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**POLICY TENSIONS RELATED TO
GENDER AND PEACEKEEPING:
THE NEED FOR A TWO-LEVEL GAME**

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PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

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Policy Tensions Related to Gender and Peacekeeping: The Need for a Two-Level Game

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Introduction

In 2015, the UN marked the 15th anniversary of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 by launching a global study of the resolution's implementation. Many civil society organizations (CSOs) provided input. The study highlighted good practices, gaps, emerging trends, and priorities for further action² and took stock of successes and challenges in implementing 1325. With respect to successes, there is an enhanced legal framework for addressing sexual violence in conflict, such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002). There is also improved institutional infrastructure for gender mainstreaming, including: more gender units and advisers; a UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict; and monitoring and response mechanisms in place to respond to sexual violence. Further, National Action Plans on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) have been developed in 54 countries.

Despite these achievements, those working on women, peace and security often report that gender is still treated as an “add-on” issue rather than integrated into all aspects of peace and security operations and processes.³ On peacekeeping, the global study concluded efforts remain “piecemeal and limited” and are “more often pilot projects and special initiatives” than programs that affect “the core business of the whole operation. They lack consistent support from mission leadership, representing more of a tick-box obligation rather than a concrete tool to enhance the operational effectiveness of UN peacekeeping.”⁴

Indeed, there is still a long way to go. Women continue to be underrepresented at top levels of decision-making and negotiations related to peace and security. According to a UN Women study that compiled data from 31 different peace processes (from 1992 to 2011), fewer than four percent of signatories to peace agreements were women. Women also comprised fewer than four percent of participants and fewer than 10 percent of negotiators at peace talks.⁵ The proportion of female soldiers and police deployed on peacekeeping missions is rising,⁶ especially in police units, but is still far from target levels.⁷ As of December 2016, about 10 percent of police and three percent of military deployed to UN peacekeeping missions were women.⁸

Although there has been an increase in high-level attention given to conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), and more institutional mechanisms have been put in place to prevent and address CRSV, rates have not clearly decreased.⁹ This does not mean that these efforts are totally ineffective;¹⁰ it does suggest that more is needed. The data also do not support optimistic conclusions concerning sexual violence committed by peacekeepers and humanitarian workers, and it is not clear that rates have decreased, that reporting has increased, or that troop contributing countries (TCCs) are doing a better job investigating and responding to reports of sexual violence.¹¹

This paper has three objectives. First, I consider key gender assumptions¹² underlying certain gender mainstreaming initiatives. These assumptions are especially evident in the field of peacekeeping but are also found in broader efforts to implement 1325. To move forward, I suggest that policy and programmatic proposals to promote the women, peace and security agenda should identify and corroborate the gender assumptions that underpin their proposals. Second, I identify two tensions associated with gender assumptions for 1325 implementation: one between research and advocacy, and the second, between responding to and reproducing

gender norms. Third, to address these tensions, I argue that gender mainstreaming should engage a **two-level game**¹³ by considering possible policy responses to current gender pressures and norms while simultaneously working to transform these gender parameters. One key question when integrating gender into peace and security processes and institutions concerns how revolutionary gender integration should be. Should gender norms be mainstreamed or eliminated? Should policy acknowledge gendered needs and pressures, or debunk them, and is it possible to do both?


This paper argues that the implementation of 1325 has too often focused on the first level game (responding to current gender pressures) to the detriment of more transformative second level gains. There has been insufficient attention and debate concerning gender ideals and end-goals. For example, what does a fully gender-mainstreamed peacekeeping operation look like?

The Integration of Gender Norms and Essentialism

For over a decade, feminist scholars and activists have expressed concerns with the gendered ideas underlying efforts to integrate women and mainstream gender into peace and security operations and institutions.¹⁴ Often, assumptions are made regarding the skills and characteristics that women can bring to peace and security and the expected impact of their participation, in tandem with assumptions about men. For example, the notion that women are better listeners is comparative, and assumes certain deficits and gendered attributes of men (i.e., men are less effective listeners and less patient or empathetic). One common assumption is that women will be better at responding to other women and children and will be likelier to ensure the interests of women and children are heard and reflected. This belief relates to women's assumed skill sets as well as to expectations concerning how they will be received. The idea is

that women, and children as well, will perceive female soldiers and peacekeepers as more trustworthy and approachable than male personnel, and will therefore communicate with them more effectively.

