



# Explaining Trends in the Frequency of Gender Provisions in Peace Agreements, 1990–2019

AGATHE CHRISTIEN AND TURKAN MUKHTAROVA

### **Authors**

Agathe Christien (2019/20 Hillary Rodham Clinton Research Fellow, GIWPS) and  
Turkan Mukhtarova (2019/20 Bank of America Women and the Economy Fellow, GIWPS)

### **Expert Advisers**

The authors are grateful to Amb. Melanne Vermeer (Executive Director, GIWPS), Dr. Jeni Klugman (Managing Director, GIWPS), Dr. Robert Nagel (Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, GIWPS), and Dr. Jessica Smith (Research and Policy Manager, GIWPS) for their valuable insights and subject-matter expertise, and to Dr. Jacqui True (Director, Monash Gender, Peace and Security Centre), Dr. Kevin McNicholl (Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Edinburgh), and Dr. Miriam Anderson (Associate Professor, Ryerson University) for serving as external reviewers of this report and providing valuable insights.

### **Acknowledgements**

The authors would like to thank GIWPS research assistants Emma Jouenne, Kate Fin, Bryan Haiwen Zou, Julia Maenza, and Liping Wang for their excellent research support. Many thanks to Sarah Rutherford and Evelyn Garrity for their management of production and outreach.

### **The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security**

Georgetown University's Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) seeks to promote a more stable, peaceful, and just world by focusing on the important role women play in preventing conflict and building peace, growing economies, and addressing global threats like climate change and violent extremism. We engage in rigorous research, host global convenings, advance strategic partnerships, and nurture the next generation of leaders. Housed within the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, the Institute is headed by the former U.S. Ambassador for Global Women's Issues, Melanne Vermeer.

### **© Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security 2020**

Suggested citation: Agathe Christien and Turkan Mukhtarova. 2020. Explaining trends in the frequency of gender provisions in peace agreements, 1990-2019. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS).

To contact the Institute or the authors of this study, email: [giwps@georgetown.edu](mailto:giwps@georgetown.edu).

Cover photo: © Sojoud Elgarrai/UNAMID. Women attend the Open Day Workshop on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in Malha, North Darfur, organized by UNAMID Gender Unit.  
Design: Jocelyn Soly

## CONTENTS

**1**  
List of Abbreviations

**2**  
Key Definitions

**3**  
Overview

**4**  
Introduction

**5**  
A Review of the Literature on Gender Provisions in Peace Accords

**9**  
Empirical Analysis

**16**  
Emerging Conclusions

**19**  
Appendices

**22**  
Bibliography

**25**  
References



---

## List of Abbreviations

---

<b>AME</b>	average marginal effects
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CSOs</b>	civil society organizations
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>IPU</b>	Inter-Parliamentary Union
<b>MENA</b>	Middle East and North Africa
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNSCR</b>	United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security 1325
<b>WBL</b>	The Women, Business, and the Law Index measures gender inequality in the law. The data set identifies barriers to women's economic participation and encourages the reform of discriminatory laws. World Bank, Women, Business and the Law 2020 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020), <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32639">https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32639</a>
<b>WPS</b>	Women, Peace, and Security
<b>PA-X</b>	The University of Edinburgh PA-X Peace Agreements Database provides a comprehensive data set of peace agreements from 1990 to end of 2019. University of Edinburgh, "PA-X Peace Agreements Database," accessed May 2020, <a href="http://www.peaceagreements.org">www.peaceagreements.org</a> .

## Key Definitions

**Armed conflict:** The use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Uppsala University, UCDP Definitions, s.v. “armed conflict,” accessed May 2020.

**Civil society organizations:** Nongovernmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life and express the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious, or philanthropic considerations. World Bank Civil Society Team, *Consultations with Civil Society: A Sourcebook* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007).

**Gender provisions:** Agreement provisions that include one or more references to women, girls, and/or gender. *PA-X Peace Agreements Database and Dataset Codebook* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2018), [www.peaceagreements.org/files/PA\\_X\\_codebook\\_Version1\\_Feb\\_20\\_20.pdf](http://www.peaceagreements.org/files/PA_X_codebook_Version1_Feb_20_20.pdf).

**Parties to the agreement:** Parties who directly sign the agreement, often the parties to the conflict and their regional allies. This was coded exactly as written in the original peace agreement. *PA-X Peace Agreements Database and Dataset Codebook* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2018), [www.peaceagreements.org/files/PA\\_X\\_codebook\\_Version1\\_Feb\\_20\\_20.pdf](http://www.peaceagreements.org/files/PA_X_codebook_Version1_Feb_20_20.pdf).

**Peace agreement:** A peace agreement refers to “formal, publicly available documents, produced after discussion with conflict protagonists and mutually agreed to by some or all of them, addressing conflict to end it.” *PA-X Peace Agreements Database and Dataset Codebook* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2018), [www.peaceagreements.org/files/PA\\_X\\_codebook\\_Version1\\_Feb\\_20\\_20.pdf](http://www.peaceagreements.org/files/PA_X_codebook_Version1_Feb_20_20.pdf).

**Third-party involvement:** When parties sign the peace agreement as third parties, such as mediators, observers, guarantors, or witnesses; these can be states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. *PA-X Peace Agreements Database and Dataset Codebook* (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2018), [www.peaceagreements.org/files/PA\\_X\\_codebook\\_Version1\\_Feb\\_20\\_20.pdf](http://www.peaceagreements.org/files/PA_X_codebook_Version1_Feb_20_20.pdf).

---

## Overview

---

The landmark United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (UNSCR 1325) calls for women's participation in all aspects of peace and security, including meaningful participation in peace processes and the adoption of a gender perspective in peace accords.

On the resolution's 20th anniversary, this paper investigates trends in the presence of gender provisions in peace agreements. We analyzed 352 peace agreements in 64 countries between 1990 and 2019 to see whether gender provisions were included and to identify which factors influence the likelihood of such provisions. Our key findings have important implications for advancing gender mainstreaming in peace processes.

### KEY FINDING 1

**Participatory processes and the democratization of peace negotiations is significantly associated with increases in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions.** When women are parties to the negotiations and civil society organizations (CSOs) are official third parties to the agreement, gender provisions are more likely. However, such participatory processes in peace negotiations remain far from the norm.

