Odinga, member of the ODM Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Dec 30: Violence surges throughout Kenya, with the center of most of the violence occurring in the Rift Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Dec 31: CCP launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Jan 10-11: Women’s Consultative Group holds sessions at the Fairview Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Jan 24: Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga have face-to-face meeting &amp; handshake organized by efforts from Kofi Annan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Jan 25: Women’s Consultative Group presents the Women’s Memorandum to the Panel of Eminent African Personalities at the Serena Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Jan 29: ODM and PNU negotiating teams begin official discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Feb 28: Agreement on the Principles of Partnership signed by the Parties to the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation, through the mediation of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Mar 4: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Committee established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Mar 5: Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence established</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### THE PHILIPPINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>MNLF is formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Martial law declared in the Philippines by President Ferdinand Marcos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Tripoli Agreement between MNLF and Philippine Government representatives signed to create an autonomous region in 13 counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>MILF created after Hashim Salamat left the MNLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>President Aquino created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>MINCODE founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Agreement on the Final Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement signed by MNLF and Philippine Government representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Agreement for the General Cessation of Hostilities signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF, and peace talks begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>President Joseph Estrada suspends peace talks and issues “all out war” policy against MILF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Mindanao Commission on Women founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>President Gloria Arroyo restarts peace talks between the Government and MILF representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Peace talks suspended due to political tensions about President Arroyo’s suspected corruption and election rigging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Lupah Sug Bangsamoro Women founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Negotiations resume under President Aquino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>WE Act 1325 founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Declaration of Continuity for Peace Negotiation signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Prof. Miriam Coronel Ferrer appointed chair of Government Negotiation Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Transition Commission established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Basic Law approved by BTC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E: DIAGRAMS

Informal flow of ideas

Formalized flow of ideas

Transfer of People

NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

International Actors
Hillary Clinton
Jean Kennedy Smith
Kathleen Stephens

British Government
Mig Mowlam

George Mitchell Team
Martha Pope

Irish Government
Liz O’Donnell

Sinn Fein
Lucita Bhreatnach*
Barbire de Brun

SDLP
Brid Rodgers

Multi-Party Talks
Moderated by US Senator
George Mitchell, Culminated in
Good Friday Agreement, 1998

NIWC
Monica McWilliams*
Pearl Sagar*

Alliance
Eileen Bell

Labour

PUP
Dawn Purvis

Academic/Training Institutions

Peace Organizations

Women’s Movement

Community Women’s Centers

Other Civil Society groups

Women at the Northern Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue
Unionist: UUP: May Steele [1/30], DUP: May Beattie, Joan Parkes, Iris Robinson [3/24], UKUP: [0/3], PUP: [0/2], UDP: [0/2]
Cross-Community: Alliance: Eileen Bell [1/7], Labour: [0/2], NIWC: Monica McWilliams, Pearl Sagar [2/2]
*Sinn Fein was expelled from the Forum
*Official Delegates at the Multi-Party Talks
KENYA PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Religious Groups
ACCK

Private Sector
KEPSA
KAM

Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP)

Development NGOs

ODM

Vital Voices

NCSC

Women’s Consultation Group

Kenyans for Peace With Truth and Justice (KPTJ)

Panel of Eminent African Personalities
Kofi Annan, Graça Machel, Benjamin Mkapa

PNU
Martha Karua

Formal Mediation culminated in 2008 power-sharing agreement

ODM
Sally Kosgei
THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

International Contact Group
Emma Leslie

Office of the Presidential Advisor of the Peace Process
Teresita Quintos Deles

Peace Negotiations Culminated in 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro

MILF PANEL
Raissa Jajurie (Legal Adviser)

GPH PANEL
Miriam Coronel Ferrer
Yasmin Busran-Lao

WE ACT 1325

MinCODE
CODE-NGO

Observers

Malaysian Facilitator

PILIPINA

Women & Gender Institute
Sulong CARHRIHL
Al-Mujadiyah Development Foundation

Mindanao People’s Caucus
Noorus Salam
Mindanao Commission on Women
Lupah Sugong Women
Balay Rehabilitasyon Center
Téduay & Lambangian Women Organization
Gaston Ortigas Institute

PCID
Nisa ul Haqq
A close examination of women’s political participation in peace processes in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines

Published by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security
Funded by the Ford Foundation

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