Figure 1: “Women in Peacekeeping: A Growing Force” (UN Department for Peacekeeping)



As depicted in **Figure 1** above,¹⁵ UN Peacekeeping (UN DPKO) argues that the presence of female peacekeepers is beneficial for four reasons; two pertain to the impact of female peacekeepers on women, one relates to their expected influence on women and children, and the other hints at women’s unique capacity to promote peace. UN DPKO does mention that “women peacekeepers have proven that they can perform the same roles, to the same standards and under the same difficult conditions, as their male counterparts.”¹⁶ Women are assumed to have the

capacity to do all that men can do and more—that is, apply their comparative advantage in looking after women and children to peace and security operations. Gender integration in this case means involving women in ways in which they supposedly perform best while at the same time not discouraging them from other operational roles.

The list of tasks that women arguably perform best is quite long. The UN DPKO suggests that “increased recruitment of women is critical for: empowering women in the host community; addressing the specific needs of female ex-combatants during the process of demobilizing and reintegration into civilian life; helping make the peacekeeping force approachable to women in the community; interviewing survivors of gender-based violence; mentoring female cadets at police and military academies; and interacting with women in societies where women are prohibited from speaking to men.”¹⁷ The presence of women peacekeepers is also believed “to reduce conflict and confrontation, provide a greater sense of security to local populations, including women and children, and broaden the skill set available within a peacekeeping mission.”¹⁸

Similar gendered claims have been made in media coverage on female peacekeepers. A *New York Times* article on female peacekeeping suggested that women’s “softer approach”¹⁹ to peacekeeping efforts in Liberia was a critical factor in reducing sexual abuse:

In 2004, a U.N. report criticized peacekeepers in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti for the sexual abuse of young women by trading food and money for sex. In 2005, 47 peacekeepers were accused of sexual abuse in Liberia, compared with 18 peacekeepers who were accused last year, according to the U.N. mission. Top U.N. officials credit the arrival of women for helping improve behavior.²⁰

A 2015 article published by *The Guardian* titled, “Are Women Better Peacekeepers? These UN Officers Think So,” echoes these sentiments. The article recounts interviews with female leaders and peacekeepers who believe that women make better peacekeepers because of certain gendered assets,²¹ such as being better listeners and more responsive to civilians.²² “What a woman brings to the task is extra sensitivity, more caring,” President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf²³ said in an interview. “I think that these are the characteristics that come from being a mother, taking care of a family, being concerned about children, and managing the home.”²⁴ In support of female peacekeepers operating in the southern Philippines, the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process, Teresita Deles, similarly remarked: “As mothers, the first practice for women is taking care of their children and disciplining their husbands. In resolving conflicts within the family, where the basis is love and fairness for all, the women are able to draw on this rare ability to resolve the conflict.”²⁵

There are four problems with relying on these assumptions and perceived gender assets for gender mainstreaming. First, they have not been thoroughly corroborated. To date, there has been little evidence that the presence of women on peacekeeping operations changes the attitudes of male peacekeepers.²⁶ Moreover, although the UN and others have suggested that increasing the number of female peacekeepers reduces sexual exploitation and abuse,²⁷ there is not extensive research to support the claim.²⁸ While it is true that there has not been a single case of a female peacekeeper accused of sexual abuse,²⁹ there have been cases of women ignoring and covering up sexual abuse committed by peacekeepers and of failing to stop abuse.³⁰ Moreover, there have been instances of female soldiers perpetrating sexual abuse in other military operations.³¹

A second criticism is that these assumptions are essentialist, relying heavily on gender stereotypes. For over a decade, scholars and practitioners have had misgivings about essentialist advocacy to support 1325 implementation.³² “Gender mainstreaming documents and practices tend to rely on essentialized notions of women as.... inherently peaceful,” Johanna Velenius has argued, and “the participation of women in peacekeeping forces is promoted on the basis of an alleged pacifying effect on their male colleagues. As a result, traditional gender roles are reinforced and the variations in masculinities and femininities are ignored.”³³ Nadine Puechguirbal, a UN gender adviser and now coordinator of UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, has likewise suggested that the language of UN documents “perpetuates rather than challenges gender stereotypes.”³⁴

Third, gender mainstreaming based on notions of comparative gender advantages tends to place the burden of addressing gender issues (such as reducing sexual exploitation and abuse, and ensuring women and men are equal players in security operations) on women. This leaves “the men who comprise that vast majority of personnel members ... out of the equation.”³⁵ Additionally, it fails to recognize that addressing gender problems³⁶ likely requires a gender (and not just women-focused) solution. For instance, in a ceasefire-monitoring program in the southern Philippines, the terms of reference for three non-governmental organizations responsible for civilian protection and ceasefire monitoring were identical. Each organization was responsible to assist with, and report on, civilian protection in their geographical jurisdiction. However, in practice, one group – an all-female unit – had to field requests by other organizations to respond to gender-based violence even if it occurred outside their area. “Our assignment is geographical,” the head of the all-female unit explained “but because of cultural

reasons women often do not speak about these issues to men, and men are uncomfortable dealing with these issues at all.”³⁷

Finally, as I will discuss below, policy and programs that rely on gendered assumptions risk reproducing gender stereotypes and expectations.