### KEY FINDING 2

**International involvement and mediation—especially by United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, other states, or regional organizations—has a significant impact on mainstreaming gender in peace settlements.** Although we did not find a statistically significant association between UN involvement as a third party and the adoption of gender provisions, states or regional organizations in official third-party roles—such as mediators, witnesses, and observers to the negotiations—is correlated with an increase in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions. The presence of UN Peacekeeping in conflict-affected countries was also found to be associated with an increase in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions.

### KEY FINDING 3

**Better scores on gender-equality indicators at the country level do not always guarantee that peace agreements will have gender provisions.** While increased female parliamentary representation is linked to an increased likelihood of adopting gender provisions, somewhat surprisingly equal rights and opportunities for women under the law is not.

### KEY FINDING 4

**Peace agreements that are ceasefire related are associated with a decline in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions.** Ceasefire agreements tend to focus on the cessation of hostilities between warring parties and are usually less comprehensive than framework agreements, which address more substantive issues such as women's rights.

## Introduction

Peace agreements are major milestones for countries transitioning from violent conflict. They signify the end (or at least the temporary cessation) of armed hostilities and present how the parties to the conflict attempt to build peace and post-conflict institutions. Peace accords can also function as a framework for recovery, reconciliation, constitutional reform, and the democratization process. The presence of gender provisions in peace accords—such as quotas for women in governance, measures to address conflict-related sexual violence, and women’s rights to own land—can shape women’s representation and participation in the post-conflict society and economy.

Increasing women’s participation in peace processes and promoting the adoption of a gender perspective in peace agreements are central components of the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS). This year marks the 20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, though progress on the implementation of the WPS Agenda has been slow and uneven across the globe. In the context of peace processes, women are still excluded from formal negotiating

**Increasing women’s participation in peace processes and promoting the adoption of a gender perspective in peace agreements are central components of the landmark UN Security Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security.**

tables. The number of peace agreements with gender provisions has also remained low, despite the goal of adopting a gender perspective when negotiating and implementing agreements.<sup>1</sup>

The good news is that there was a significant increase in the share of peace agreements with gender provisions, from below 10 percent in the 1990s to 45 percent in 2013. The bad news is that this was not sustained. The share has fallen since 2013, to a new low of 11 percent in 2018. In 2019, the share of agreements with gender provisions rebounded to 29 percent, but remained below the 2013 peak.

This report investigates these trends over time, using country-level data about the peace process and other factors. Our analysis looks at 352 peace agreements between 1990 and 2019 to determine the variables influencing the likelihood of gender provisions being adopted.

The structure of the paper is as follows: We begin with a brief review of the literature and present a conceptual framework to analyze factors that explain the adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements. Using the University of Edinburgh’s PA-X Peace Agreements Database, we analyze trends of gender provisions in peace agreements.<sup>2</sup> We then examine the relationship between the adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements and a set of explanatory variables. We conclude by discussing these research findings and outlining the policy implications for how to best advance gender mainstreaming in peace processes.

# A Review of the Literature on Gender Provisions in Peace Accords

Existing quantitative research into the presence of gender provisions in peace accords have examined three broad explanations: namely, the UN's role in mediation and international norm diffusion through UNSCR 1325, the democratization of peace processes through the inclusion of women and civil society, and conflict and country-level socioeconomic factors. We review the literature for each explanation below.

## The UN's role in mediation and international norm diffusion through UNSCR 1325

UNSCR 1325 calls for the participation of women in conflict resolution and peace-building. Its adoption in 2000 was foundational to an international normative framework—the WPS Agenda—which has mainstreamed a gender perspective into peace and security work (True 2016). UNSCR 1325 has since been used as an advocacy tool to advance gender equality and women's inclusion in peace and security processes. The rise in references to women in peace agreements between 2000 and 2010, from 11 to 27 percent, was taken to suggest that international bodies and norms were playing a decisive role in the adoption of gender provisions (Bell and O'Rourke 2010; Bell 2015).

The rise in gender provisions between the 1990s and the 2010s was more pronounced when the UN was signatory to the peace agreement (Bell and O'Rourke 2010, 954; Bell 2015). One way the UN can exert its influence in implementing UNSCR 1325 is as a third party to peace processes. A number of studies illustrate the UN's role in negotiations and in advocating for normative standards, such as those outlined in UNSCR 1325 (Bell and O'Rourke 2010; Bell 2015; McLeod 2014).

However, it is unclear to what extent the UN can influence the agreement text, and it has been argued that the successful adoption of a gender lens in peace agreements significantly depends on organizations other than the UN (Bell and O'Rourke 2010, 975).

## The democratization of peace processes

Other research shows that women's representation in parliament and civil society are important factors in the adoption of gender-responsive policy (Bashevkin 2014; Childs and Krook 2008; Htun and Weldon 2012). These factors can also play an important role in peace processes. Democratic inclusion and the democratization of the negotiations through the participation of women and CSOs have been found to boost the likelihood of adopting gender provisions in peace accords (True and Riveros-Morales 2019, 37).

Quantitative studies have found that women's participation in peace negotiations is significantly correlated with the likelihood of including gender provisions (True and

Riveros-Morales 2019, 23; Tengbjer Jobarteh 2019, 2; Aballe et al. 2020). This can be explained by women's ability to change the dynamics of the talks and channel the concerns and voices of the broader society to the negotiating table, thereby fostering democratic inclusion (Anderlini 2003; Paffenholz et al. 2016). Women's participation does not necessarily guarantee, however, that a higher number of issues related to women's rights and security will be addressed. This can be attributed to a variety of factors, including token representation and traditional gender norms. (Tengbjer Jobarteh 2019, 2).

There is evidence that peace agreements with female signatories are more durable, as measured in days without armed conflict from the signing of the agreement to the beginning of renewed fighting (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018, 994). While this analysis does not explicitly address gender provisions in peace agreements, it shows that agreements with female signatories have both a significantly higher number of provisions aimed at political reform and higher implementation rates (985). This was traced to the fact that female signatories tend to collaborate and build strong relationships with CSOs (which increases the legitimacy of the agreement), contribute context-sensitive knowledge, and support accord implementation at the local level (989; Prendergast and Plumb 2002). The number, scope, and extent to which agreement provisions are implemented have also been shown to be strong predictors of peace durability (Joshi and Quinn 2017).