Two Tensions Associated with UNSCR 1325 Implementation

This section elaborates upon the problems associated with the gender assumptions underpinning 1325 and shows how they result in two tensions for the policy and practice of gender mainstreaming: one between research and advocacy, and the second between responding to and reproducing gender norms.

The Tension Between Research and Advocacy

One consequence of basing advocacy for female inclusion on gendered assumptions is that research probing the veracity of these assumptions is perceived as undermining efforts to include women in peace and security. Moreover, there is a concern that female peacekeepers, military, and police already face far more scrutiny than men and research questions concerning their effectiveness or impact will add to this skepticism. As one UN DPKO official argued (in response to research on all-female peacekeeping contingents): “Nobody has really asked what is the effectiveness of an all-male unit, so why do people ask what is the effectiveness of an all-female unit? I felt we had gone beyond the question of why women should participate, it is just a right that women should participate, full stop.”³⁸ A leader of an all-female peacekeeping contingent similarly asked: “Why is women's participation in any formal peace and security

structure always put into question? Why should women bear the burden of proving they can make a difference while men ... have long been making a total mess of our security situation?”³⁹

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations gender officer quoted above is correct that women have a right to participate, and this right should not be conditional on effectiveness.⁴⁰ At the same time, research, including sex-disaggregated research, on variables related to effectiveness is essential for the implementation of 1325 and the subsequent success of peacekeeping operations. This research is also necessary to consider whether the assumptions underlying advocacy as well as practice (for example, choosing a female peacekeeper over a male to respond to a gender-based violence case) can be corroborated.

Insight into whether female and male peacekeepers perform similar tasks on peacekeeping missions and if they have distinct impacts on achieving various mission objectives is critical for understanding the gender pressures of peacekeeping. For example, are women likelier to respond to the concerns of civilian women than are male personnel? And if so, is this because they feel an implicit expectation to carry out this task (and men do not)? Or, is communication with civilian women and children explicit in their terms of reference? The implementation of 1325 will be hamstrung if such gender pressures remain unknown. Gender mainstreaming cannot occur without understanding the role that gender norms and expectations play in peace and security operations. Ironically, advocating for women’s inclusion by referring to the positive impact of their participation may inhibit a deeper understanding of the ways in which gender biases and gender pressures might be frustrating women’s full and equal participation. This paper argues that research on the effectiveness of both male and female peacekeepers is needed not to support advocacy *per se* but to understand how best to mainstream gender in operations and institutions. There needs to be more rigorous understanding of how men

and women are treated on deployments, whether they have different roles (formal and informal), how they respond to different gendered expectations, and whether they have distinct effects on the mission and its objectives.

Suppose that a study found that in fact female peacekeepers do not bring specific (gendered) assets to peacekeeping missions (for example, that they are not better at responding to female civilians or halting sexual violence), or that the data suggest they are less effective than male peacekeepers in certain ways. Although this might come across as a blow to UN implementation or as unsupportive of the gender, peace and security agenda, in reality it could do the opposite.⁴¹ If research suggests that women are ineffective in certain ways or on specific missions or under certain conditions, this finding likely reveals more about men than about women and even more about gender norms than anything else.⁴² Women generally comprise about four percent of those deployed on peacekeeping missions. Their experience will be significantly shaped by how the other 96 percent respond to their presence and work with them on the ground. Women often face challenges such as gender discrimination, skepticism, harassment, token roles, and gender-based violence that might influence their effectiveness as peacekeepers.⁴³ Female and male peacekeepers navigate gender expectations during their deployments that emanate from each other, from their commanding staff, and from the communities in which they work. These expectations could influence their effectiveness on specific peacekeeping tasks (and whether they are encouraged or allowed to carry out these tasks).

The Tension between Responding to, and Reproducing Gender Norms

Another tension that arises when implementing the gender, peace and security agenda concerns how policies and programs respond to gendered pressures and needs without reinforcing them. Even if the gender assumptions described earlier in the paper are true, by giving women and men positions that exploit these gendered assets, the cycle of gender socialization continues, and gender norms are re-constituted.