**Quantitative studies have found that women's participation in peace negotiations is significantly correlated with the likelihood of including gender provisions.**

Democratizing peace processes necessitates participation of and consultations with CSOs, including women's groups (Paffenholz et al. 2016). Dayal and Christien (2020) found that 71 percent of all informal peace efforts between the 1990 and 2017 had apparent involve-

ment from women's groups, despite their exclusion in formal peace processes. This suggests that women play significant peacebuilding roles beyond the formal peace table, including by providing critical information to formal peace negotiators that can foster local ownership of the process. As described above, strong links between women's civil society and female signatories have a positive impact on women's direct participation in peace talks (Krause, Krause, and Branfors 2018, 985) and the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement with gender provisions (True and Riveros-Morales 2019, 23). Paffenholz et al. (2016, 5) also showed that women's groups have substantially contributed to peacemaking and constitution negotiations in various ways, including direct participation at the peace table and inclusive commissions. Participatory processes that include CSOs, especially women-led organizations, are particularly critical in achieving peace agreements with gender provisions, because they bring different perspectives to issues discussed in peace talks and voice local concerns that can lead to the inclusion of such provisions.

Existing literature on women's political inclusion suggests that women in leadership positions could also influence the adoption of a gender lens in policy making (Bashevkin 2014; Htun and Weldon 2012). This has implications in the context of peace processes. For example, True and Riveros-Morales (2019, 23) found that the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments was positively correlated to the likelihood of adopting gender provisions in peace agreements. The higher women's share in parliament, the more female legislators can articulate their diverse experiences of war and visions of peace (32).

## Conflict-related and socioeconomic factors

This set of factors covers a broad range of conflict and country-level variables. Research has shown that conflict-related and socioeconomic factors—such as conflict duration (Anderson 2016; McLeod 2014), military expenditure (True and Riveros-Morales 2019), agreement type and peace-process stage (Bell 2015), and women’s well-being in the country (True and Riveros-Morales 2019)—can influence the presence of gender provisions in peace accords.

**Conflict duration.** Anderson (2016) and McLeod (2014) have found that women’s rights are more likely to appear in peace agreements following prolonged conflicts. This has been traced to more effective women’s advocacy over time and more profound societal rupture. Changes in gender norms are more likely to occur in protracted conflicts, as women take on new roles in the economy and become active agents for peace (Anderson 2016, 2; Hughes and Tripp 2015).

**Military expenditure.** Higher military expenditure as a percentage of GDP has been found to reduce the likelihood of adopting gender provisions in the peace agreement (True and Riveros-Morales 2019). This aligns with Domingo et al. (2015), who found that the militarized nature of peace processes was a significant obstacle to women’s participation.

**Agreement type and peace-process stage.** Agreements can be reached at different stages of peace processes. These stages include pre-negotiation (to get parties to the point of negotiating), framework agreements (to address substantive issues to solve the conflict), implementation, and ceasefires (PA-X; Bell 2015). Bell (2015, 15) found that framework agreements are more likely to include a reference to women than other types of agreements. Lee-Koo and True (2018, 5) also found that comprehensive agreements contained more substantive gender provisions than ceasefires, preliminary agreements, and nonbinding agreements. However, these studies do not systematically analyze the impact of other types of agreements and peace-process stages on the likelihood of adopting gender provisions. We use Bell (2015) and the PA-X database’s disaggregation of agreement stage in our analysis to further explore the relationship between different stages and the adoption of gender provisions (see Appendix 1).

**Women’s well-being in the country.** Existing literature is mixed on whether greater gender equality at the country level affects the onset of negotiations and the adoption of gender provisions in negotiated settlements. We would expect to see countries with a better ranking in women’s well-being and gender equality indices to adopt gender provisions in peace accords. For example, one study by Nagel (2020) found that countries with more patriarchal gender relations and greater women’s exclusion from public life are less likely to engage in negotiations to solve intrastate conflicts. Although the study does not explicitly analyze the adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements, its findings suggest that there are conditional effects. For example, countries with greater levels of women’s exclusion might be less likely to have peace agreements because they are less likely to negotiate in the first place—and if they reach an agreement, they would be even less likely to include gender provisions.

However, a study by True and Riveros-Morales (2019) found that indicators of women's well-being have mixed effects on the likelihood of adopting gender provisions. For example, high fertility rates, which are generally associated with less gender equality in the country, were associated with a lower likelihood of adopting gender provisions (34), but so were high female tertiary-school enrollment and increases in the Women's Political Empowerment Index. This finding can partly be explained by the fact that low education levels, particularly among women, might drive more attention to women's rights and well-being among negotiators and stakeholders.

In sum, the evidence to date suggests that the UN's involvement in peace negotiations, the democratization of the process through women's and CSOs' participation, and country-level socioeconomic factors all have statistically significant associations with the likelihood of adopting gender provisions in peace agreements.

**Our analysis adds to this evidence by:**

- ① covering a more extensive time period (1990–2019);
- ② further investigating the role of regional actors such as the African Union (AU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU) in the adoption of gender provisions;
- ③ accounting for the presence of active UN Peacekeeping in conflict-affected countries and how it might affect the likelihood of adopting gender provisions;<sup>3</sup> and
- ④ analyzing how domestic gender-equality indicators might influence the adoption of gender provisions.

Our investigation, like previous studies, cannot rigorously establish causality between gender provisions and a set of tested variables. That being said, through the inclusion of additional variables, we can control for potential confounding factors. By accounting for these confounding variables and their independent and combined effects, we can ensure that the observed relationship is not purely correlational. However, to establish causality more strictly would require in-depth case-study research.

---

## Empirical Analysis

---

### Summary of trends

We investigate a sample of 352 peace agreements<sup>4</sup> in 64 countries reached in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2013, 2018, and 2019. We chose five-year intervals between 1990 and 2010 to include 1995, the year of the Beijing conference,<sup>5</sup> and 2000, the year UNSCR 1325 was adopted, as potentially pivotal moments. We include 2013 and 2018 because they constitute a peak and a recent low, respectively. To provide the most up-to-date figures, we also include 2019.