Training programs designed to exploit women's gendered comparative advantages provide a clear example of gender norms being reproduced by programs initiated on behalf of 1325. In *Female Peacekeepers Take the Helm, to End Gender-Based Violence*,⁴⁴ UN Women discussed a pilot project to train female military officers to prevent and address CRSV. "The course is very important for the female officers," one participant explained, "not only are we recycling all the knowledge considering our experience on the ground but ... it also opens our mind to the future, in terms of female inclusion in peacekeeping operations."⁴⁵ A high-level representative from UN Women argued that, "courses like these will bring more women forward and upward in the ranks to challenge the stereotypes and biases that have kept their numbers small and their roles limited."⁴⁶

Based on similar rationale, Ireland has trained all-female units that can be deployed to UN peacekeeping missions where sexual violence rates are especially high.⁴⁷ Ireland's Minister of Defense Simon Coveney explained,

... what we have in mind is to respond to a request from the United Nations to be able to embed female-only units in other larger peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world where gender-based violence is a major part of conflict, and in support of conflict management in post-conflict situations where, unfortunately for all sorts of reasons,

whether it be tradition or religion, women can do things that men cannot do, with suffering populations who are trying to rebuild their lives after conflict.⁴⁸

This paper suggests that before developing training programs and policies that exploit gendered comparative advantages, there should be more reflection on whether these and other gender norms should serve as a foundation for male and female inclusion in peace and security operations. The question is whether gendered comparative advantages should be utilized or challenged by programming and practice on behalf of 1325. To answer this question, there needs to be more specification of the gender ideals for peacekeeping operations. If training of women to prevent and respond to sexual violence continues, this will be the path charted for “female inclusion in peacekeeping operations.”⁴⁹ Instead of confronting “stereotypes and biases,”⁵⁰ however, peacekeeping operations would exploit gender stereotypes that they play a part in reproducing.

If we accept that women are more skillful or comfortable than men at responding to conflict-related sexual violence,⁵¹ the policy conclusion could be that men need more training than women on these issues, not less. According to 1325, policy should aim to mainstream gender across all operational functions related to peace and security, and all parties should be engaged in this effort—not just women, human rights activists, and feminists, but also soldiers and fighters, and both women and men. Male soldiers need to see prevention and response to sexual violence as a critical part of their job as soldiers, on par with other tasks such as uncovering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and collecting intelligence.

One strategy for doing this is to reposition the issue of addressing CRSV and military sexual assault as critical to military and foreign policy objectives. An extensive body of research shows how CRSV not only devastates individuals and families but also chips away at the

bedrock that communities need to build lasting peace.⁵² CRSV is also used by militant and terrorist groups as a weapon of war, serving strategic purposes similar to other weapons and tactics that are given more priority in military training and decision-making. Rape and sexual violence are used to exert control, overpower, and devastate communities by spreading fear and hatred. Its widespread use alters the calculus and trajectory of warring parties, and the war itself. Gender-based violence within militaries and police units threatens the cohesion, morale, and emotional and physical well-being of personnel, thereby compromising the effectiveness of security initiatives, peacekeeping missions, and combat operations. Indeed, for many of these reasons President Obama rightly identified military sexual assault as a national security threat.⁵³

A complication associated with making CRSV every soldier's equal responsibility is that female victims of this violence, especially if they were abused by men, or male soldiers, may prefer to report this violence to a woman, or feel more comfortable around female soldiers.⁵⁴ It may also be culturally awkward or against certain religious doctrines or norms for men to speak about sexual issues with women. Even if a female soldier has little personal interest or awareness of sexual violence issues, even if she is not especially compassionate or sensitive to victims of violence, even if she herself is aggressive or violent, she may be *perceived* as more approachable or trustworthy from the perspective of a female victim of violence than a male soldier.⁵⁵ As suggested above, this female soldier may be assumed to have a wide range of gendered skills and attributes, even if she does not actually possess them.

The use of male-female teams to respond to sexual violence issues and for gender training is one way to respond to certain gender needs and realities,⁵⁶ while buffering their reproduction. With a male-female team, the opportunity for female victims of violence to speak to a female soldier is safeguarded. At the same time, by placing men on equal footing in

institutional responses to sexual violence, a powerful message is sent: men can and should be at the forefront of efforts to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence. Further, there should be more opportunities within peace and security institutions for men to gain this expertise.

Tensions are also evident when developing policy and programs that respond to gender pressures and gendered divisions of labor, such as those related to caregiving responsibilities. For example, reports of female peacekeepers often refer to the challenges women experience being away from their children and families during long deployments. In the documentary, *A Journey of a Thousand Miles: Peacekeepers*, tearful female peacekeepers from Bangladesh (deployed to Haiti) read letters from their children, commenting that the separation from them was one of the hardest parts of the mission.⁵⁷ A *New York Times* journalist in a series on female peacekeepers reported that, “some women have found the challenge of leading a life far from their family too daunting. As female participation grows, that issue will be critical for the United Nations, which is considering shorter, more flexible rotations.”⁵⁸

In most troop contributing countries, women are the primary caregivers for children, as well as other dependents. Policy that recognizes the pressures female peacekeepers may face while deployed due to caregiving and other responsibilities at home must be considered but, at the same time, policy interventions need to be careful to ensure problematic gender pressures are not re-constituted. If shorter and more flexible rotations are adopted to help female peacekeepers (and female peacekeepers alone) achieve a better work-life balance, in reality it may further entrench women in the “life” part of the work-life balance, and disadvantage them at “work”. Shorter and more flexible rotations⁵⁹ would likely make it even more difficult for peacekeepers

to effectively do their jobs, and might give women less experience and seniority and fewer promotion possibilities.⁶⁰

Indeed, even by asking female peacekeepers (and only female peacekeepers) about their children, and how they balance being both a mother and a peacekeeper, gender norms are reproduced. There are very few (if any) publications that ask male peacekeepers about the impact of their deployment on fatherhood or other family commitments, or if they would prefer shorter rotations due to caregiver responsibilities. Some (and not just peacekeepers and not just men) might find such questions to be culturally insensitive or comical. By asking both men and women questions concerning how they juggle caregiving responsibilities, would the UN be perceived as just trying to find out more about peacekeepers' other pressures and obligations? Or would they be understood to be taking a more normative and potentially controversial stance, such as, that women and men should be engaged, and perhaps equally so, in caregiver responsibilities?

The discussion above illuminates the limitations of seeing gender mainstreaming as a technical activity. Too often, gender mainstreaming is understood as a process that involves tacking gender onto existing power structures, positions, and norms, without unsettling them. Effective gender mainstreaming will often require new learning, the undoing of biases, critical reflection, and debate.

Disentangling the Agenda, and the Need for Gender Destabilizing Approaches

This paper argues that programs and policies on behalf of the gender, peace and security agenda should identify and, if possible, corroborate any gender assumptions, such as those

concerning gendered comparative advantages, needs and pressures. What happens after these gender assumptions have been identified and potentially corroborated? They should be addressed at two levels.⁶¹ The first level considers and potentially employs gendered comparative advantages and responds to existing gender pressures. The second level aims to counter the reproduction of these norms and pressures (should they be deemed problematic, and this will itself be a contested question), and to transform these underlying gender realities. The proposal for male-female teams to address CRSV rather than all-female contingents designed for this purpose comes out of this two-level analysis.

This proposal recognizes gendered pressures and needs (such as that female victims may want to speak with female police officers). Yet, it moves beyond these needs and demonstrates that men, too, should be engaged in responses to gender-based violence. The recognition that both female and male peacekeepers could have (or perhaps should have) caregiving and family responsibilities in their home countries (as mothers and fathers, sons and daughters, etc.) also reflects a two-level analysis. A program based only on the first level, for example, might only give training and support to female peacekeepers regarding managing commitments from home while deployed, and might only consider shorter deployments (or family leave issues) for female peacekeepers. Not all programs or policies will need to engage both levels. However, many more of them should; it is hoped that this analytical exercise will help to find creative policy alternatives that respond to gendered needs, without blindly recreating them.

Two-level analysis requires a clear understanding of the end-goals and ideals for gender mainstreaming. It is unlikely that policy will advance this vision if it is unknown. What does a 100 percent gender-mainstreamed and gender-integrated peacekeeping mission look like? The numbers are the most straightforward; the ideal mission would probably have close to a 50/50

ratio of women and men, although achieving precise gender balancing matters less than the types of jobs that women and men are doing, and at what level.

If the ultimate objective is to have women and men engage in all aspects of peace and security, and to serve in roles where they have typically been under-represented, this means that advocacy, programming, and policy will need to focus on reshaping, rather than exploiting, gender norms. This paper does not offer a comprehensive discussion of policy options for engaging men and women in fields and tasks where they have been under-represented, or for destabilizing and altering all of the gender norms of peace and security operations. Instead, this concluding section will focus on one issue—military recruitment—as a way to illustrate some of the policy and programmatic shifts that might be required, and the questions that need to be asked.

Analysis at the first level with respect to military recruitment would focus on current gender-related needs and pressures that might affect recruitment and retention of women, i.e., are women satisfied with policies related to maternity leave in the military? Are there promotion opportunities open to women? This level of analysis would also consider the specific recruitment needs for women within the military given the gender issues related to its operations. For example, US Marine Female Engagement Teams were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct body searches of women at checkpoints and to communicate with civilian women.

The second level of analysis would be more transformative and focus on debunking certain gendered expectations and pressures for women and men in the military (rather than just responding to them) and look at engaging women and men in ways that do not necessarily conform to gender norms. Gender stereotypes have potentially hidden the possibility that there may be women already strong enough, and men already ‘gender-sensitive’ enough to carry out

tasks in military and peacekeeping operations – jobs too readily assumed to be sex-specific. Indeed, recruiters may overlook the best candidates.