Coding of the variables and full descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. A summary of trends is outlined below.

First, the share of peace agreements with gender provisions<sup>6</sup> remains short of the UNSCR 1325 goal, which advocates adopting a gender perspective when negotiating and implementing peace agreements. Our analysis revealed that references to women, girls, and/or gender increased around fivefold between 1990 and 2013—yet, in 2018, only seven out of 62 peace agreements had any references to women, girls, and/or gender. In 2019, the share of agreements with gender provisions rebounded (Box 1), but remained below the 2013 peak.

Second, the share of official, third-party involvement by states or regional organizations composed of member states—such as the AU, the EU, and the OSCE—was generally higher than involvement by the UN and CSOs. Between 2013 and 2018, there was a sharp decline of 40 percentage points in the share of involvement

---

### BOX 1


## What Characterized the Peace Agreements Reached in 2019?

- Twenty-nine percent of peace agreements reached in 2019 have gender provisions. These agreements were part of the Intra-Afghan Peace Conference, Sudan's political transition, and local peace processes in the Central African Republic and Mali. Specific gender provisions included the protection of women's political, socioeconomic, and educational rights, the parties' commitment to cease hostilities and prevent gender-based violence, and the appointment of female representatives in agreement-monitoring committees.
- Women were parties to 41 percent of the 2019 peace agreements—a major improvement on the two preceding years in the sample.
- Half of the 2019 agreements have active UN Peacekeeping presence, as do 80 percent of those with gender provisions.

by states and regional organizations as third parties. Although we see a sudden increase to 41 percent in the following year (2019), it remains lower compared to 2010 (48 percent) and 2013 (52 percent). The involvement of civil-society actors as third parties also has remained low over the entire period (Figure 1).

Third, between 2010 and 2019, we see a decline of ten percentage points in the share of female parliamentary representation among countries listed in our sample. Fourth, since 2005, at least 30 percent of all peace agreements were signed in Africa. We also see a substantial rise in peace agreements aiming to resolve conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) after 2013, representing 52 percent of the sample in 2018 and 29 percent in 2019.

**Figure 1: Share of Peace Agreements with Gender Provisions and Third-Party Involvement in Peace Negotiations, 1990–2019**



**Note:** Figure 1 shows the summary statistics of peace agreements with gender provisions between 1990 and 2019 and trends of third-party involvement in peace negotiations as mediators, witnesses, or observers.

Given the evident variance in peace agreements—such as the type of agreements, regional distribution, and parties involved—we now turn to statistical analysis, using data from the PA-X database, to investigate these trends in greater depth.

### Logit analysis: Model

Given the binary nature of the dependent variable (adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements), we used a logistic regression (logit) model to investigate its quantitative relationship with a set of explanatory factors. Explanatory variables include conflict- and negotiation-related factors (e.g., women listed as parties to the agreement, the presence of a UN Peacekeeping operation) and socioeconomic characteristics of the country (e.g., female parliamentary participation, Women, Business, and the Law [WBL] Index ranking, and log of GDP [PPP] per capita [2011 USD]).<sup>7</sup> We also included the year that each peace agreement was signed as a control variable. Table 1 shows the full set of variables presented in the logit analysis.

Some of the variables summarized in the previous section and discussed in the literature review are not included in the final analysis due to sample-size considerations (e.g., women as third parties, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and conflict duration).<sup>8</sup> However, in all preliminary investigations and robustness checks, none of those variables were found to be statistically significant.<sup>9</sup>

**Table 1: Independent Variables Used in the Logit Analysis**

<b>Women as parties</b>	Evidence of one or more women listed among the parties who directly signed the peace agreement, often the parties to the conflict or their regional allies. Sources: PA-X database and other case-specific primary or secondary documents with evidence of women taking part in negotiating groups.
<b>The UN as third party</b>	Evidence of UN bodies or representatives as third parties to the peace agreement (mediators, witnesses, or observers). Source: PA-X database
<b>States or regional organizations composed of member states as third parties</b>	Evidence of states or regional organizations composed of member states as third parties to the peace agreement (mediators, witnesses, or observers). Source: PA-X database
<b>Civil society organizations as third parties</b>	Evidence of CSOs as third parties to the peace agreement (mediators, witnesses, or observers). Source: PA-X database
<b>Previous agreement as part of the same peace process</b>	Evidence of previous agreements reached as part of the same peace process. Source: PA-X database
<b>UN Peacekeeping</b>	Evidence of a UN Peacekeeping operation taking place in the conflict-affected country when the agreement was reached. Source: UN Peacekeeping
<b>Agreement year</b>	Year when the peace agreement was signed. Source: PA-X database
<b>Agreement type: Ceasefire</b>	An agreement that provides a ceasefire or demobilization, or an agreement that is purely providing a monitoring arrangement or extension. Source: PA-X database
<b>Female parliamentary representation (0-100 percent)</b>	The percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber held by women. Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
<b>Women, Business, and the Law Index Score (0-100)</b>	The WBL Index measures gender inequality in the law. The data set identifies barriers to women’s economic participation and encourages the reform of discriminatory laws. Source: World Bank

The final table shows the impact of ceasefire agreements on the likelihood of adopting gender provisions. We did not include other agreement types, due to high collinearity. However, in all preliminary analyses, none of the other types (e.g., framework agreements, renewal, or implementation agreements) were found to be statistically significant.

Furthermore, none of the regional dummies were found to be statistically significant in preliminary analyses. We chose not to include them in the model because of specification-bias considerations. The full set of variables tested in preliminary analysis can be found in Appendix 1. The final logit model is using 246 peace agreements.

### Logit analysis: Findings

We are using the marginal effects to interpret the results of the logistic model because we are interested in effects in the probability scale, but coefficients are estimated in the log-odds scale (Norton et al. 2018). The average marginal effects show the change in probability with a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable and are less sensitive to changes in the specification.

**Table 2: Factors Influencing the Presence of Gender Provisions in Peace Agreements, 1990–2019**

Variables	Average Marginal Effects
Women as parties	0.219*** (0.0486)
UN Peacekeeping	0.190*** (0.0574)
UN as third party	0.00380 (0.0621)
Previous agreements as part of same peace process	-0.0585 (0.0515)
CSOs as third parties	0.126** (0.0630)
States or regional organizations as third parties	0.124*** (0.0474)
Agreement stage: Ceasefire	-0.136* (0.0744)
Log of GDP per capita, PPP (2011 USD)	0.00957 (0.0276)
Female parliamentary representation (0-100%)	0.00735** (0.00292)
Women, Business, and the Law Index (0-100)	-0.00413*** (0.00146)
Agreement year	0.000297 (0.00261)
Observations	246

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 2 shows the average marginal effects. Full logit findings can be found in Appendix 3. All the results summarized below are statistically significant and follow in order of relative importance.

### KEY FINDING 1

**Participatory processes and the democratization of peace negotiations is significantly associated with increases in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions.** We find that women’s participation as parties to the negotiations is associated with a 22-percentage-point increase in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions. The presence of CSOs as official third parties is also associated with a 13-percentage-point rise in the probability of adopting gender provisions.

### KEY FINDING 2

**International involvement and mediation—especially by UN peacekeepers, other states, or regional organizations—has a significant impact on mainstreaming gender in peace settlements.** Results show that official third-party participation in the negotiations—as mediators, witnesses, and observers—by states or regional organizations is associated with a 12-percentage-point increase in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions. A UN Peacekeeping presence in the conflict-affected country is also found to be linked to a 19-percentage-point increase.

### KEY FINDING 3

**Better scores on gender-equality indicators at the country level do not always guarantee that peace agreements will have gender provisions.** A one-percentage-point increase in parliamentary representation of women is associated with an increase in the probability of adopting gender provisions by 0.7 percentage points. However, one score increase in the WBL Index is associated with a 0.4-percentage-point decline in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions.

### KEY FINDING 4

**Peace agreements that are ceasefire related are associated with a decline in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions.** We find that if an agreement is a ceasefire, the probability of adopting gender provisions declines by 14 percentage points.

To investigate whether our results are robust to changes in the specification and assess the sensitivity of our findings, we ran a series of regressions. We looked into the signs of the coefficients (whether the association is positive or negative) and their statistical significance. Overall, findings remained consistent across all combinations of explanatory variables used in the model (see Appendix 4 for the full set of results).<sup>10</sup>

## Logit analysis: Discussion of the findings

In line with earlier analyses, our findings suggest that international involvement and mediation in peace processes is associated with a higher likelihood of gender provisions in the peace agreement. We further contribute to the literature on international mediation through two new findings.

First, while official UN involvement as a third party is not statistically significant in the analysis, a third-party role by states or regional organizations—such as the AU and the OSCE—is associated with an increase in the likelihood of adopting



*South Sudan's President Salva Kiir (seated), flanked by Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta (L) and Ethiopia's Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn (2nd L), signs a peace agreement in South Sudan's capital Juba, August 26, 2015.*  
© REUTERS / Alamy Stock Photo

gender provisions. The effectiveness of third-party involvement in peace processes depends on the degree of power and interest that the intervener has over the process and outcome of negotiations (Fisher 2001). States and regional organizations might have more leverage to influence the agreement text.

Second, we found that the presence of UN Peacekeeping in the conflict-affected country is associated with a higher likelihood of adopting gender provisions. Peacekeeping mandates have increasingly focused on conflict transformation and stabilization, including through conflict mediation. UN peacekeepers are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and activities (Karlsrud and da Costa 2012; United Nations 2012). This finding confirms that UN Peacekeeping missions can positively support the implementation of the WPS Agenda (Kreft 2017) and that their participation in peacebuilding activities might have an impact on mainstreaming gender in peace negotiations. However, it is important to note that we cannot identify the underlying causal mechanism. In our analysis, we are unable to separate the effect of UN peacekeepers' presence in a country on peace processes from potential confounding effects associated with where UN peacekeepers are deployed.

One surprising finding is that better gender equality in laws and regulations at the country level is not necessarily correlated with an increase in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions in peace agreements. While women's parliamentary

representation is associated with an increase, higher ranking in the WBL Index is not. Countries with lower levels of gender equality in the law might receive greater attention from international and local stakeholders, which can lead to greater advocacy for women's rights and inclusion in peace accords (True and Riveros-Morales 2019). Explicit gender discrimination in law can be seen as a priority issue to address in peace negotiations and the outcome agreement.

**Better gender equality in laws and regulations at the country level is not necessarily correlated with an increase in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions in peace agreements.**

Our analysis also confirms earlier findings that democratic inclusion is associated with increases in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions in the peace agreement (Anderlini 2003; True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Tengbjer Jobarteh 2019; Aballe et al. 2020). Both women (as parties to the negotiations) and CSOs (as third parties) were found to be positively correlated with adopting gender provisions. The more participatory and inclusive peace efforts are, the more likely that the peace agreement will contain gender provisions. The year 2018 had an unusually low number of women as parties to negotiations, which may help explain why few peace agreements had gender provisions.

While most of the agreement types we checked<sup>11</sup> were not statistically significant, ceasefire agreements are found to be associated with a decline in the likelihood of adopting gender provisions. Ceasefire agreements commonly focus on the cessation of hostilities between warring parties, prohibiting acts, and establishing de-escalation and confidence-building measures, such as detainee exchanges (Olcay 2020). They tend to be less comprehensive than framework agreements and address fewer substantive issues, such as gender and women's rights. This could explain why ceasefires negatively correlate with the likelihood of adopting gender provisions. It also could explain why 2018—the year with the highest number of ceasefires—was particularly low in terms of gender provisions. However, ceasefire agreements should include gender provisions because women peacebuilders on the front lines are usually among the first to call for such an agreement, such as in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 2020). Women also play major roles in armed groups; in humanitarian relief; in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes, such as in Colombia (O'Neill 2015); and in advocating for the release of the detained and the disappeared, such as in Syria (Nassar 2015). Women's views and needs should therefore be reflected in ceasefire agreements.

## Emerging Conclusions

The anniversaries of UNSCR 1325 and the Beijing Platform for Action have sparked discussions about the achievements and remaining gaps in advancing women's rights and gender equality. In the context of peace processes, women remain excluded from official negotiations and many peace accords lack gender provisions, which can include the protection of women's rights, the adoption of gender-inclusion mechanisms, the creation of institutions for women, and the inclusion of measures to prosecute perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence, among other things. To further inform the implementation of the WPS Agenda, this study investigates factors that have contributed to the adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements between 1990 and 2019.