One way to increase the visibility and representation of women in certain occupations of the military known to be physically demanding is to proactively recruit women who are capable and interested in fulfilling the terms of reference of these positions. One of the concerns with opening combat positions to women is that they will not have the strength, endurance or physical (and emotional) toughness for the job.⁶² This has led to debates concerning whether fitness requirements should be changed and concerns that a lowering of standards might compromise military effectiveness. Yet it is not clear that the military has sufficiently worked to recruit women who would likely meet current fitness and strength requirements. Without doubt, there are many tough, physical, and athletic women who could potentially pass the requirements of military training.

Similarly, to increase the number of men focused and engaged in implementing tasks that are generally associated with women, militaries and police forces would work to hire male social workers, psychologists and others with strong skill sets for sexual abuse prevention and other gender issues. The UN and other players, including troop contributing countries, would try to recruit men that are qualified to serve as gender advisers and protection officers—men who have taken gender courses and who perhaps never imagined themselves stepping into a police or military recruitment office. Military recruitment would be reconfigured as a rewarding and fulfilling place for men with these different skill sets. For instance, recruitment advertisements might still show men jumping out of helicopters (as well as women, per the discussion above), but might also show men actively engaged in roles and activities that require sensitivity, analysis,

compassion, and listening. The military and police would convey the message that men with these skills are an essential part of an effective, disciplined and well-run military.

This paper calls for more thoughtful and purposeful handling of gender norms when implementing 1325. Peace and security operations should potentially exploit gendered comparative advantages and be responsive to gendered pressures. The critical point is that this is not all they should do. Instead, gender mainstreaming should operate at two levels. Creative policy and programming can respond to gender realities and pressures and at the same time consider opportunities for overturning problematic gender norms. Without this two-level analysis, the above policy tensions associated with gender will continue to hinder progress and few strides will be made in implementing the gender, peace and security agenda.

Notes

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² UN Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace. A Global Study on the Implementation of 1325* (New York: UN Women, 2015) <http://wps.unwomen.org/en> (Accessed January 17, 2016)

³ The idea that gender is added on to agendas and programs rather than integrated was mentioned in many of the review documents of 1325. I have also heard this voiced in my own research interviews, and it was widely expressed at a *Bridging Theory and Practice Workshop* which brought practitioners and academics working on gender and peacekeeping to the Georgetown Institute of Women, Peace and Security in March 2016.

⁴ UN Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 144-5.

⁵ UN Women, *UN Women Sourcebook on Women, Peace and Security* (New York: UN Women 2012): 5-6. <http://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2012/10/un-women-sourcebook-on-women-peace-and-security> (Accessed January 23, 2017).

⁶ The total proportion of women deployed in December 2016 was 4.1%. In 2006, the number was 1.6%. UN Peacekeeping, Gender Statistics and UN Peacekeeping, *DPKO/OMA Statistical Report on Female Military and Police Personnel*. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/gender_scores1325_chart.pdf

⁷ Ban Ki Moon launched a campaign in August 2009 to try to reach 20% women in police units, and 10% military by 2014. IRIN, "Women Peacekeepers – More Needed," IRIN, May 20, 2010, Accessed January 23, 2017. <http://www.irinnews.org/feature/2010/05/20/women-un-peacekeepers-more-needed>

⁸ UN Peacekeeping, *Gender Statistics* (United Nations, December 2016). <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/gender/2016gender/dec16.pdf>

⁹ For a helpful discussion of this question, see Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordås, "Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, Introducing the SVAC dataset, 1989-2009," *Journal of Peace Research* 51.3 (2014): 424.

¹⁰ We do not know what the rates of violence would be in the absence of these interventions. For example, it is possible that these interventions have reduced certain spikes in violence or that the rates would be even higher in their absence.

¹¹ UN Women, "Tracking Implementation of Security Resolution 1325 (2000)," *UN Women Sourcebook on Women, Peace and Security* (2012): 8.

¹² By gender assumptions, I am referring to characteristics or attributes that are accepted as true or as certain to occur without sufficient proof, and that are ascribed to women and men just because they are women and men. Examples of these and how they factor into gender mainstreaming efforts will be discussed below in the section "The Integration of Gender Norms and Essentialism."

¹³ Two-level games, a concept introduced by Robert Putnam in the 1980s, refers to a game-theoretical model of reality that views international negotiations between states as consisting of simultaneous negotiations at both the intra-national (domestic) level and the international level (between states). These negotiations impact each other, and international negotiations depend on the interplay of the two levels. See Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (1998): 427–460. Putnam's 'two-level game' concept has been used in gender-related work to model negotiations related to employment (with the levels referring to the employer level and domestic partner level of negotiations). See Hannah Riley Bowles' and Kathleen L. McGinn's paper, "Gender in Job Negotiations: A Two Level Game." *HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP08-027* (2008).