The empirical findings suggest that the democratization of peace processes through greater participation by women and CSOs, third-party involvement by states and regional organizations, the presence of UN Peacekeeping in the conflict-affected country, and women's parliamentary representation are significantly associated with the likelihood of adopting gender provisions in negotiated settlements.

### **The main implications that emerge suggest the following:**

- ① First, there are still too few women among parties and third-party delegations to peace talks, and they are often unable to influence the outcome of negotiations and the agreement text. Democratizing peace processes includes creating inclusive spaces where women can effectively contribute alongside male negotiators and mediators, at the same peace table and not only in separate gender-expert groups.<sup>12</sup> Participatory processes also include participation from civil-society actors in inclusive negotiating spaces to localize agreement provisions.
- ② Second, the lack of gender sensitivity in ceasefire agreements suggests that there is a need to center women and gender in ceasefires. Lasting ceasefires require women's effective participation in the design, management, negotiation, and monitoring of the agreement (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 2020). This is particularly critical in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, during which women peacebuilders have played a critical role in calling for a global ceasefire and addressing humanitarian, health, and sanitary needs. Adopting gender provisions in ceasefire agreements can contribute to lasting peace and security.
- ③ Third, the importance of third-party involvement by states or regional organizations in the adoption of gender provisions helps delineate a more comprehensive landscape of international mediation and involvement in peace negotiations. It also shows that these regional organizations are committed to gender mainstreaming in peace processes.

- ④ The finding that better levels of women’s well-being and empowerment in a country are not associated with gender provisions in peace accords reminds us that sustained efforts are required to adopt a gender perspective in peace processes, regardless of country-level indicators of gender equality.

Looking ahead, there are multiple avenues for further research. For example, it would be useful to disaggregate the third-party role to examine mediators, witnesses, and observers and get a more nuanced account of third-party support. It would also be interesting to analyze the nature and extent of UN Peacekeeping’s role in pushing for mainstreaming gender in peace negotiations. Furthermore, a qualitative analysis of the gender provisions themselves, and whether they were implemented, would provide insights into the wide spectrum of gender provisions—from vague promises and mentions of women’s rights to detailed commitments such as inclusion mechanisms. This would enrich our understanding about the nature and effectiveness of these provisions to advance women’s peace and security. Similarly, it is worthwhile to analyze the extent and strength of gender-inclusive language in peace accords. This could entail, for example, comparing the placement and number of gender-related provisions to the placement and number of other provisions in the peace agreement.

At the 20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, the limited progress regarding women’s participation in formal peace processes and the inclusion of a gender perspective in peace agreements warrants vigilance. Further research is needed to analyze how, and by which mechanisms, the actors and variables described above play a role in the adoption and implementation of gender provisions.

## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Manual Coding of the Variables Tested in the Analysis

Dependent Variables	
Gender provisions	Presence of references to women, girls, and gender in the peace agreement. Source: PA-X Peace Agreements Database.
Independent Variables	
Region	The conflict occurs in: MENA (No=0; Yes=1), Africa (excluding MENA) (Yes=1), Asia and Pacific (Yes=1), Europe and Eurasia (Yes=1), Americas (Yes=1), Cross-regional (Yes=1). Source: PA-X Peace Agreements Database.
Conflict duration until an agreement was reached	Conflict duration until agreement was reached: 0-5 years (Yes=1), 6-10 years (Yes=1), 11-15 years (Yes=1), +16 years (Yes=1). Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program.
Agreement type	Types: Pre-negotiation (Yes=1), Framework/Substantive-partial (Yes=1), Framework/Substantive-comprehensive (Yes=1), Implementation/re-negotiation (Yes=1), Renewal (Yes=1), Cease-fire related (Yes=1), Other (Yes=1). Source: Bell (2015), PA-X Peace Agreements Database.
Previous agreement as part of the same peace process	Evidence of previous agreements reached as part of the same peace process (Yes=1). Source PA-X Peace Agreements Database.
Women as parties	Evidence of one or more women listed among the parties who directly signed the peace agreement, often the parties to the conflict or their regional allies (Yes=1). Sources: PA-X Peace Agreements Database and other case-specific primary or secondary documents.
Women as third parties	Evidence of one or more women listed among the third parties to the peace agreement, including witnesses, mediators, and observers (Yes=1). Sources: PA-X Peace Agreements Database and other case-specific primary or secondary documents.
UN as third party	Evidence of UN bodies or representatives listed as third parties (Yes=1). Source: PA-X Peace Agreements Database.
States or regional organizations composed of member states as third parties	Evidence of states or regional organizations composed of member states as third parties (Yes=1). Source: PA-X Peace Agreements Database.
Civil society organizations or actors as third parties	Evidence of civil society actors or organizations as third parties (Yes=1). Source: PA-X Peace Agreements Database.
UN Peacekeeping	Evidence of UN Peacekeeping operation taking place when the agreement was reached (Yes=1). Sources: United Nations Peacekeeping.
Female parliamentary representation (0-100 %)	The percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber held by women (0-100%). Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union
Women, Business, and the Law Index (0-100)	The WBL Index measures legal differences between men's and women's access to economic opportunities (0-100). Source: World Bank
GDP per capita, PPP (2011 USD)	GDP per capita (PPP) is per capita gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity.
Agreement year	Year when the peace agreement was signed.

## Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics, 1990–2019

Variables	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2013	2018	2019
Women as parties (% of share)	17	18	27	14	10	22	13	41
UN Peacekeeping (% of share)	2	42	12	27	24	33	24	47
UN as third party (% of share)	16	17	15	7	15	7	8	24
Previous agreements (% of share)	41	58	41	60	61	55	42	65
CSOs as third parties (% of share)	23	6	19	10	3	7	12	12
States or regional organizations as third parties (% of share)	14	45	32	33	48	52	11	41
<b>Conflict duration until agreement reached (% of share)</b>								
(0-5 years)	32	61	7	23	14	26	16	41
(6-10 years)	9	6	27	7	28	10	64	47
(11-15 years)	27	5	3	13	10	7	2	
(16+ years)	32	28	63	57	48	57	18	12
<b>Region (% of share)</b>								
MENA	5	17	3	17	6	7	52	29
Europe and Eurasia		54	19	3	18	7	3	18
Asia and Pacific	9	12	39	43	27	33	6	6
Americas	45	11	25		3	3		
Africa (excl. MENA)	36	5	14	30	43	50	36	47
Cross-regional	5	1		7	3		3	
<b>Agreement type (% of share)</b>								
Pre-negotiation/process	41	32	63	17	27	14	19	6
Framework/substantive-partial	20	25	12	33	27	29	24	41
Framework/substantive-comprehensive	5	5	5	23	3	7	10	12
Implementation/renegotiation	12	17	12	17	25	29	11	12
Renewal	2	1		3	3		3	12
Ceasefire related	20	20	8	7	15	19	31	17
Other						2	2	
Female parliamentary representation (Mean)	7	9	10	13	22	17	15	12
Women, Business, and the Law Index (0-100) (Mean)	57	60	62	57	52	61	54	55
N=352	44	65	59	30	33	42	62	17

### Appendix 3: Logistic Regression Model Results

Having gender provisions	Coef.	St.Err.	t-value	p-value	[95% Conf	Interval]	Sig
Women as parties	1.857	0.457	=4.07	0.000	0.962	2.752	***
UN Peacekeeping	1.610	0.517	3.12	0.002	0.598	2.623	***
UN as third party	0.032	0.525	0.06	0.951	-0.997	1.061	
Previous agreements	-0.495	0.438	-1.13	0.258	-1.353	0.363	
CSOs as third parties	1.069	0.542	1.97	0.048	0.007	2.131	**
Member states as third parties	1.048	0.416	2.52	0.012	0.233	1.863	**
Stage: Ceasefire related	-1.150	0.639	-1.80	0.072	-2.402	0.103	*
Log of GDP per capita, PPP (2011 USD)	0.081	0.234	0.35	0.729	-0.378	0.540	
Female parliamentary representation	0.062	0.026	2.41	0.016	0.012	0.113	**
Women, Business, and the Law Index	-0.035	0.013	-2.69	0.007	-0.060	-0.010	***
Year	0.003	0.022	0.11	0.910	-0.041	0.046	
Constant	-7.137	44.517	-0.16	0.873	-94.388	80.114	
Mean dependent var		0.199		SD dependent var		0.400	
Pseudo r-squared		0.239		Number of obs		246.000	
Chi-square		58.659		Prob > chi2		0.000	
Akaike crit. (AIC)		210.983		Bayesian crit. (BIC)		253.047	

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Pr=.13

## Appendix 4: Robustness Analysis

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Core variables	Maximum	Minimum	Mean	Average Standard deviation	Percent Significance	Perc+	Perc-	Avg T
Women as parties	1.84	1.54	1.70	0.40	1	1	0	4.35
UN as third party	0.25	-0.23	0.06	0.48	0	0.5	0.5	0.27
CSOs as third parties	1.32	0.90	1.14	0.50	0.75	1	0	2.33
UN Peacekeeping	1.61	0.90	1.30	0.42	1	1	0	3.12
States or regional organizations as third parties	1.10	0.82	0.96	0.37	1	1	0	2.64
Stage: Ceasefire related	-0.75	-1.42	-1.06	0.58	0.25	0	1	1.83
Testing variables								
Female parliamentary representation	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.02	1	1	0	2.41
Women, Business, and the Law Index (0-100)	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	1	0	1	2.78
Agreement year	0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0	0.5	0.5	0.88
GDP per capita, PPP (2011 USD)	0.07	-0.13	-0.03	0.21	0	0.25	0.75	0.32

## Bibliography

- Aballe, Jillian, Emma Grant, Foteini Papagiotti, Dorie Reisman, and Nicole Smith. 2020. *Gender-Sensitive Provisions in Peace Agreements and Women's Political and Economic Inclusion Post-Conflict*. New York: Global Network of Women Peacebuilders.
- Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi. 2003. "The untapped resource: Women in peace negotiations." *Conflict Trends* 2003 (3): 18-22.
- Anderson, Miriam J. 2016. *Windows of Opportunity: How Women Seize Peace Negotiations for Political Change*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bashevkin, Sylvia. 2014. "Numerical and Policy Representation on the International Stage: Women Foreign Policy Leaders in Western Industrialised Systems." *International Political Science Review* 35 (4): 409-429.
- Bell, Christine. 2015. *Text and Context: Evaluating Peace Agreements for Their "Gender Perspective"*. New York: UN Women. [https://wps.unwomen.org/pdf/research/Bell\\_EN.pdf](https://wps.unwomen.org/pdf/research/Bell_EN.pdf).
- Bell, Christine, and Kevin McNicholl. 2019. "Principled Pragmatism and the 'Inclusion Project': Implementing a Gender Perspective in Peace Agreements." *Feminists@law* 9 (1).
- Bell, Christine, and Catherine O'Rourke. 2010. "Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and Their Agreements." *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 59, no. 4 (October): 941-980.
- Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. 2008. "Critical Mass Theory and Women's Political Representation." *Political Studies* 56, no. 3 (October): 725-736.
- Dayal, Anjali Kaushlesh, and Agathe Christien. 2020. "Women's Participation in Informal Peace Processes." *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 26 (1): 69-98.
- Domingo, Pilar, Rebecca Holmes, Tam O'neil, Nicola Jones, Kate Bird, Anna Larson, Elizabeth Presler-Marshall, and Craig Valters. 2015. "Women's voice and leadership in decision-making." London: ODI
- Fisher, Ronald J. 2001. "Methods of Third-Party Intervention." In *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, edited by Norbert Ropers, Martina Fischer, and Eric Manton. Berlin: Berghof Center for Conflict Management.