<https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=5739> In this paper, I am proposing the use of a 'two-level game' analytical model to demarcate different domains of gender pressures and norms that (similar to Putnam's model, and Bowles application) intersect and influence each other.

¹⁴ There is a substantial body of work that questions the gendered norms and assumptions underlying war and security policy, and that offers suggestions for more substantial transformation and gender integration (for example, see Cynthia Enloe, Jean Bethke Elshain, Rebecca Grant, Sandra Harding, Nancy Harstock, Jill Steans, and Christine Sylvester).

¹⁵ Figure 1 is excerpted from UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), “Women in Peacekeeping,” <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml>, Accessed January 18, 2016.

¹⁶ UN DPKO, “Women in Peacekeeping”

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Doreen Carvajal, “Female Approach to Peacekeeping,” *New York Times*, March 5, 2010.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ These assets have often been assumed to be the result of a gendered division of labor. The idea is that through their role as caregivers, women have gained distinctive skills that will make them better peacekeepers. Other explanations that have been given for gendered differentiation in skill sets include those related to gender socialization, gendered perceptions of success and aptitude for certain tasks (including gendered perceptions of oneself), and evolutionary biology.

²² Simon Allison, “Are Women Better Peacekeepers? These UN Officers Think So.” *Daily Maverick*, part of The Guardian Africa network, 17 September 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/women-better-peacekeepers-un-officers-think-so>

²³ Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was the first female to be democratically elected as head of state in Africa. She is also a 2011 Nobel Laureate Peace Prize winner.

²⁴ Carvajal, “Female Approach to Peacekeeping.”

²⁵ See Dateline Philippines, “All-Women Peacekeepers Pledge 24/7 Protection,” *PeaceWomen*, October 5, 2010, Accessed November 15, 2014. www.peacewomen.org/news_article.php?id=2070&type=news

²⁶ Olivera Simic, “Does the Presence of Women Really Matter? Towards Combating Male Sexual Violence in Peacekeeping Operations,” *International Peacekeeping*, 17.2 (2010): 189.

²⁷ Donna Bridges and Debbie Horsfall, “Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping: Toward a Gender-Balanced Force,” *Armed Forces & Society* 36.1 (2009).

²⁸ This does not mean that it is not true. Higher numbers of female peacekeepers may be correlated with lower rates of sexual violence. In my view there is not enough definitive research at the current time to suggest that this is the case, or to rule it out (policy should therefore certainly be cautious with this assumption). Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley have argued that gender equality norms of troop contributing countries are a more powerful predictor of rates of sexual exploitation and violence than the presence of females on the mission (“Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 53.1 [2015]).

²⁹ UN Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 141.

³⁰ An investigation into sexual abuse of children by peacekeepers in the Central African Republic, for example, found Carman Lapointe had “abused her authority” in launching an investigation of a whistleblower concerning the abuse. Susana Malcorra and Joan Dubinsky were two other high-level UN officials who were found to have “mishandled” the response to the allegations. See Colum Lynch, “The UN Official Who Blew the Lid On Central African Republic Sex Scandal Vindicated,” *Foreign Policy*, Dec. 17, 2015. Flavia Pansieri, UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights at the time of the abuse, admitted to not paying enough attention to the accusations of assault. AP, “UN Human Rights Official Resigns over Central African Republic Child Sexual Abuse,” *The Guardian*, 22 July 2015, Accessed January 20, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/22/un-rights-official-resigns-central-african-republic-child-abuse>

³¹ See Dara Kay Cohen, “Female Combatants and the Perpetration of Violence: Wartime Rape in the Sierra Leone Civil War,” *World Politics* 65.3 (July 2013), and Laura Sjørberg and Caron E. Gentry, *Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics* (London: Zed Books, 2007).

³² Cheryl Hendriks (2015), “Women, peace and security in Africa,” *African Security Review*, 24: 4. ; Mary Daly (2005), “Gender Mainstreaming in Theory and Practice,” *Social Politics*, 12: 3. ; Simić, “Does the Presence of Women Really Matter? Towards Combating Male Sexual Violence in Peacekeeping Operations.”

³³ Velenius, “A Few Kind Women,” 510.

³⁴ Nadine Puechguirbal, “Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A Textual Analysis of UN Documents,” *International Peacekeeping* 17.2 (2010): 172.

³⁵ Karim & Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” 104.

³⁶ They are gender problems because they have to do with social expectations of women and men (that are shaping perceptions of both women and men vis-à-vis each other and themselves), gender relations and power dynamics between women and men, and ideas of femininity and masculinity and how they are ascribed to peace and security tasks as suggested above.

³⁷ Interview with Mary Ann Arnado, March 11, 2011, Davao, Philippines.