- Htun, Mala, and S. Laurel Weldon. 2012. "The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change: Combating Violence against Women in Global Perspective, 1975–2005." *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 3 (August): 548-569.
- Hughes, Melanie M., and Aili Mari Tripp. 2015. "Civil War and Trajectories of Change in Women's Political Representation in Africa, 1985–2010." *Social Forces* 93, no. 4 (June): 1513-1540.
- Joshi, Madhav, and Jason Michael Quinn. 2017. "Implementing the Peace: The Aggregate Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Peace Duration after Intrastate Armed Conflict." *British Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 4 (October): 869-892.
- Karlsrud, John, and Diana Felix da Costa. 2012. *Casting the Net Too Deep and Too Wide? UN Local Peacebuilding-Peacekeeping Nexus in South Sudan*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
- Krause, Jana, Werner Krause, and Piia Branfors. 2018. "Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace." *International Interactions* 44 (6): 985-1016.
- Kreft, Anne-Kathrin. 2017. "The Gender Mainstreaming Gap: Security Council Resolution 1325 and UN Peacekeeping Mandates." *International Peacekeeping* 24 (1): 132-158.
- Lee-Koo, Katrina, and True, Jacqui. 2018. *Toward Inclusive Peace: Mapping Gender-Sensitive Peace Agreements, 2000-2016*. Melbourne: Monash Gender, Peace and Security.
- McLeod, Laura. 2014. *Gender and Peace Settlements from a Quantitative Perspective: A Global Survey*. Manchester, UK: European Research Council and the University of Manchester.
- Nagel, Robert Ulrich. 2020. "Gendered Preferences: How Women's Inclusion in Society Shapes Negotiation Occurrence in Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Peace Research*, July 13, 2020.
- Nassar, Sema. 2015. *Detention of Women in Syria: A Weapon of War and Terror*. Copenhagen: Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network. [www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/321-emhrn-womenindetention-en-final.pdf](http://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/321-emhrn-womenindetention-en-final.pdf).
- Norton, Edward C., Bryan E. Dowd, and Matthew L. Maciejewski. 2018. "Odds ratios—current best practice and use." *Jama* 320, (1): 84-85.
- Olcay, Asli Ozcelik. 2020. "'Corona Ceasefires': An Opportunity for Negotiated Agreements?." *Just Security*, May 4, 2020. [www.justsecurity.org/69979/corona-ceasefires-an-opportunity-for-negotiated-agreements/](http://www.justsecurity.org/69979/corona-ceasefires-an-opportunity-for-negotiated-agreements/).

- O'Neill, Jacqueline. 2015. *Engaging Women in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR): Insights for Colombia*. Washington, DC: Inclusive Security. [www.inclusivesecurity.org/publication/engaging-women-in-disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-ddr-insights-for-colombia/](http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/publication/engaging-women-in-disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-ddr-insights-for-colombia/).
- Paffenholz, Thania, Nick Ross, Steven Dixon, Anna-Lena Schluchter, and Jacqui True. 2016. *Making Women Count—Not Just Counting Women: Assessing Women's Inclusion and Influence on Peace Negotiations*. Geneva: Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative and UN Women.
- Prendergast, John, and Emily Plumb. 2002. "Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to Peacebuilding." In *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Tengbjer Jobarteh, Isolde. 2019. "Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Inclusion of Gender Provisions." Independent thesis advanced level, Uppsala University.
- True, Jacqui. 2016. "Explaining the Global Diffusion of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda." *International Political Science Review* 37 (3): 307-323.
- True, Jacqui, and Yolanda Riveros-Morales. 2019. "Toward Inclusive Peace: Analyzing Gender-Sensitive Peace Agreements 2000–2016." *International Political Science Review* 40 (1): 23-40.
- United Nations. 2012. *Peace: Keep It. Build It*. New York: UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support.
- United Nations. 2017. *The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Addressing Local Conflicts*. New York: UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support. [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/20171003\\_local\\_conflict\\_web\\_0.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/20171003_local_conflict_web_0.pdf)
- United Nations Peacekeeping. "Terminology." Accessed May 2020. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology>.
- Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. 2020. *Centering Women, Peace and Security in Ceasefires*. [www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/FINAL%20WPS%20Ceasefire%20Brief.pdf](http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/FINAL%20WPS%20Ceasefire%20Brief.pdf).

-

---

## References

---

- 1 S UN Security Council, Resolution 1325, On Women, Peace, and Security, S/RES/1325, 3 (October 31, 2000), [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1325\(2000\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1325(2000)).
- 2 University of Edinburgh, "PA-X Peace Agreements Database," accessed May 2020, [www.peaceagreements.org](http://www.peaceagreements.org).
- 3 UN peacekeeping missions are critical actors in peace processes. UN mandates can be an explicit tool for gender mainstreaming (Kreft 2017) and have changed over time toward stabilization, conflict transformation, and mediation, such as in Mali and the Central African Republic (United Nations 2017).
- 4 See definition of gender provisions under Key Definitions, p. 3.
- 5 The 1995 Beijing conference led to the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which remains a progressive blueprint for advancing women's rights and gender equality.
- 6 See definition of gender provisions under Key Definitions, p. 3.
- 7 GDP [PPP] per capita [2011 USD]: Due to data unavailability, we used 2011 numbers instead of 2010 for Djibouti, 2016 numbers instead of 2019 for Sudan, and 2012 numbers instead of 2013 for Syria.
- 8 Although we coded 352 agreements manually from the PA-X database, the final sample size of the logit model is 246. Some of the data entries were left blank due to missing evidence of women as parties or third parties.
- 9 Core variables are the primary factors that we believe contribute to explaining the presence of gender provisions in peace agreements. Therefore, we chose to include them in all preliminary analysis.
- 10 The results for the variables (women as parties, CSOs as third parties, and the states or regional organizations as third parties) are highly robust. In all combinations, results are significant, and the signs of the coefficients do not change. Although the UN peacekeeping variable's coefficient does not change, it is only significant in half of the regressions. Since the sign does not change, we accept this result as robust. The UN as a third party to the peace agreement is the only variable where the coefficient switches sign depending on which independent variables are included in the model, but this variable was not statistically significant in any of the regressions. This finding aligns with our results.
- 11 The list includes pre-negotiation, framework/substantive (partial), framework/substantive (comprehensive), implementation/renegotiation, renewal, cease-fire related, and other. Coding can be found in Appendix 1.
- 12 Webinar on women in peace negotiations in MENA, Monash GPS, April 2020.



**GIWPS**

Georgetown Institute for  
Women, Peace and Security

[giwps.georgetown.edu](http://giwps.georgetown.edu)