³⁸ Interview with Policy Gender Officer, Strategic Policy and Development Section, UN DPKO, Feb. 5, 2015.

³⁹ Mary Ann Arnado, *A Victory for Women, A Reason to Celebrate* (Philippines: Isis International, 12 April 2011). http://www.isiswomen.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1456:a-victory-for-women-a-reason-to-celebrate&catid=20&Itemid=449

⁴⁰ As outlined above, however, the UN DPKO does claim that in many respects female peacekeepers are more effective than men in advocating for women’s inclusion.

⁴¹ This relates to broader arguments on the politics of statistics and research. In the field of gender and conflict, see Dara Kay Cohen and Amelia Hoover Green, “Dueling Incentives: Sexual Violence in Liberia and the Politics of Human Rights Advocacy,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 49.3 (2012): 445-458, which questioned the data of sexual violence as reported by the UN and others in Liberia.

⁴² The fact that female peacekeepers are often a small percentage of uniformed personnel (majority—minority dynamics) will also influence gender dynamics. Further, gender intersects with other variables such as class, race, and training that affect the experience and treatment of peacekeepers on mission.

⁴³ It is important to mention that men also face these challenges, including sexual abuse and exploitation. The numbers of men who have been victims is difficult to know given under-reporting and the fact that gender-based violence is still generally viewed as a problem involving male perpetrators and female victims, rendering those who fall outside of this binary invisible. For example, there is evidence to suggest that humanitarian workers overlook this possibility, and men are less likely to be asked if they have been victims of sexual assault or harassment. Ellen Anna Philo Garris, “Invisible Victims? Where Are Male Victims of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in International Law and Policy?” *European Journal of Women’s Studies*, 22.4 (2015): 412-427, and Sandesh Sivakumaran, “Lost in Translation: UN Responses to Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Situations of Armed Conflict,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 92.877 (2010): 259-277.

⁴⁴ UN Women, “Female Peacekeepers Take the Helm to End Gender-Based Violence,” *UN Women*, 28 April 2015, Accessed November 22, 2016. <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/5/female-peacekeepers-take-the-helm#sthash.TZkNhlqZ.dpuf>

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Peter Murtagh. “Coalition to create all-female units for some UN operations.” *Irish Times*, Nov 13, 2015, Accessed May 23, 2016, <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/coalition-to-create-all-female-units-for-some-un-operations-1.2427856>

⁴⁸ Murtagh, *Irish Times*.

⁴⁹ UN Women, “Female Peacekeepers Take the Helm.”

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ As suggested earlier in the paper, the extent to which this assumption is true, and under what conditions, is largely unknown.

⁵² See the Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, *Annotated Bibliography on Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict* (Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights, 2012) Accessed January 23, 2017 https://genderandsecurity.org/sites/default/files/sexual_violence_and_armed_conflict_annot_bib.pdf

⁵³ Bryant Jordan, “Obama: Sexual Assault Threatens National Security,” *Military.com Network*, May 17, 2013, Accessed October 31, 2016 <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/05/17/obama-sexual-assault-threatens-national-security.html>

⁵⁴ It is widely thought that women are far likelier to be victims of CRSV than men, and men likelier than women to be perpetrators. The extent to which this is the case is unclear as there is no accurate sex-disaggregated data on

perpetrators and victims of conflict related sexual violence. See section on “Possible biases” in Cohen and Nordås, “Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict,” 421.

⁵⁵ The extent to which this assumption holds, and is in fact the case, needs to be further studied.

⁵⁶ These gender needs and realities should be corroborated with evidence rather than assumed.

⁵⁷ This documentary, produced and co-directed by Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy (an Oscar award-winning filmmaker) profiles the experience of the all-female Bangladeshi unit deployed to Haiti on a UN peacekeeping mission. Information about the film is available at <http://www.peacekeepersdoc.com/>

⁵⁸ Carvajal, “Female Approach to Peacekeeping.”

⁵⁹ More general evidence about women working part-time suggests that this is associated with worse pay and career prospects. See Kim A. Weeden et. al. “Long Work Hours, Part-Time Work, and Trends in the Gender Gap in Pay, the Motherhood Wage Penalty, and the Fatherhood Wage Premium,” *The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences*, 2.4 (August 2016).

⁶⁰ Margaret Jenkins, “An All-Women Peacekeeping Group: Lessons from the Mindanao People’s Caucus,” in *Women, Religion and Peacebuilding: Illuminating the Unseen*, ed. Susan Hayward and Katherine Marshall (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2015).

⁶¹ See Footnote 2 of this paper for more background.

⁶² See Megan MacKenzie, “Let Women Fight: Ending the U.S. Military’s Female Combat Ban,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 23, 2013.